FAQ'S: Frequently Asked Questions

LEUGENS, MYTHEN EN FEITEN OVER IRAK - MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT IRAQ

Iraqi Sanctions: Myth and Fact

by Jeff Lindemyer

President Bush says that the terrorists' motives were because they" hate freedom." There are several more plausible answers, key factors behind anti-American rage, a significant one being the sanctions against Iraq.

On August 6, 1990, immediately prior to the "Persian Gulf War," the United Nations levied sanctions against Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. In the ensuing eleven years, the sanctions have not changed. Over one million Iraqis lie dead as a direct result of the sanctions, over half of them children, and over four million Iraqis have fled the country in hope of a better life.  Quality of life has plummeted; the economy is in shambles, disease and malnutrition are commonplace, and even potable water has become scarce.

Yet Saddam Hussein remains dictator. My aim in this article is to debunk the most common myths surrounding the Iraqi sanctions.

SECRET MOTIVATIONS

Myth: "Sanctions are not intended to harm the people of Iraq." (U.S. State Department, March 2000)

Fact: Several United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) documents prove, in the words of one author, "beyond a doubt that, contrary to the Geneva Convention, the U.S. government intentionally used sanctions against Iraq to degrade the country's water supply after the Gulf War. The United States knew the cost that civilian Iraqis, mostly children, would pay, and it went ahead anyway." (The Progressive, August 2001)

One document entitled "Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities," dated January 22, 1991, is quite straightforward in how sanctions will prevent Iraq from supplying clean water to its citizens. Failing to secure equipment and chemicals, these items (which is nearly impossible to do under the sanctions), the documents adds, will result in a shortage of drinking water and could "lead to increased incidences, if not epidemics, of disease." (U.S. Department of Defense, January 1991)

The U.S. government was not only aware of the devastation of the sanctions, but was monitoring their progress. The first in a lengthy series of documents entitled "Disease Information" is a document whose heading reads "Subject: Effects of Bombing on Disease Occurrence in Baghdad." Another document cites a UNICEF/ WHO report that "the quantity  of potable water is less than five percent of the original supply," that "there are no operational water and sewage treatment plants," and that diarrhea and respiratory infections are on the rise. Almost as a sidenote, it adds, "Children particularly have been affected by these diseases." (US Dept. of Defense, March 1991).

OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM

Myth: "Thanks to the oil-for-food program, the people of Iraq, especially those in the north, are getting needed foods and medicines." (U.S. State Department, March 2000)

Fact: Former UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Denis Halliday, oversaw the oil-for-food program and believes otherwise. "The OFF program as conceived is completely inadequate. It was designed in fact not to resolve the situation, but to prevent further deterioration of both mortality rates and malnutrition. It has failed to do that; at best it has just about sustained the situation. It is grossly under-funded, and it has not even begun to address the dietary needs of the Iraqi people... And on top of that you have a medical sector which gobbles up the rest of the money to a great extent, so again we have not managed to provide the basic needs of the Iraqi people." (The Fire This Time, April 1999) Halliday resigned from his post in September 1998 in protest of the sanctions against Iraq. He had worked for the United Nations for 34 years.

Myth: "Iraqi obstruction of the oil-for-food program, not United Nations sanctions, is the primary reason the Iraqi people are suffering." (U.S. State Department, March 2000)

Fact: The UN sanctions were levied against Iraq in August 1990 and the program commenced in December 1996. It is therefore impossible to attribute the suffering of the Iraqi people to the obstruction of a program that did not exist until six years after the fact. The suffering of the Iraqi people preceded any possible interference.
Oil-for-food program or not, the plight of the Iraqi people, especially that of children, has been unconscionable. Since the onset of the sanctions, almost one-quarter of all infants are born underweight and the same number is malnourished (UN Report, March 1999). The situation doesn't get any better as they get older either, as 32percent of children under five are chronically malnourished, with the mortality rate increasing over six-fold to be among the highest in the world (UNICEF, November 1997 and WHO, March 1996) Stemming mainly from hunger and disease, the result is the death of 4,500 children under the age of 5 per month. (UNICEF, October 1996). That translates roughly to 150 children killed each and every day. In all, if pre-war trends in child mortality had continued through the 1990s, there would have been half a million fewer deaths of children under five in Iraq from 1991 to 1998 (UNICEF, August 1999).

Myth: "Iraq is mismanaging the oil-for-food program, either deliberately or through incompetence" (U.S. State Department, March 2000).

Fact: The U.S. State Department claims that there has been some improvement in the mortality rates in northern Iraq, where the UN controls distribution of food and medicine, and that this proves that Saddam Hussein is to blame for the crisis in southern and central Iraq. As Hans Van Sponeck, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, who took over after Halliday's resignation, has even noted, the claim of mismanagement is simply not true (The Fire This Time, April 1999).

Since the bombing of the "Persian Gulf War" was concentrated in southern Iraq, the destruction of civilian infrastructure is most severe there. Yet the oil-for-food program provides no funding for the distribution of food and medicine in southern and central Iraq. Southern and central Iraq also receives far less support per capita from the international community than northern Iraq. Comprising 85% of the population, southern and central Iraq benefits from only 11 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as opposed to the 34 NGOs benefiting northern Iraq (Education for Peace in Iraq Center).

Myth: "Holds on inappropriate contracts help prevent the diversion of oil-for-food goods to further Saddam's personal interests." (U.S. State Department, March 2000).

Fact: Requests for desperately needed equipment routinely get held up in the Security Council for months at a time. The delays have gotten so bad that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Office of the Iraq Program  Director Benon Sevan have written letters decrying the excessive holds placed on items ordered under the Program (Education for Peace in Iraq Center).
"Holds on contracts for the water and sanitation sector are a prime reason for the increases in sickness and death. Of the eighteen contracts, all but one hold was placed by the U.S. government. The contracts are for purification chemicals, chlorinators, chemical dosing pumps, water tankers, and other equipment... I urge you to weigh your decision against the disease and death that are the unavoidable result of not having safe drinking water and minimum levels of sanitation." (The Progressive, August 2001). Unfortunately for the people of Iraq, the letter was addressed to Madeline Albright the same person who stated that the death of over a half of a million children was "worth it." In 2001, U.S. diplomats blocked child vaccines for Iraq, including for diphtheria, typhoid, and tetanus. Over $3 billion worth of contracts remain on hold (Education for Peace in Iraq Center, August 2001).

Myth: "Saddam Hussein is hoarding both food and medical supplies from his people to evoke Western sympathy." (U.S. State Department, March 2000).

Fact: Allegations of "warehousing" of food and medicine were put to rest by former UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Hans Van Sponeck, who explained that low worker pay, lack of transportation, poor facilities, and low funding are responsible for the breakdowns in inventory and distribution systems. The bureaucracy of the oil-for-food program, such as contract delays and holds, also plays a substantial role. Sponeck, like his predecessor, Denis Halliday, resigned from his post in February 2000 in protest at the sanctions. Also like Halliday, Von Sponeck had worked for the United Nations for over 30 years. (The Fire This Time, April 1999).

Halliday concurs, saying that "there is no one person in the Ministry of Health or anywhere else in the Iraqi government who is deliberately trying to damage the health, or allowing children or others to die by deliberately not distributing medical supplies. That's just nonsense" (The Fire This Time, April 1999).

BOMBS AS SUPPLEMENTAL SANCTIONS

Myth: "Saddam Hussein's repression of the Iraqi people has not stopped" and therefore "lifting sanctions would offer the Iraqi people no relief from neglect at the hands of their government" (U.S. State Department, March 2000)

Fact: According to the State Department, "Saddam continues to attack coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones, which were established to prevent Saddam from attacking Kurdish and Shi'a civilians, in violation of UNSC Resolution 688 and 949" (U.S. State Department,  March 2000)

The constant bombing of the "no-fly zones" in Iraq by the United States and Britain, however, is not authorized under any UN resolution.

CONVENIENT JUSTIFICATION

The U.S. State Department claims that "Iraqi authorities routinely practice extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions throughout those parts of the country still under regime control. The total number of prisoners believed to have been executed since autumn 1997 exceeds 2,500" (U.S. State Department, March 2000). Former US Marine and UN Weapons Inspector in Iraq Scott Ritter says that Saddam Hussein is "a brutal dictator. He may torture to death 1,800 people a year. That is terrible and unacceptable. But we kill 6,000 a month" (FOR interview, June 1999).

Myth: Iraq "has not fully declared and destroyed its WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs" or complied with weapons inspections. Iraqi economic sanctions "prevent the Iraqi regime access to resources that it would use to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction" (U.S. State Department, March 2000)

Fact: The State Department fails to address its role in helping Iraq develop its weapons programs. "Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the government of Iraq, which was the government of the Ba'ath Party led by Saddam Hussein, was an ally of the United States. Iraq was a "recipient of massive amounts of weapons of mass destruction, most notably biological weapons stocks" (National Catholic Reporter, May 1999).
The truth is that Iraq has been, by and large, disarmed. Following the Gulf War, Iraq was forced into an unprecedented disarmament process and its military might has been considerably diminished by the work of UNSCOM. Chief Weapons Inspector Richard Butler said [in July 1998] that "if Iraqi disarmament were a five-lap race, we would be three-quarters of the way around the fifth and final lap." Iraq's neighbors have said that Iraq no longer poses any threat. Even an Israeli military analyst has said that "Iraq's biological weapons program was over-hyped"
(Education for Peace in Iraq Center).

As for UNSCOM inspections, the lack of success lies mainly with the United States government's hidden agenda. UNSCOM had eight years of virtually unrestricted inspections. But contrary to the UN goal of weapons inspections, the United States government has sought to use the inspections as intelligence gathering missions. Halliday states, "the CIA and others have owned up to what they did, in fact, that they used the UN as a cover for espionage, which is a very unfortunate thing and what, of course, the Iraqis had been saying for many years and the UN had denied for many years. They were right; we, obviously, were wrong" (The Fire This Time, April 1999).

Further evidence of this comes directly from former UN Weapons Inspector, Scott Ritter. "Fingers point at the United States primarily in using the weapons inspection process not so much as a vehicle for disarming Iraq, but rather as a vehicle for containing Saddam and for gathering information that could be used to remove Saddam. The US perverted the system; not the weapons inspectors" (FOR interview, June 1999). Ritter resigned from UNSCOM because of this perversion.

Myth: "Saddam retains the capability to inflict significant damage upon Iraq's neighbors and its own civilian population" and "Without sanctions, Saddam would be free to use his resources to rearm and make good on his threats against Kuwait and the region" (U.S. State Department, March 2000).

