CAMPAIGNER’ S GUIDE–USEFUL INFO-MORE FAQ's

UN Report on Humanitarian Crisis ~ March 30, 1999
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/panelrep.html
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Economic and Social Indicators

Education

The issue of Saddam's building palaces is complex, but the claim that ithas been the main reason behind the worsening of conditions in Iraq isfalse. Although it's hard to refute it being a diversion of resources, itcannot be used to justify sanctions.

In the report "Unsanctioned Suffering," the New York-based Center forEconomic & Social Rights (CESR) cited Sec. of State Albright's claim in1996 that Saddam had spent $1 billion over the last five years on palacebuilding. CESR reported that this estimate was exaggerated because it "wasbased on the cost of constructing similar buildings in the region andtherefore did not take account of Iraq's peculiar economic conditions" suchas low wages and building costs.

In her book "Sanctioning Saddam," Sarah Graham Brown states that after theIran-Iraq war, the regime had allocated $2.5 billion on a presidentialpalace. The Iraqi economist Al-Nasrawi, in his book "The Economy of Iraq,"makes the same point.

Here's my take on it. Towards the end of the first war, Saddam privatizedthe construction sector, giving preference to individuals with strong tiesto the regime. This in my opinion was part of his strategy to secure theirsupport. After both wars, the construction sector benefited from the needto reconstruct the infrastructure. Although prestige was definitely afactor, palace building may have been Saddam's way of buying them off (bygiving them contracts to build palaces).

Although the State Department's figure of $1 billion may be exaggerated,the palace building was probably done by private contractors which meansthat they would charge enough money (in dinars) to make a sizable realprofit in a hyperinflationary economy.

Talking Points: Iraq

1- For almost 11 years, the Iraqi civilian population has been suffering from the most draconian and prolonged economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations and supported by the US government:

• "Smart Bombs" dropped by the U.S. 11 years ago targeted water treatment plants, sewage treatment plants, power plants, schools and hospitals.
• One-fourth of Iraqi children under the age of five are malnourished. [UN Report, March 1999]
• There has been a 160 percent rise in Iraq's infant mortality rate since 1991. Iraq has the highest increase in child mortality during the period 1990-99 of 188 countries surveyed. [UNICEF, December 2000]
• As many as 70 percent of Iraqi women suffer from anemia. [U.N. Report, March 1999]
• Sanctions have contributed to the death of over one million Iraqis. More than 200 people die each day in Iraq; 5,000 to 6,000 die each month. [UNICEF and Denis Halliday, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq]
• Access to potable water, relative to 1990 levels, is only 50 percent in urban areas and 33 percent in rural areas. The overall deterioration in the quality and quantity of drinking water has contributed to the rapid spread of infectious disease. Raw sewage often flows into streets and homes. [World Food Program]
• School enrollment for all ages (6 - 23) has declined to 53 percent. [UN Report, March 1999]
• Per capita income fell from $3,416 U.S. dollars in 1984 to less than $1,036 in 1998. Other sources estimate a per capita decrease as low as $450 U.S. in 1995. [IMF and UN Report, March 1999]
• Iraq experienced a shift from relative affluence to massive poverty. [UN Report, March 1999]

2- Instead of ending the economic sanctions against Iraq, the United States and Britain have come up with so-called "Smart Sanctions", which is basically meant to institutionalize (and justify) the ongoing suffering of the Iraqi people. The smart sanctions policy does not improve