Fact: Raymond Zilinskas, UN Weapons Inspector in Iraq, states "Although it has been theoretically possible for the Iraqis to regain such weapons since 1991, the duplicity would have been risky and expensive, and the probability of discovery very high" (Chicago Tribune, February 1998). Scott Ritter, however, is more blunt. "When you ask the question, "Does Iraq possess militarily viable biological or chemical weapons?" the answer is a resounding "NO!" "Can Iraq produce today chemical weapons on a meaningful scale?" "NO!" It is "no" across the board. So from a qualitative standpoint, Iraq has been disarmed. Iraq today possess no meaningful weapons of mass destruction capability" (FOR interview, June 1999).

Myth: The United Nations levied the sanctions against Iraq, so the United States is not to blame.

Fact: Van Sponeck addresses his point head on. "The UN doesn't impose sanctions. It's the UN Security Council member governments who come together and impose sanctions... I don't see the distinction between US sanctions, in broad terms, and what is done and coming out of the Security Council of the UN. The leader in the discussion for the sanctions is the US side and they are the ones, together with the British, that have devised many of the special provisions that govern the implementation of the 986 [oil-for-food] program" (The Fire This Time, April 1999). Every few hours another child dies ... a child who knew nothing of the "Persian Gulf War," nothing of the oil-for-food program, and nothing of weapons inspections. The child only knew that she wanted to live. How many more parents must weep at their fallen children before we realize what we have done?
On that clear, blue-skied morning in the middle of September, something was taken than can never be recovered. Over 5,500 lives were lost and the illusion of invincibility was undeniably shattered forever. Planes fly overhead and we worry, threats of new attacks are commonplace, but worse of all, the feeling of utter helplessness is entirely pervasive, spreading to each and every individual in the western world. For most of America, September 11 was a once in a lifetime event, but for Iraq, September 11 comes every month.

Jeff Lindemyer is a student and journalist attending U. of California, Berkeley.

B - SEVEN  BIG LIES ABOUT IRAQ

                                                                 by Jon Basil Utley

UPDATE--AND NOW ANOTHER BIG ONE--THAT IRAQ IS A TERRORIST STATE & WAS INVOLVED IN THE 9/11 ATTACK ON AMERICA. 

ANSWER:Certain interests in America have mounted a vast campaign in conservative media to attack Iraq again.  See Georgie Anne Geyer column on lobby in Anti-Arab Advocates Risk U.S. Interests.  All they can point to is a single meeting between one hijacker and an Iraqi in Prague.  Saddam is an enemy of Islamic Fundamentalists. Iraqi women were among the most emancipated in the Moslem world.  You never see Saddam wearing a robe and shouting about a Holy War.  Many Arabs even argue that Iraq was set up to be destroyed and kept destitute, because it was the most secular, modern, technologically advanced, large nation in the Arab world.  Iraq has not been a supporter of "global terrorism," the term used by Rumsfeld for justifying attacks on more nations (NYTimes 12/19).  It does support the Palestinan terrorists against Israel's settlements on the West Bank.

ONE --IF WE DON'T BOMB IRAQ, SADDAM WILL USE HIS WMD AGAINST US OR HIS NEIGHBORS OR ISRAEL

ANSWER:  Saddam is rational.  He had these weapons during the First Gulf War and didn't because he feared our threats of consequences even when his nation was being decimated.  Israel has some 200 atomic bombs and an active biological and chemical weapons program.  It can well defend itself.  It has already threatened Iraq with their use if Iraq attacks with WMD.   Meanwhile Washington arms all Iraq's neighbors (except Iran), and Turkey bombs and invades Iraq at will.  Yet the pressure now in Congress to attack Iraq is based upon its unreal threat to Isreal. 

TWO--IT'S SADDAM'S FAULT THAT HALF A MILLION CHILDREN DIED SINCE THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE, SADDAM COULD FEED HIS PEOPLE IF HE CARED INSTEAD OF USING HIS MONEY TO BUY WEAPONS-- "More than one million Iraqis have died- 500,000 of them children-as a direct consequence of economic sanctions... As many as 12% of the children surveyed in Baghdad are wasted, 28% stunted and 29% underweight." --UN FAO, December 1995.  For details see Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children 1990-98.

ANSWER--Nearly all oil sales money has been allocated through United Nations inspectors, subject to over 35% reduction for reparations and UN expenses, and subject to Washington's veto and foot dragging--usually months for even the simplest decision. Washington has allowed food and medicine imports, but almost nothing else.  For nearly ten years it blockaded chlorine to sanitize the water and any equipment to rebuild the electricity grid, sanitation and irrigation facilities.  Even pencils for school children were prohibited. (A NY TIMES editorial 2/11/01 reports, "currently American diplomats are holding up billions of dollars of imports needed for civilian transportation, electric power generation...and even medical treatment").   Finally the Europeans rebelled at the cruelty and shamed Washington into allowing such imports, (NY Times 12/6/00).  However, at this date 12/2/01 about $1 billion of electric and other machinery has been held up for a year by Washington. Until oil prices increased last year, sales ran about $4 billion yearly minus about 35% withheld  by UN left 2.6 billion divided by 20 million population =  $130 per year per person = 36 cents per day per person for food, medicine.   Obviously Iraq needed to rebuild its agriculture and transport infrastructure to feed itself, but this was prevented by Washington.

Washington blockaded supplies to rebuild Iraq's bombed oil production and refining facilities since 10 years, although it went to war supposedly to assure oil supplies for the world.  Iraq is now also getting substantial monies through sales of smuggled oil, especially since the price of oil went up and the rest of the world tires of the American blockade.  No doubt some of this goes for weapons purchases. 

THREE  —  IF IRAQ ALLOWED INSPECTIONS FOR WMD (WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION), WASHINGTON WOULD REMOVE THE BLOCKADE.  IRAQ MUST PROVE THAT IT HAS NO WMD AND THAT IT WON'T MANUFACTURE ANY IN THE FUTURE.

ANSWER  There's No Connection Between Inspections and Sanctions on Iraq AND CONSEQUENTLY NO INCENTIVE FOR IRAQ TO COMPLY.    Equally no Nation can "prove" a negative, that it's not doing something.  Biological and chemical weapons can be made, "in a large closet which is all the space you need to mix deadly chemical weapons...... Chemical and biological weapons are the great equalizers against our atomic weapons." (TIME Everyman a Superpower, 11/24/97). 

Re inspections, REUTERS reported,  12/13/99,----"The (European) aim was to prevent the United States and Britain from imposing arms requirements that Iraq could not meet and thus keeping the sanctions in place for years to come." And FRANCE PRESSE 12/13/99, "French diplomats retorted that by insisting on full cooperation, the council would give the United States an excuse to refuse to suspend sanctions on the flimsiest grounds.”  Madeleine Albright declared in 1997: “We do not agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted.”  Clinton went one step further when he said, “sanctions will be there until the end of time, or as long as he [Saddam] lasts."  THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT REPUDIATED THESE STATEMENTS

Scott Ritter, former head of the U.N. arms inspection team in Iraq, on the NBC TODAY SHOW, 12/17/98, explained, "Washington perverted the U.N. weapons process by using it as a tool to justify military actions, falsely so. ... The U.S. was using the inspection process as a trigger for war." For details on how Iraq complied, e.g. 700 inspections by UN/US officials, and grew to  realize that Washington would prevent the sanctions from ever being lifted see Le Monde-Diplomatique

FLASH  Iraqi offers return of monitors in exchange for lifting blockade

 

FOUR --  IRAQ WOULDN'T LET THE UN/US MONITORS INSPECT POSSIBLE WMD PRODUCTION OR STORAGE SITES.  THAT'S WHY AMERICA STARTED BOMBING.

ANSWER:  Iraq did so from 1991 until 1998, but Washington still wouldn’t take off the trade blockade.  Scott Ritter, the former UNSCOM inspector,  told CNN on 2/18/01 "In terms of large-scale weapons of mass destruction programs, these had been fundamentally destroyed or dismantled by the weapons inspectors as early as 1996, so by 1998 we had under control the situation on the ground."

 Then in 1998 Washington made new demands, access to all government personnel files, the basis of its power structure.  UN weapons inspectors were still roaming Iraq.   They had not found anything for over three years.  Iraq saw that U.S. demands were just always increased with no hope of sanctions being lifted.  In 1998, the U.S. Government had also allocated millions of dollars to overthrow the Iraqi government, though such actions were a clear violation of international law.  The Iraqis complained that most of the UN inspectors were British and Americans, who were trying to overthrow their government, and determined that many were acting as spies, (Scott Ritter on CNN 1/5/02 said he had been working with Israeli intelligence from 1995-98) so they expelled the "inspectors".  The U.S. denied this and Clinton launched a new bombing campaign using information from the "spy UN inspectors" for bombing targets.  Later in 1998, the UN chief inspector, former Marine Corps intelligence officer Scott Ritter, published a book detailing the heavy spying conducted by the American "UN" inspectors, including hiding high-tech equipment to intercept Iraqi communications.

       

FIVE  --IT'S IRAQ'S FAULT THAT THE BLOCKADE CONTINUES.  AMERICA HAS NOTHING AGAINST IRAQ'S PEOPLE, ONLY AGAINST ITS GOVERNMENT.

ANSWER    Britain and Washington have introduced a "peace plan" demanding that Iraq must allow inspections, but would still be under the trade blockade. 

      Russia and France have introduced a plan (vetoed by Washington) allowing for immediate lifting of sanctions in return for continued, ongoing WMD inspections.  Washington has already often stated policy of no relief from blockade no matter what Iraq does, as long as Saddam stays in power.  This is typical Washington policy (denounced by former Pres. Jimmy Carter) of demanding rulers follow policies to get themselves killed or at least thrown out of power (and then tried for "war crimes") while Washington continues devastating the nations' civilians for years (Pat Buchanan speech) while nothing changes.      (For detailed discussion of resolution see CASI from Cambridge and IAC detailed analysis of UN Resolution)    

 

SIX --THE UNITED NATIONS ORDERED SANCTIONS AND WASHINGTON IS JUST ENFORCING THEM

 

ANSWER:  Most nations in the world want them lifted for non-military goods.  It is the U.S. veto that prevents lifting of the sanctions (United Press, 11/1/00)  Imposed in 1990 many nations argue that they were never intended to last for years and are one of the most brutal sanction regimes in modern history.   The crippling trade embargo is incompatible with the UN charter as well as UN conventions on human rights and the rights of the child (BBC News Online, 9/30/00). Unilaterally attacking Iraq is totally unconstitutional and illegal under United Nations Charter and Nuremberg Judgements.

 

SEVEN --SADDAM GASSED HIS OWN PEOPLE

ANSWER:   Atrocities are often the key substance of propaganda to get Americans to go to war.   Didn’t our government also do that at WACO? The C2 gas used by the FBI killed children who couldn’t fit into gas masks and then created an explosive mixture which triggered fire and immolation, (see super documentary, WACO, nominated for an Academy Award).   Saddam is a horrible dictator, no doubt, but now 300 times as many Iraqis are dead as those supposed killed by the gassing.

    To see how good natured Americans are lied to by our own government see, How Hill and Knowlton Public Relations "sold" the Iraq War).  For the First World War, it was stories that German soldiers ate Belgian babies.  For the Iraq war it was lies about babies being thrown out of incubators, "testified" to a Congressional Committee, with massive media coverage, by a "mystery" witness who later turned out to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti sheik’s ruling family who is Ambassador in Washington.  It was all lies. Then we were told there were aerial photographs of the Iraqi Army massed on Saudi Arabia’s border ready to attack. They were never released; they apparently were lies too. How do we know we weren't also lied to about the gassing?   See Jude Wanniski report for detailed questions about truth of the "gassing."

For more background and earlier questions about Iraq, please go to   http://iraqwar.org/talking-points.htm

 

CONCLUSION:  Look at the above and think how America is now hated.  No wonder many Arabs engage in suicide missions.    American military are so unpopular in Saudi Arabia that the government hides our Airmen away in desert bases to keep them out of sight from its citizenry. (A CNN reporter from TIME magazine years ago said that the greatest dream of glory for many young Saudis would be to die in battle killing Americans.  Such reports were very rare.  Now we know how true they were.    How the world sees us was reported by the WALL STREET JOURNAL'S European edition editor (2/24/98) "What came up most were charges of American hypocrisy. The US wants to bomb Iraq over its violations of UN directives, but won’t take any action against the Israelis for theirs (e.g. occupation of part of Lebanon and settlements in Palestine)."  WASHINGTON TIMES (10/9/01) columnist Bruce Fein put it another way,  "Other nations and peoples are more resentful of our pious hypocrisy than of Realpolitik bluntness."  

                No doubt America could "win" another war with Iraq.  But then what?  More death, more hatred, more enemies wanting vengeance.  Out of the billion plus Moslem world others would finally find new ways, perhaps biological, to hit us back.  And meanwhile we would live in constant fear of that day.

        If, instead, Washington showed justice and fairness in its policies, then it would not be creating sworn and desperate enemies who, in former Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's words, "define themselves as being Enemies of America."   The best security for Americans is not to make so many enemies (see Joseph Sobran column, How Many Enemies Do We Want?)

 

ADDENDUM  --Evidence from Kosovo of similar Washington tactics against civilians --Destruction of the Danube River bridges   also wrecked billions of dollars of trade setting back struggling Bulgaria, Rumania and all the Black Sea nations which use barge traffic for most heavy loads to Europe.

The BOSTON GLOBE (5/16/99) reported:

    "In planning the 1991 Persian Gulf War, US officers found a 12 bridges for the movement of Iraqi troops in and out of Kuwait. US planes bombed those bridges over and over, with little effect. So they bombed every bridge in Iraq, 160 in all, about two-thirds of them far from Kuwait.   After a while, all bridges were seen and treated equally. Similarly, now in Belgrade, it seems, all military agencies are seen and treated as if they were of equal importance. The Pentagon announced last week that three-quarters of the targets hit in this air war, 270 out of 380, have been 'strategic targets.' Only 110 have been directly connected to the soldiers and militias in Kosovo."

C) FAQ'S on CASI (Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq)      http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/guide/

What's the problem with Iraq? Are sanctions to blame? What is 'oil for food', and isn't it enough? Didn't the Security Council offer an "oil-for-food" arrangement in 1991? Isn't Security Council Resolution 1284 the solution? Isn't the problem that the Iraqi regime doesn’t distribute the supplies it receives? Why is Northern Iraq in a better shape than the areas under the control of the Iraqi government? What is the UN Compensation Commission? Will "smart sanctions" alleviate the humanitarian problem in Iraq? Why is 'oil for food' suffering a funding crisis? What do other people say about sanctions? What part does the US have in the sanctions? Will "smart sanctions" alleviate the humanitarian problem in Iraq? Isn't the problem that Iraq doesn't distribute the supplies that it receives? Do you have a list of incidents when coalition forces bombed Iraq while patrolling the 'no-fly zones'? Does Iraq have weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? What is Phase V? Isn't it all Saddam's fault? What does UNICEF say about sanctions? How many children have died because of sanctions? How are sanctions on Iraq different from those that were placed on South Africa? What is the goal of the sanctions on Iraq? How are the sanctions supposed to achieve their goals? From whence come the food and other humanitarian goods which are given to Iraq in exchange for oil? Is it surplus? Is it genetically modified? And to whom does the oil go? And which oil companies are drilling it? Also, which oil companies are providing the oil industry infrastructure aid to Iraq? Doesn't Iraq earn all that it needs through its oil sales? How many people died in, or as a result of, the Gulf War? Is it true that a US ambassador knew of the potential invasion of Kuwait and turned a blind eye? Would sanctions be lifted if Iraq agreed to weapons inspections? Do UNICEF's mortality figures for Iraq originate from the Iraqi government? Is child malnutrition still a problem in Iraq?

D) FAQ'S on VIW-UK (Voices in the Wilderness)

http://www.viwuk.freeserve.co.uk/library/faq.html

1) Sanctions have little or nothing to do with the current crisis.
According to UNICEF UK economic sanctions have been an 'important factor' in the deaths of half a million Iraqi children. Save the Children Fund UK have called the sanctions 'a silent war against Iraq's children.'

Last year, one of the world's leading human rights NGO's, Human Rights Watch - who certainly have no love for Saddam Hussein - admonished the US Government to 'stop pretending that the sanctions have nothing to do with the dire public health crisis confronting millions of Iraqis.' The British Government should do the same.

2) Iraq has plenty of money available to purchase food and medicines.

The humanitarian crisis isn't simply a matter of 'food and medicines.' Rather, the fundamental causes of the crisis are : (i) the massive deterioration of Iraq's civilian infrastructure (electricity, water, sanitation, sewage, hospitals etc...) and (ii) the collapse of Iraq's economy. These two factors are both overwhelmingly the result of the 1991 Gulf War and 11 years of economic sanctions.

Whilst there is more money available now (because of higher oil prices) :

The sums available are inadequate. For example, the FCO claimed that $16 billion was available for the humanitarian programme last year. The figure was wrong (the real figure was just under $12 billion ) but even the FCO's inflated figure fell well short of what was (and is) needed, eg. the Economist Intelligence Unit has estimated the cost of reconstructing Iraq's essential infrastructural utilities at $50 - $100 bn. According to the most senior UN aid official working in Iraq (UN Humanitarian Co ordinator, Tun Myat) : "the overall well-being of the people [of Iraq]" will "not improve" unless "the basics - housing, electricity, water and sanitation - [are] restored" (Press Briefing, 19th October).

The UN allocates 28% of all oil-for-food funds to pay for 'war reparations' and its own expenses.

By its very nature a programme like oil-for-food can't address the problems of sanctions-induced economic collapse. eg. according to Human Rights Watch (August 4th 2000) : 'An emergency commodity assistance program like oil-for-food, no matter how well funded or well run, cannot reverse the devastating consequences of war and ten years of virtual shutdown of Iraq's economy ... The deterioration in Iraq's civilian infrastructure is so far-reaching that is can only be reversed with extensive investment and development efforts.'

3) Isn't it all Saddam's fault? After all he only has to co-operate with the inspectors and Iraq can be free of sanctions.
It's immoral to inflict collective punishment on the general population of Iraq as a means of exerting pressure on the Iraqi Government. The Economist put it this way (8th April 2000):

"If year in, year out, the UN were systematically killing Iraqi children by airstrikes, western governments would declare it intolerable, no matter how noble the intention.

They should find their existing policy just as unacceptable. In democracies, the end does not justify the means."

4) Isn't Saddam spending all the money on palaces and luxuries for his cronies?
No. According to the British Government's own figures, last year, if all of the illicit revenues available to the Iraqi Government had been channelled into the official humanitarian programme ('oil for food') revenues would have been increased by less than 3%.

By contrast the UN currently diverts 28% of all 'oil for food' to pay for 'war reparations' and its own expenses. The mega-rich Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC) was recently awarded $15 billion compensation : the folk at the KPC aren't suffering from malnutrition and water-borne disease.

The funding for all those buildings is from inside Iraq, in Iraqi Dinars, printed by the government... The work is carried out by state owned contracting companies, whose staff receive salaries anyway, whether they do work or not. The materials are local (except perhaps the reinforcement steel and marble which are probably brought from Jordan and Turkey). The government itself is not spending any money on importing, but publishing tenders, and the private sector imports. The payment is made in Dinars.. So, no funds are diverted from the Oil-for-food towards building.

The building projects also serve as a symbol of Iraq's defiance of sanctions, and its refusal to submit. It is to boost morale in Iraq and the Arab world, and show that Iraq is still standing.
The projects also serve to tackle a major problem: unemployment, by creating jobs for tens of thousands.

Iraq is not only building palaces. Iraq has reconstructed and repaired every building and construction destroyed since 1991, purely relying on Iraqi expertise and work. Schools (as have been suggested) have also been repaired and built, but the problem of schools is not only building, but supplies and facilities. All bridges, telephone exchanges, hospitals, oil refineries, electrical generation plants, etc..have been repaired in as good a way as the availability of spare parts allow.

5) Isn't the Iraqi Government hoarding all the food and medicine?
No. According to the current UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq, Tun Myat, Iraq's food distribution system is "second to none" (October 2000). On 1st March 2000 his predecessor, Hans von Sponeck had stated that the distribution of supplies coming into Iraq was "totally satisfactory" with 91.7 % of supplies distributed. For medical supplies the figure was lower (72%) "but this reflected World Health Organisation recommended stockpiling practices" and the time needed for quality control.

6) What about the 15,000 Ventolin inhalers that turned up in Lebanon ? [these inhalers were allegedly purchased under the 'oil for food' programme]
There has never been any evidence of large scale diversion under the programme. The UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq, Tun Myat, believes that all the necessary arrangements have been made to ensure that goods under oil-for-food are used for the agreed purposes (Press briefing, October 2000).

7) Isn't Saddam Hussein deliberately sabotaging the oil-for-food programme by failing to order medicines and other supplies.
There's no evidence to support this allegation. Oil-for-food doesn't run perfectly and there have been problems recently with the timely submission of contracts for medicines and other goods to the UN . However, a number of factors - including a major shake-up of the contracting system in an attempt to eliminate dodgy suppliers - probably account for much of these delays. In January of this year the current Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq, Tun Myat, said that there was 'nothing sinister' about these delays.

8) It's a myth that sanctions prevent goods from getting to Iraq.
Sanctions do prevent goods from getting to Iraq: there are currently more than $3.5 billion worth of humanitarian supplies that are being blocked by the UN Sanctions Committee. Whilst there are now a number of so-called 'green lists' of pre-approved goods which don't have to be submitted to the Committee, many desperately needed goods continue to be blocked and delayed. [Note, however, that these 'holds' aren't the root cause of the humanitarian crisis (see 2. above).]

9) The UK only puts a tiny percentage of goods on hold.
This may be true since the UK only comes a distant second place to the US, which is responsible for over 98% of the 'holds.' However a lot of mischief can be done with even a few holds since 'the absence of a single item of equipment, sometimes insignificant in size or value, can be sufficient to prevent the completion of an entire project' (Benon Sevan, Executive Director of oil-for-food). As Sevan put it 'What is the use, for example, if approval is given for the purchase of a very expensive truck and the application for the purchase of its ignition key is placed on hold?'

10) Income per head in Iraq is now the same as (or higher than) that in Egypt, Iran and Jordan yet no-one starves in those countries.
Even if the first claim were true (which is most unlikely) this is clearly the wrong comparison. The meaningful comparison is between the level of resources available to Iraq (which are still very limited) and the scale of its current needs (which are enormous).

None of the other countries listed have been subjected to the devastating 'coalition' assault of 1991 and over ten years of economic strangulation. Before sanctions Iraq had spent decades developing: lowering levels of child mortality; improving literacy, sanitation etc ... Much of this progress has been destroyed by the 1991 Gulf War and ten years of sanctions.

11) Child mortality rates have actually fallen in northern Iraq.
According to UNICEF, who conducted the surveys which produced these figures on child mortality, "the difference [in child mortality rates between the north and south/center] cannot be attributed to the differing ways the Oil for Food Program is implemented in the two parts of Iraq". The UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator, Tun Myat, reiterated this point in a recent press briefing, stating "that [the] improvement in nutrition in the north was not due to differences in distribution, or the fact that the United Nations was responsible for implementation of the programme in the north." (UN Press Briefing, 19th November 2000).

Important differences (between the north and the south/center) include :

"that the sanctions have not been so rigorously enforced in the north as the border is more 'porous' than in the [south/center]" (UNICEF, August 1999)

that the north (with roughly 15% of Iraq's population) has 50% of Iraq's productive arable land (UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, September 2000)

that the north has "received 22% more per capita [than the south/center] and gets 10% of all UN-controlled assistance in currency" while the rest of the country receives only commodities (UNICEF, August 1999)

"the fact that the north has received far more support per capita from the international community than the south and centre of the country" (UNICEF, August 1999)

According to the Economist 'the main reason for the relative prosperity of Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region is that has an economic life beyond oil-for-food.'

12) 'Smart' sanctions are the answer.
According to the Economist, 'smart' sanctions offered 'an aspirin where surgery is called for.'

'Smart' sanctions would continue to prevent the re-inflation of Iraq's economy - a necessary precondition for the end of the humanitarian crisis - whilst maintaining the current ban on foreign investment. Under 'smart' sanctions Iraq's economy would continue to be run like a gigantic refugee camp.

As one officer with a high-profile aid agency put it: 'It won't improve life for the ordinary Iraqi ... It will do nothing to tackle the real issue - how to stimulate the internal economy and allow civil society to come back.' (FT, 1 June 2001)

'Smart' sanctions would also attempt to choke off the only revenues Iraq has to pay its doctors and teachers and to install and distribute the goods it purchases under the humanitarian programme. This is why former UN Humanitarian Co-ordinators for Iraq, Denis Halliday and Hans von Sponeck, have condemned the proposal for actually 'tightening the rope around neck of the average Iraqi citizen.'

Finally, note that it is incorrect to say that 'smart' sanctions would have ended all restrictions on civilian imports: rather, they might have reduced the extent to which the US and Britain currently obstruct the implementation of the oil-for-food (see 7. above)

13) If sanctions are lifted Saddam Hussein will just spend all the money on luxuries and the military.
According to the Financial Times 'Iraq's devastated economy' 'will not revive ... while control over Iraq's oil revenues remains in the hands of the UN, and foreign investment and credits are still prohibited.'

The Iraqi Government does not need to be forced to spend money on the Iraqi people: while there is no doubt that private appropriation and military expenditure are important priorities for the Iraqi leadership, the historical record shows that a commitment to social welfare is also an important government priority in its own right.

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (, prior to the imposition of sanctions the Iraqi welfare state was 'among the most comprehensive and generous in the Arab world.'

A December 1999 report the International Committee of the Red Cross noted that 'Just a decade ago, Iraq boasted one of the most modern infrastructures and highest standards of living in the middle east' with a 'modern, complex health care system" and 'sophisticated water-treatment and pumping facilities.' Sanctions have destroyed all this.

Despite a major diversion of resources to war, child mortality declined by 40% during the 1980's. Since sanctions were imposed, child mortality has more than doubled.

Looking forward, we must realise the importance of Baghdad's longstanding commitment to public health and education, the role played by such investments in securing the Ba'ath Party's appeal to its supporters, and the huge pent-up demand for these public services caused by (and blamed on) the economic sanctions. There is only one guarantee: as long as the economic sanctions continue, so will the humanitarian crisis.

14) We have to maintain sanctions to stop Saddam Hussein from blowing up the world.
According to the former head of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, economic sanctions "simply aren't working other than to harm the Iraqi people." "we now know that using economic sanctions to bring about compliance in the weapons area does not work. So de-linking [military sanctions from economic sanctions] would address the need to stop doing something that isn't working."

According to the former chief of UNSCOM's concealment unit, Scott Ritter "it was possible as early as 1997 to determine that, from a strictly qualitative standpoint, Iraq had been disarmed" :

Iraq no longer possessed any meaningful quantities of chemical and biological agent, if it possessed any at all, and the industrial means to produce these agents had either been eliminated or were subject to stringent monitoring. The same was true of Iraq's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. As long as monitoring inspections remained in place, Iraq presented a WMD-based threat to no one ..." (Arms Control Today, June 2000)

The US and Britain destroyed UNSCOM in December 1998 by launching an illegal bombing campaign against Iraq ('Operation Desert Fox') and prior to that the US had undermined UNSCOM by infiltrating it with members of its intelligence services.

15) Critics of sanctions offer no alternative.
Untrue. Lifting economic sanctions immediately is a clear alternative to the existing policy of maintaining these sanctions. There are no good reasons for maintaining economic sanctions and plenty of reasons not to continue them.

Economic sanctions don't work to bring about compliance on the Weapons of Mass Destruction front (see 13. above), nor do they prevent human rights abuses by the Iraqi Government. They don't protect the Kurds in northern Iraq and they actually strengthen the Iraqi Government's grip on power. Most importantly, economic sanctions impose horrendous suffering on ordinary Iraqis and lifting these sanctions is a necessary pre-requisite for ending the current humanitarian crisis.

Note that critics of sanctions don't have to prove that lifting economic sanctions will solve all of Iraq's problems, or resolve all outstanding disputes between Iraq and the US/UK/UN. Lifting sanctions won't achieve this but then neither does the existing policy which kills thousands of children every month.

Myths and Realities Regarding Iraq and Sanctions 

Voices in the Wilderness

       

 [Taken from Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War,ed. Anthony Arnove (Cambridge: South End Press, 2000), pp. 67-75.

To order, call 1-800-533-8478, email southend@igc.org, or visit

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Myth 1: The sanctions have produced temporary hardship for the Iraqi people but are an effective, nonviolent method of containing Iraq.

Sanctions target the weakest and most vulnerable members of the Iraqi society-the poor, elderly, newborn, sick, and young. Many equate sanctions with violence. The sanctions, coupled with pain inflicted by US and UK military attacks, have reduced Iraq’s infrastructure to virtual rubble. Oxygen factories, water sanitation plants, and hospitals remain in dilapidated states. Surveys by the United Nation’s Children’s Fund (Unicef) and the World Health Organization (WHO) note a marked decline in health and nutrition throughout Iraq. (1)

While estimates vary, many independent authorities assert that at least 500,000 Iraqi children under five have died since 1990, in part as a result of the sanctions and the effects of the Gulf War. An August 1999 Unicef report found that the under-five mortality rate in Iraq has more than doubled since the imposition of sanctions. (2) Former UN humanitarian coordinator for Iraq Denis Halliday has remarked that the death toll is "probably closer now to 600,000 and that’s over the period of 1990-1998. If you include adults, it’s well over 1 million Iraqi people." (3)

The United Nations recently observed:

In addition to the scarcity of resources, malnutrition problems also seem to stem from the massive deterioration in basic infrastructure, in particular in the water-supply and waste disposal systems. The most vulnerable groups have been the hardest hit, especially children under five years of age who are being exposed to unhygienic conditions, particularly in urban centers. The [World Food Program] estimates that access to potable water is currently 50 percent of the 1990 level in urban areas and only 33 percent in rural areas. (4)

The UN sanctions committee, based in New York, continues to deny Iraq pencils, computer equipment, spare parts, and air-conditioned trucks, all necessary elements to sustaining human life and society. (5) Agricultural and environmental studies show great devastation, in many cases indicating permanent and irreversible damage. (6)

Others have argued that, from a North American perspective, sanctions are more economically sustainable than military attacks, since sanctions cost the United States less. In fact, hundreds of millions of US tax dollars are spent each year to sustain economic sanctions. Expenses include monitoring Iraqi import-export practices, patrolling the "no-fly" zones, and maintaining an active military presence in the Gulf region. (7)

Sanctions are an insidious form of warfare, and have claimed hundreds of thousands of innocent lives.

Myth 2: Iraq possesses, and seeks to build, weapons of mass destruction. If unchecked, and without economic sanctions, Iraq could, and certainly would, threaten its neighbors.

According to former United Nations Special Commission (Unscom) chief inspector Scott Ritter, "[F]rom a qualitative standpoint, Iraq has been disarmed. Iraq today possesses no meaningful weapons of mass destruction." While it is certainly possible that Iraq has the seed stock to rebuild its purported arsenal, Ritter has said that Iraq does not currently possess the capability to produce or deploy chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. (8)

The United States only became concerned with Iraq’s military potential in 1990, after the invasion of Kuwait. The US supplied Iraq with most of its weapons. Just one day before Iraq invaded Kuwait, then-President George Bush approved and signed a shipment of advanced data transmission equipment to Iraq. The United States and Britain were the major suppliers of chemical and biological weapons to Iraq in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War, in which the United States supported both
sides with weapons sales. (9)

Finally, the United States possesses, and keeps on alert, more nuclear weapons than the rest of the world combined. Many Iraqis feel that it is disingenuous of the United States-sitting atop the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, refusing to comply with international treaties or allow its weapons programs to be inspected by international experts, and being the only nation in the world ever to drop an atomic
bomb-to tell Iraq what it can and cannot produce. In 1998 and 1999, the United States bombed four countries-Serbia, Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan-all in violation of international law.

Myth 3: Iraq has acted in violation of UN resolutions, while the United States has not.

UN Resolution 687, paragraph 14, calls for regional disarmament as the basis for reducing Iraq’s arsenal. By arming Iraq’s neighbors in the Middle East, the US is contravening the same UN resolution with which it maintains arguments for sustaining the sanctions. Israel possesses more than 200 thermonuclear weapons and has violated scores of UN mandates, yet the US remains silent on the UN floor with regard to this violation of international law. (10)

While the United States claims to be encouraging peace in the Middle East by destroying Iraq’s arsenal, it continues to arm Iraq’s neighbors. The list of consumers of American military technology-in the Middle East and elsewhere-reads like a "who’s who" of international terrorists, human rights violators, and dictators. The US supplies Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran with weapons and technology. All are Iraq’s neighbors and could potentially threaten its borders. UScontractors also supplied most of the weapons used by the Indonesian military in its invasion and occupation of East Timor. (11)

Myth 4: The Iraqi government has weakened and undermined the UN weapons inspection program, in part by kicking out inspectors in December 1998, thus forcing the US and UK to undertake "Operation Desert Fox."

The Iraqi government, knowing that the United States favors Saddam Hussein’s ouster and will impose sanctions until a "regime change," has no incentive to cooperate with the United States or intrusive inspections. Top Clinton administration officials-notably Secretary of State Madeleine Albright-have said publicly that sanctions will remain intact until Saddam Hussein is out of office. (12)
This is not stipulated under the UN resolutions enforcing the sanctions.

Unscom director Richard Butler removed inspectors from Iraq prior to the December 1998 bombardment of the country, contrary to what is commonly reported. The US government claims Iraq "threw out" inspectors. In fact, the opposite occurred. According to Butler’s own records, his team of weapons inspectors made numerous unimpeded visits the week before the December bombing. On only a few intentionally provocative visits was he prevented from inspecting a site. (13)

In February 1998, former weapons inspector Raymond Zilinskas stated that "95 percent of [Unscom’s] work proceeds unhindered." He wrote in the Chicago Tribune, "Although it has been theoretically possible for the Iraqis to regain such weapons since 1991, the duplicity would have been risky and expensive, and the probability of discovery very high." (14)

Butler himself confirmed that he was in constant communication with the US military the week before the bombing. He often took his cues from Washington. Furthermore, the US government admitted (after an embarrassing Washington Post story) that it had been using Unscom to spy on Iraq. Iraq had previously charged Unscom with spying-a claim vehemently denied by the US government. (15) The ultimate irony is that Iraq pays for the entire UN operation in Iraq through oil
revenues, thus financing workers to spy on behalf of the United States.

Efforts at negotiation and conciliation, such as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s February 1998 visit to Baghdad, have produced cooperation and an opening for dialogue. Establishment of a clear timetable for ending inspections and recognizing progress made by the Iraqi government would provide clear incentive for future dialogue and compliance.

Myth 5: The Iraqi government is deliberately withholding and stockpiling food and medicine to exacerbate the human suffering for political sympathy and to draw attention to the need to lift sanctions.

The US State Department alleges in its September 1999 report Saddam Hussein’s Iraq that Iraq appears to be warehousing and stockpiling medicines, with malicious intent. (16)

The warehousing of medicines is heavily monitored by the United Nations and is acknowledged by local UN administration and staff to be caused by logistical problems stemming from nine years of sanctions and lingering Gulf War damage. Periodic UN reports on the humanitarian programs in Iraq list many technical issues that complicate providing medicine to a country of 22 million people.
Obstacles to efficient distribution include low wages of Iraqi warehouses workers, insufficient transport, and the poor condition of Iraqi warehouses in the provinces.

The United Nations conducts frequent inventories of the food and medicine stored in Iraq. Former humanitarian coordinator Hans von Sponeck and his deputy, Farid Zarif, have repeatedly called for the "depoliticization" of distribution, arguing that stockpiling is the result of Iraq’s damaged infrastructure, rather than malice on the part of the Iraqi government. (17)

There is a serious problem, which von Sponeck has referred to as "uncomplimentarity." In many cases, Iraq must purchase goods from foreign suppliers. Items come in pieces; for example, dental chairs arrive but compressors must be ordered from another company, or syringes arrive but needles take longer. Thus, some shipments must be held in Baghdad until they are complete. This happens, von Sponeck explained, with about one-half of the orders. (18) Moreover, the UN sanctions committee takes longer to approve some orders than others, thus forcing Iraq to keep medicine in storage until the complements are approved.

Temperatures in Iraq during summer often reach 130 degrees Fahrenheit. Air-conditioned trucks are therefore essential for shipping perishable goods, including cancer medication, surgical gloves, and foodstuffs. Yet air-conditioned trucks are practically nonexistent in Iraq, since the sanctions committee has barred them under "dual use" considerations. (19) While it is certainly true that air-
conditioned trucks could be used for military purposes, they are also necessary to ship medication.

The infrastructure is so degraded throughout Iraq that medicine and even spare parts are "Band-Aids to a huge problem," according to von Sponeck. (20) There are electrical shortages in every city, including Baghdad. Water and sanitation facilities have collapsed. Oxygen plants have fallen apart.
Denis Halliday stated that Iraq would need at least $50 billion to rebuild its agricultural, medical, and social infrastructure. (21)

After allocations are taken out of Iraq’s oil revenues to finance Gulf War reparations, and UN administrative costs, and other mandated expenses, the amount of money which trickles down to the average person in Iraq is completely insufficient. Iraq cannot afford to rebuild its infrastructure under the oil-for-food program. Water sanitation facilities, electrical grids, communication lines, and
educational resources will remain permanently degraded until the sanctions are lifted.

Myth 6: The Iraqi leadership uses money intended for humanitarian purposes to build palaces and enrich itself.

The New York Times claims that "with oil sales blocked, [Saddam Hussein] chose to spend what money was available on lavish palaces and construction projects." (22) In the years before oil-for- food, it’s important to recall that the Iraqi government was distributing food to its civilian population.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization said in 1995 of the rationing system that began in September 1990: "The food basket supplied through the rationing system is a life-saving nutritional benefit which also represents a very substantial income subsidy to Iraqi households." (23)

Iraq is pumping as much oil today as it did before the Gulf War, but is making less money because of the change in oil prices and the dramatic rise of inflation since 1990. When one considers that three Iraqi dinars could buy $1 in 1990, and today it takes more than 2,000, the difference in oil sales between 1990 and today is significant. While Iraq is permitted to sell more than $5.26 billion of oil every six months, these funds are not at the discretion of Saddam Hussein, but are kept in a
UN escrow account with the Bank of Paris in New York City.

The sanctions, though intended to weaken Iraq’s elite ruling class, only strengthen its political hegemony. With Iraq’s population decimated by hunger, disease, and fear of US and UK bombs, the development of civil society is hampered, as are hopes for pluralism. Iraq’s elite is empowered by a lucrative black market. With sanctions taking thousands of lives each month, the Iraqi government can better rally popular support and bitterness against the US government.

Myth 7: The distribution in northern Iraq-where the UN is most heavily involved-is better than in the south, proving that the Iraqi government is failing to adequately distribute food and medicine to its people.

Sanctions are simply not the same in the north and south. Differences in Iraqi mortality rates result from several factors: the Kurdish north has been receiving humanitarian assistance longer than other regions of Iraq; agriculture in the north is better; evading sanctions is easier in the north because its borders are far more porous; the north receives 22 percent more per capita from the oil-for-food program than the south-central region; and the north receives UN-controlled assistance in currency, while the rest of the country receives only commodities. (24)

Myth 8: The international community is united in its opposition to Iraq, and favors economic sanctions.

France, China, and Russia are three countries among many that have criticized the economic sanctions against Iraq. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, they have challenged the US and UK position on sanctions and have questioned military strikes. (25) The Pope, more than fifty US bishops, numerous religious leaders, and scores of organizations have condemned and protested both sanctions and military strikes. Two Nobel Peace laureates and five congressional
staffers traveled to Iraq in 1999 to promote international concern and understanding for the conditions found in Iraq today. The Arab League has called for the immediate lifting of the economic sanctions. (26)

Myth 9: The US and UK fighter planes patrolling the "no-fly" zones are protecting Iraqi minority groups. Since the end of the December 1998 bombing campaign, there has been no "collateral damage" in these regions.

Since the December 1998 bombing campaign against Iraq, US and UK fighter planes have flown thousands of sorties over the northern and southern "no-fly" zones, allegedly to protect northern Kurds and southern Shiites.They patrol the Iraqi airspace, they say, so that Iraq cannot attack its own people, as it did during the 1980s. While UN resolutions do call for the protection of Iraqi minorities, there is no stipulation for military enforcement of the zones. (27)

According to the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, the US and UK planes have killed dozens of innocent civilians, and injured many more. (28) For example, on January 25, 1999, a guided missile killed more than ten people in Basra when it struck a civilian neighborhood. While the Pentagon denies any civilian casualties, eye-witness accounts describe encounters with scores of
children and families wounded and killed when US and UK bombs missed their targets. (29)

While the US claims to be protecting northern Kurds from the Iraqi government, the US is silent when Turkey flies into Iraq, over the "no-fly" zone, to bomb Kurdish communities, because Turkey is a US ally. (30)

The bombing also complicates the humanitarian efforts of the United Nations. Aid workers have been forced to cancel trips into Kurdish and Shiite regions, and many civilians have been accidentally wounded, further burdening hospitals that are struggling to cope with daunting incidences of illness and preventable disease.

Notes

1.  See Unicef and Government of Iraq Ministry of Health, Child and Maternal Mortality Survey 1999: Preliminary Report (Baghdad: Unicef, 1999). Available online at http://www.unicef.org.
See also WHO Resource Center, Health Conditions of the Population in Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis (Geneva: WHO, 1996). Available online at http://www.who.int.

2.  See Unicef press release, "Iraq Survey Shows ‘Humanitarian Emergency,’" August 12, 1999 (Cf/doc/pr/1999/29).

3.  Matthew Rothschild, interview with Denis Halliday, The Progressive 63: 2 (February 1999): 26.

4.  United Nations, "Report of the Second Panel Pursuant to the Note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100), Concerning the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq," Annex II, S/1999/356, March 30, 1999, p. 6, article 20.

5.  For a list of the holds, See UN Office of the Iraq Program wesbite, http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/ .

6.  See Dr. Peter L. Pellett, "Sanctions, Food, Nutrition, and Health in Iraq" (pp. 151-68) and Dr. Huda S. Ammash, "Toxic Pollution, the Gulf War, and Sanctions" (pp. 169-178), in Anthony Arnove ed., Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War, (Cambridge: South End Press, 2000) for references to several of these studies.

7.  The US spent more than $1 billion just to operate its bombing campaign against Iraq in 1999. See Steven Lee Myers, "In Intense But Little-Noticed Fight, Allies Have Bombed Iraq All Year," New York Times, August 13, 1999, p. A6.

8. Fellowship of Reconcilliation, interview with Scott Ritter, Fellowship 65: 9-10 (September- October 1999): 13.

9.  See Noam Chomsky, "‘What We Say Goes’: The Middle East in the New World Order," in Collateral Damage: The ‘New World Order’ at Home and Abroad, ed. Cynthia Peters (Boston: South End Press, 1992), pp. 61-64 and references; Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein (New York: Harper- Collins, 1999); Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, updated ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), p. 152; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991); and Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine (Boston: Northeastern UP, 1996).

10. UN Security Council Resolution 687, paragraph 14. All UN resolutions cited are available online at http://www.un.org . See Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel, America, and the Bomb (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993), pp. 198-99, and Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia UP, 1998).

11. See Noam Chomsky, East Timor and the Western Democracies (Nottingham: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1979), p. 2, and Matthew Jardine and Constâncio Pinto, East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance (Boston: South End Press, 1996).

12. See, for example, Tim Russert, interview with Madeleine Albright, NBC, Meet the Press, January 2, 2000.

13. See Richard Butler, "Iraqi Bombshell," Talk 1: 1 (September 1999): 240. See also Mark Huband, "Misery and Malnutrition Form Bedrock of Iraq’s New National Character," Financial Times, March 21, 1998, p. 4, on Iraqi compliance with Unscom inspections.

14. Jim Lehrer, interview with Raymond Zilinskas, PBS, Newshour, February 16, 1998; Raymond Zilinskas, "The Quickest Fix Would Be Too Costly," Chicago Tribune, February 15, 1998, "Perspectives," p. 1.

15. Barton Gellman, "US Spied on Iraqi Military Via UN," Washington Post, March 2, 1999, p. A1.

16. US Department of State, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (September 1999). Available online at http://www.usia.gov/regional/nea/nea.htm.

17. See Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility, interview with Hans von Sponeck, Baghdad, April 5, 1999 (  http://www.wpsr.org ), and Stephen Kinzer, "Smart Bombs, Dumb Sanctions," New York Times, January 3, 1999, p. 4: 4.

18. Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility, interview with Hans von Sponeck, Baghdad, April 5, 1999.

19. For a list of the holds, See UN Office of the Iraq Program wesbite, http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/.

20. Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility, interview with Hans von Sponeck, Baghdad, April 5, 1999.

21. Denis Halliday, lecture, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, February 15, 1999. Available from Citizens Concerned for the People of Iraq. See http://www.scn.org/ccpi.

22. Barbara Crossette, "Children’s Death Rate Rising in Iraqi Lands, Unicef Reports," New York Times, August 13, 1999, p. A6.

23. UN Food and Agriculture Organization Technical Cooperation Program, Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq (Rome: FAO, 1995), p. 8.

24. See Unicef press release, "Iraq Survey Shows ‘Humanitarian Emergency,’" August 12, 1999 (Cf/doc/pr/1999/29). See also Pellett, "Sanctions, Food, Nutrition, and Health in Iraq."

25. Of the five permanent members, only the US and UK, for example, approved UN Security Council Resolution 1284 in December 1999. See Roula Khalaf, "UN Adopts New Resolution on Iraq," Financial Times, December 18-19, 1999, p. 1.

26. See Fellowship of Reconcilliation, Nobel Laureate Delegation March 1999 Report (Nyack, New York: FOR, 1999); Los Angeles Times Wire Services, "US Congressional Staffers Pay Visit to Iraqi Hospital," Los Angeles Times, August 31, 1999, p. A9; Pax Christi USA, "Bishops’ Statement on the Iraqi Sanctions," letter to President Bill Clinton, January 20, 1998; and Jasper Mortimer, "Arab Leage Supports Lifting Iraq Sanctions," Associated Press, September 13, 1999.

27. See Steven Lee Myers, "US Jets Strike 2 Iraqi Missile Sites 30 Miles Outside Baghdad," New York Times, February 25, 1999, p. A7, for a rare admission that "In fact, no United Nations resolutions created the restricted zones."

28. UN Security Section/UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Air Strikes in Iraq: 28 December 1998-31 May 1999 (Baghdad, UNOHCI, 1999), pp. 1-12.

29. Vijay Joshi, "Iraq Says American Attack Kills 11," Associated Press, January 26, 1999.

30. See Matthew Rothschild, "A Misguided Policy Toward Iraq," San Diego Union Tribune, September 5, 1996, p. B11.

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FAQ's on Economic Sanctions Against Iraq: Oct. 23, 2001
http://www.nonviolence.org/vitw/pages/170.htm

Below is a summary of frequently asked questions and answers regarding economic sanctions against Iraq drawing from several main points made by Hans von Sponeck, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Professor
Marc Bossuyt, Professor of International Law at the University of Antwerp (UIA), and Former Chairman of the
UN Commission on Human Rights, and Denis, Vienot  President, Caritas Europa in a document dated 23 August 2001.

 

10 Talking Points: No New War with Iraq
January, 2002 (http://www.nonviolence.org/vitw/TPJan2002.html)

1. There is no credible evidence whatsoever that Iraq had any connection to the September 11 attacks on the US.  Saddam Hussein and his regime have no clear relationship to the terrorist al-Qaeda network or the recent attacks on the US.  Much is made over an unsubstantiated report that Mohammed Atta met an Iraqi diplomat, Khalil Ibrahim Samir Al-Ani, in April 2001, in Prague.  We might also need to then know why a US Central Intelligence Agent met with bin Laden himself in July 2001 in a hospital in Dubai [Le Figaro; October 31, 2001.]

If one holds al-Qaeda responsible for the September 11 attacks, then there is no justification to turn next toward Iraq.  Attacking Iraq now would only expose the unilateral action of the U.S.  Who decides who is a terrorist and when they have violated the changing rules?  The assumption behind a new attack on Iraq would be that
the US has to maintain the right to act without external authority whenever it wishes [Noam Chomsky, “The World after September 11,”  Talk at Tufts University, December  8, 2001, “Paths to Peace and Security” Conference by American Friends Service Committee.] 

What is the connection between the diametrically opposed Baath Party, a nationalist military dictatorship, and the al-Qaeda, a fundamentalist network that stretches across many countries, but never once noted to be operating in any conjunction with Iraq?  al-Qaeda and the Baath Party in Iraq share in an extremely different practice and interpretation of Islam, and perhaps not much more, outside of standing up to US hegemony in the region.

2. A perceived “success” in removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, does not justify ramping up for Iraq to be the next target. The justification offered to the public for the US campaign against Afghanistan was that  the Taliban was harboring terrorists.  Many argue that the US itself is a terror, the most violent force of this century,
involved in unofficial wars on nearly each continent.  A recent report documented over 3700 civilian deaths in Afghanistan so far as a result of the US campaign [Marc Herold, “A Dossier of Civilian Deaths” 12-10-01, see  http://www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm or Democracy Now in Exile! “Archives” for 12-10-01 at www.democracynow.org ] No one mourning the loss of several thousand Americans killed on September 11, can claim the same tragedy forced upon others, as a victory.  The US has no basis to turn to Iraq to further the same horror  upon other innocent civilians. Any air and ground war on Iraq will result in tremendous loss of life of Iraqi citizens, and arguably further entrench Saddam Hussein’s rule.  

3. The US pulled its weapons inspectors out of Iraq in 1998; Iraq did not end weapons  inspections. Is Iraq next because Iraq has ‘refused to submit to weapons inspections?’  The facts seem to be easily forgotten when it comes to the events leading up to the December 1998 Desert Fox bombing campaign against Iraq. Contrary to popular belief, Iraq never kicked out the weapons inspectors.  Richard Butler, the head of UNSCOM, pulled the inspectors out of Iraq in anticipation of the 1998 U.S. Desert Fox bombing campaign. It was only as a result of these bombings that the Iraqi government subsequently refused to allow inspectors to return to the country.   At the time, the Washington Post [“Annan Suspicious of UNSCOM Role;” January 06, 1999] quoted a top aide to the Secretary-General as saying that, “the United Nations cannot be party to an operation to overthrow one of its member states.  In the most fundamental way, that is what’s wrong with the UNSCOM operation.”  What country would then welcome the return of inspectors who had been collecting surveillance, outside of any UN mandate?

4. The US is not really interested in weapons inspections. People forget that the Iraqi accusations that UNSCOM was spying on the Iraqi government turned out to be true. The U.S. infiltrated and subverted the mission of the international inspectors, and then used the Iraqi government’s protests against that subversion as an excuse to bomb the country.  The U.S. itself destroyed weapons inspections in Iraq, and used the expected dramatic standoff’s as a reason to unleash the deadly ‘Desert Fox’ bombing.

Since 1991, Iraq’s military might has been greatly reduced. UNSCOM Chief Richard Butler said in July 1998, "if Iraqi disarmament were a five-lap race, we would be three quarters of the way around the fifth and final lap." Even Iraq's  neighbors, including Kuwait, have said that Iraq no longer poses any threat. An Israeli military analyst has commented that
Iraq's biological weapons program was over-hyped [See:Education for Peace in Iraq Center at http://www.saveageneration.org .]

5.  While it is clear that Iraq attempted to subvert and circumvent weapons inspections, Iraq also complied with hundreds of extensive weapons inspections. According to former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) chief inspector  Scott Ritter, "[F]rom a qualitative standpoint, Iraq has infact been disarmed... The chemical, biological, nuclear and long-range ballistic missile programs that were a real threat in 1991 had, by 1998, been destroyed or rendered harmless." [Boston Globe op-ed (3/9/00); The Case for Qualitative Disarmament of Iraq; by Scott Ritter, former Chief Weapons Inspector, June 2000  http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/june00/iraqjun.htm .]

Until President Clinton had the arms inspectors pull out in 1998 before Desert Fox bombings, inspections took place constantly. According to Ritter "the UN never once found evidence that Iraq had either retained biological weapons or associated production equipment or was continuing work in the field." [Fellowship of Reconciliation, interview with Scott Ritter, Fellowship 65: 9-10 (September- October 1999): 13.]

6.  The US knows from where Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons came. The United States only became concerned  with Iraq’s military potential in 1990, after the invasion of Kuwait. The US supplied Iraq with most of its weapons during the 1980’s. Just one day before Iraq invaded Kuwait, then-President George Bush approved and signed a shipment of advanced data transmission equipment to Iraq. The United States and Britain were the major suppliers of chemical and biological weapons to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, in which the United States supported both sides with weapons sales. [See Noam Chomsky, "‘What We Say Goes’: The Middle East in the New World Order," in Collateral Damage: The ‘New World Order’ at Home and Abroad, ed. Cynthia Peters (Boston: South End Press, 1992), pp. 61-64 and references; and, Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict, New York: Rutledge, 1991]

7.  UN Security Council Resolution 687 calls for regional disarmament throughout the Middle East, not just in Iraq.  We can call on our government to stop ignoring the fact that Iraq’s disarmament was intended to be part of a broader dismantling of arms in the whole Middle East region.  The US can begin good-faith negotiations with the Iraqi government to return weapons inspectors to Iraq in the context of this regional call for disarmament. Ultimatums that are issued without any possibility of discussion, under the threat of massive war, and ignoring Iraq’s own security concerns in the region, are not a useful form of international diplomacy. The US could examine its weapons sales to all of Iraq’s surrounding neighbors over this period of eleven years that Iraq has been sanctioned from international trade.  [See Security Council Resolution 687: United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP)   http://www.un.org/depts/oip .]

8. Iraq linked to Anthrax?  Previous weapons inspections found no Anthrax in Iraq. Scott Ritter, UN arms inspector from 1991 to 1998 wrote, "Under the most stringent on-site inspection regime in the history of arms control, Iraq's biological weapons programs were dismantled, destroyed or rendered harmless during the course of hundreds of
no-notice inspections. The major biological weapons production facility - al Hakum, which was responsible for producing Iraq's anthrax - was blown up by high explosive charges and all its equipment destroyed. Other biological facilities met the same fate if it was found that they had, at any time, been used for research and development of biological weapons."
[“Don't blame Saddam for this one; There is no evidence to suggest Iraq is behind the anthrax attack,” Scott Ritter: October 19, 2001, The Guardian, United Kingdom.]

9.  Civilians will be the ones to continue to suffer under an attack on Iraq, not Saddam Hussein. Unfortunately, the war against the Iraqi people did not end with the cessation of military attacks in 1991, but continues to this day with a suffocating blockade that has already claimed over one million civilian lives, the vast majority of whom are children
and the elderly. More than 500,000 toddlers and infants have died due to the Consequences of the sanctions.  Including the 50,000 adult deaths caused by sanctions every year, Iraq now has a mortality rate of over 200 people every day [UNICEF August 1999; UNICEF, April 1998.]

Saddam Hussein and his regime have survived 11 years as the Iraqi people have perished.  To repeat an attack on this defenseless people, with no rationale for a war, is not only cruel, but exposes the fact that other reasons are behind the effort.  Oil, control of resources, weapons sales, and US dominance in the region, are just a few of the more honest reasons [See Voices in the Wilderness, http://www.nonviolence.org/vitw   .]

10.  The “war on terrorism” is not “going well” and should not be expanded. The “success” of the war in Afghanistan is Pentagon and State Department spin.  The public relations firm, Rendon Group, has been hired (with our tax dollars for only $3,500/day) to do communications for the administration.  We also now have Charlotte Beers, a top level advertising executive, from a wealthy Texas oil family, now the new “Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs ” to help Colin Powell sell the war(s) to the American public.  Powell said, “(Charlotte) is fluent with this sort of thing.
I wanted one of the world’s greatest advertising experts, because what are we doing?  We’re selling. We’re selling a product.  That product we are selling is democracy.  It’s the free enterprize system, the American value system.”  [Heather Wokusch , “Bystander Apathy: the Battle for Our Hearts and Minds”, Common Dreams, November 6, 2001, http://www.commondreams.org  .]  

More civilians have now died in Afghanistan than did in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. [Ibid, Marc Herold.]  Osama bin Laden has not been found and brought to justice.   An exponential increase in anti-American hatred is evident from before the war, which will fuel future attacks on the U.S.

War on Iraq will only further compound the suffering of innocent people already under the silent siege of economic sanctions and weekly bombings in the so-called ‘no-fly zones’ [Gulf News from Dubai, December 22, 2000; UN Security Reports, 1999.]  It will also of course make Americans less not more safe, as we are told it will.  Stop the war from expanding!

 

 

 

F) - Talking Points

 From: Phyllis Bennis

Dear friends,

We got a request from a few people, for answers to Frequently Asked Questions on Iraq. So here's an initial, quick set of answers. Not comprehensive, even in terms of the questions, but some of the FAQs...do point out errors, missing areas, whatever. The times are very grim. There were too many dying children even before the bombing began. A Palestinian friend of mine told me he couldn't bear to watch his daughter's cheery inter-faith holiday program, all he could see was visions of Iraqi kids just her age. But it's heartening that I can't even keep up with the email traffic on demonstrations & teach-ins and protests going on around the country.

1. Was there legal authority under UN resolutions for the US bombing raids? (What is the Clinton administration claiming and what's the reality)

The bombing strikes are a violation of international law. There is NO UN resolution that calls for, allows, justifies, or accepts unilateral acts by a member state against Iraq in retaliation for real or alleged violations. U.S. officials usually refer to two possible UN resolutions to justify military strikes. Both claims are false.  a) Security Council resolution 678, passed November 29, 1990, which authorized the use of force against Iraq. This was the U.S.-initiated resolution providing a UN cover for Washington's decision to force a military response to Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait. It is taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (the only way use of force can be authorized) and authorizes "all necessary means" to make Iraq "withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces" from Kuwait. That resolution's authorization inherently expired with the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. There are no Iraqi troops in Kuwait, therefore one cannot rely on a legitimating instrument limited to the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, to justify bombing Iraq for a different reason eight years later.  b) The Council resolution 1154, passed March 2, 1998. After heated debate and with widespread reluctance, U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson succeeded in getting the Council to pass a resolution including the threat of "severest consequences" for Iraq if there should be any future violation of Iraq's commitment to provide access to UNSCOM. However, virtually every Council ambassador, with the exception of those of the U.S. and Britain, stated explicitly that they did not define "severest consequences" to mean automatic authorization for any Member State to use military force on its own. The Russian ambassador coined the term "automaticity" to describe what the Council was NOT authorizing -- the U.S. or another country claiming an "automatic" UN authorization to simply launch military actions on its own. Rather, the definition of "severest consequences" was that, in the event of a further Iraqi violation, the Council must be reconvened to discuss what the "severest consequences" should be. The resolution includes the words "The Council remains seized of the matter," meaning the Council maintains control over the issue, continues to monitor the situation, and that the relevant issue (how to respond to a future violation) belongs to the Council for decision-making.

2. What did the UNSCOM and IAEA reports really say? Did this report indicate Iraq had seriously broken the November agreement brokered by Kofi Annan? What steps would/should the UN have taken next if the US had not started bombing?

Butler's December 1998 report is fundamentally ambiguous. He describes several specific instances of Iraqi non-compliance with UNSCOM. And, since his February 1998 agreement with Kofi Annan promised "unconditional and unrestricted" access, those instances do represent a violation of the agreement. However, Butler's own language indicates that the discrete instances of defiance took place in a broader context of overall cooperation. This distinguished these specific November/December violations, for example, from the broad non-compliance of the period following Iraq's August 5, 1998 announcement that it was halting all cooperation with UNSCOM. The violations described by Butler represent an incremental, not qualitative, problem: the inspectors were carrying out "the majority," or "some" of their inspections, though not getting access to everything they requested.  Butler's language is "In statistical terms, the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation." He then describes problems within that context of "Iraq's cooperation." In other sections of the report, he details examples of partial compliance and partial violation.  The accompanying IAEA report is far less equivocal. It identifies specific surveys and inspections carried out, and states that Iraq "has provided the necessary level of cooperation to enable the above-enumerated activities to be completed efficiently and effectively."  The political problems with Butler's report is that the conclusions he reaches, and especially the absolutist, one-sided and unequivocal tone, do not match the facts even as he states them. His conclusion states that "the Commission is not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security Council and, thus, to give the Council the assurances it requires with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes." There is no mention of the fact that his report admits UNSCOM has been able to conduct SOME of the substantive disarmament work, or MOST of the disarmament work; the report does not state what percentage remains incomplete.  (This assessment doesn't even take into account the actual substance of the reported violations. One highlighted incident of Iraqi non-compliance involved UNSCOM's demand for unfettered access to the Ba'ath Party headquarters. While arguably allowed under Iraq's promise of "unrestricted" access, that was hardly a politically reasonable request -- if the goal was real disarmament rather than political provocation.)  The level of partial non-compliance Butler reported should have been met with a Security Council meeting (perhaps involving as well the Disarmament (First) Committee of the General Assembly to broaden the approach and bring new thinking to the debate) to discuss options. Certainly diplomatic approaches should have been the starting point. Besides normal diplomatic discussions, which clearly should have been the first response to partial non-compliance, three new approaches might have been considered:  1) Allow UNSCOM to go public with records found in Iraq documenting the source of Iraq's weapons programs (currently UNSCOM is prohibited from such disclosures). This would facilitate shutting down current versions of these smuggling and/or legal trade routes.  2) The Council could broaden its efforts regarding Iraqi disarmament by requesting involvement of other agencies. These might include the good offices of the Secretary General, regional organizations (the Arab League or the Organization of the Islamic Conference), UN agencies such as the Conference on Disarmament, or multi-lateral fora such as the Conference of States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in which Iraq might actually participate.  3) Begin the process called for in resolution 687 to carry out disarmament in Iraq in the context of regional disarmament. Convene high-level conferences to discuss how to implement 687's calls for establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone throughout the Middle East.

3. Have US officials interpreted what was contained in these reports?

The broad problem with U.S. responses is that they all repeat and reflect the apocalyptic tone of Butler's conclusions, rather than examining more judiciously the actual facts of his report. They also ignore IAEA's unequivocal statement of Iraqi cooperation. The IAEA report is particularly significant, since it follows over a year-long assessment by IAEA that, although they cannot prove a negative (that being the complete absence of such a program), they have no evidence that Iraq has any viable nuclear weapons program. This contrasts directly with Clinton's inclusion of nuclear weapons sites in his list of U.S. targets in Iraq.

4. What is known or suspected, and what are the sources of these suspicions, re Bulter's dealings with the Americans over the report and the withdrawal of UN inspectors?

There is no direct evidence of U.S. involvement in the drafting of the report, although rumors are circulating around the UN regarding Butler's contacts with U.S. officials, showing his report to the U.S. Mission before submitting it to the UN Secretary General, and even that he drafted it in the U.S. Mission. None of those allegations are confirmed. What is known is that the tone of the report, and especially its absolutist conclusion that deviates so thoroughly from the facts contained within it, reflect a clear intent to justify a military response. Only the U.S. has an interest in such a result.  In terms of the decision to withdraw the UNSCOM inspectors, what is known is that the U.S. advised Butler to withdraw his people from Iraq before the Council had even discussed the report. On Wednesday morning (16 Dec) Kofi Annan said that "I got a call from Ambassador Burleigh [U.S. ambassador to the UN] saying they are asking U.S. personnel in the region to leave. And they had also advised Butler to withdraw UNSCOM and Butler and I spoke." Butler also indicated he withdrew his inspectors, as well as those of the IAEA (which depends on UNSCOM for logistical support) at the suggestion of the U.S. He said his only concern was for the safety of his inspectors. He did not notify or arrange for evacuation of the UN's humanitarian workers, of whom about 300 international and 850 Iraqi staff remained in Iraq when the bombing began.  Just as was the case on 16 January 1991 when the U.S. air strikes began over Baghdad, these air strikes began while the Security Council was in session. This time the Council was actually discussing Butler's report when the strikes allegedly based on the report began.

5. In terms of the severe shortages of humanitarian supplies (food, medicine, etc) for the Iraqi people, how much can this be blamed on the economic sanctions, on the cumbersome UN process of approving imports, and on Saddam Hussein's misallocation of resources and perhaps intentional attempt to make his people suffer to win world sympathy.

All these factors play a part. Saddam Hussein, like all military dictators, is primarily concerned with protecting and privileging his military and political supporters. However, despite other economic cronyism, UN and other humanitarian agencies generally give high ratings to the Iraqi government food ration system; there is relatively egalitarian access to equally insufficient food. Iraq's government has used some money (obtained from smuggled oil sales as well as pre-war reserves) for new buildings and palaces, and for protecting Saddam Hussein's favored troops and political backers from the ravages of sanctions.  However, the U.S.-led international sanctions have by far wrought a more devastating impact. Context must be recalled: Saddam Hussein's government was and has been a military dictatorship for 20 years; for 12 of those years, the U.S. supported that regime. It was still a dictatorship, and political human rights were still severely constrained. But prior to 1990 and the imposition of sanctions, the Iraqi population had among the highest standards of living in the Middle East: food access, education, health care and general quality of life approached that of developed countries. The most common problem faced by Iraqi pediatricians was childhood obesity.  Today the Iraqi population still faces severe denial of human rights --political and civil rights-- by the Iraqi regime. But additionally, since 1990 it faces the lethal denial of other human rights --economic and social rights-- AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS. The UNICEF figures indicate that 5,000-6,000 children under the age of five die each month as a direct result of sanctions. The deaths are not primarily from a lack of food, but lack of clean water, as well as medicine and equipment to treat easily curable (many water-borne) diseases. While the current ration-based "food basket" approaches the UN minimum caloric level, it does not include sufficient actual protein, vitamins, etc. for health or growth (A cup of oil and a cup of sugar would provide more than sufficient calories; it would not provide health.)  UNICEF and other humanitarian agencies agree that conditions have continued to deteriorate even with the initiation of the Oil for Food program; Iraq's oil infrastructure (pumping and processing) is simply too "degraded" since the 1991 war to produce sufficient oil to bring in anything close to the top allowable amounts of money. Of the limited funds earned through Oil for Food, one-third off the top goes to pay for Kuwaiti reparations and the costs of UNSCOM.  Although there have been some recent efforts at improvements, the Sanctions Committee (made up of the members of the Security Council) continues to impose near-crippling delays and denials of licensing for importing materials required for repairs and replacement of the oil and physical infrastructure, as well as for allowable consumer items. The committee's definitions of prohibited "dual use" goods includes such items as pencils for schoolchildren (because the graphite could be used in weapons production) and chlorine to purify untreated water (the water treatment system was destroyed in 1991 and not rebuilt).  If there are international concerns that the suffering is designed to win sympathy, the answer should be ending of economic sanctions while tightening and expanding military restrictions.

6. How close was the UN to lifting economic sanctions?

Hard to say. The comprehensive review long sought by Iraq would likely have concluded (based on last several years of UNSCOM and IAEA reports) that Iraq is clean on nuclear weapons; that all but about a dozen prohibited missiles have been destroyed or accounted for; that the chemical weapons program is well on its way to extinction; and that serious problems remain only with the biological program.  That doesn't mean economic sanctions would be lifted immediately. But such a review would set the stage to allow the beginning of an incremental lifting of some sanctions in recognition of incremental compliance with Iraq's disarmament requirements.

7. Does the bombing signal a shift in US policy from containing Saddam's regime (as well as Iran) to a unilateral determination to remove him from power. What are the components of this new strategy (bombing, covert ops, support for opposition)?

The move to emphasize military action -- certainly this strike but including the near-strike of last November -- reflects an abandonment of dual containment as the basis of U.S. policy in the region. It also means abandoning the already-thin commitment to disarmament that provided at least the rhetorical basis for sanctions and military moves against Iraq. The new strategy is one of active containment, aimed officially at overthrowing and replacing Saddam Hussein.  Military action is ratcheting up; these bombing strikes are far more sustained and intensive than any earlier post-War strikes by the Clinton administration. They are reminiscent of the actual force used in the early days of the air component of Desert Storm. Covert operations against Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership may occur, but are unlikely to be either successful or significant within broader U.S. strategy. The U.S. has no interest in a popular uprising; there is no vice-dictator in place, Uday Hussein is probably more destabilizing to U.S. interests than his father, and certainly no viable democratic opposition or a political culture of broadening the leadership in a post-Saddam Hussein era currently exists in Iraq.  The small Iraq Liberation Act allocation for investigating the possibility of war crimes charges against Saddam Hussein is likely a ploy; U.S. efforts in this regard are half-hearted at best, since they face a difficult battle to keep the relevant time frame for Iraqi war crimes limited to the invasion of Kuwait and after. Washington is unlikely to want earlier instances (including the REAL war crimes of the Anfal campaign, Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds in Halabja and Iranian troops in 1988) included since such investigation would reveal U.S. involvement in providing chemical, biological and other weapons.  The White House said (December 17) that it will "continue to work with the international community to maintain and enforce economic sanctions." That likely means economic sanctions will be tightened, rather than scrapped as a failed blunt instrument killing only civilians while consolidating (through its control of scarce food and medical resources) Iraqi government power. This may include new pressures on neighboring countries to stop cross-border trade, even tighter strangleholds on Sanctions Committee licensing applications, cut-backs in Oil for Food, etc.

8. Are there credible, pro-democracy opposition forces within or outside Iraq?

The Iraq Liberation Act funds, up to $100 million available to Clinton for efforts to overthrow the regime, are likely to be wasted on London-based exile groups fighting for money and against each other. None have much of a significant base in Iraq The same is true for the various Kurdish factions eager for U.S. or any other backing.. The Shi'a opposition in the southern Iraq has some significant support on the ground and has engaged in some small-scale fights with Iraqi troops, gets support from Iran and is unlikely to get any U.S. backing. Some exiled activists Iraqi Communist Party remain involved; they have condemned U.S. efforts to fund opposition figures.

9. What are the real targets of the bombing? (political/military) Can the bombing seriously cripple whatever remains of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs?

The U.S. claims most targets are military; the photos they show seem to indicate that military targets are among those chosen. However, the Pentagon isn't showing very many pictures. We don't know where other bombs are falling. Many of the early Tomahawks landed in and around Baghdad, in heavily populated neighborhoods. At least one hospital has been damaged, as well as houses and more. Other targets are in the South, in and around Basra. No clear picture yet.  The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Hans von Sponeck, confirmed that a UN World Food Program warehouse holding 260,000 tons of rice was destroyed. The warehouse was 100 miles north of Baghdad in the city of Tikrit --hometown of Saddam Hussein. Von Sponeck told AP that ``our program has been severely curtailed.'' UN humanitarian workers described at least one missile strike very close to their headquarters; they described it as "terrifying," despite U.S. media reports of "normal life" in Baghdad. The Pentagon admitted one of its strikes aimed at an "economic target" was successful in destroying a refinery in southern Iraq.  Announcements were made last November that the target of the military strikes would be the governmental and physical infrastructure. Everyone agrees, including Clintonites, that the bombing cannot cripple whatever remains of the WMD programs. Thus the adoption by all ranking officials of "degrade" as the goal-du-jour. That goal guarantees success: anything hit, incuding a hospital, school or rice warehouse, "degrades" Iraq's ability to govern/survive.

10. What is the real meaning of the House resolution passed yesterday?

Seems to be cover for not wanting to oppose the kind of kill-Iraqis military strike almost everyone in Congress seems to love. They really want to oppose the action just because Clinton initiated it. But this way they can support the troops --not the president-- getting on board to claim as their own the military strikes. The additional paragraph about supporting efforts to overthrow the regime has essentially fallen into a black hole; the media coverage of the resolution didn't even mention it. The vote was XX in favor, 5 against on a "resolution to support the troops."  There is no indication anyone in Congress other than some of the 5 opponents actually discussed or understands the significance of the overthrow-the-regime language in the context of an actual change in strategic direction away from dual containment towards active overthrow.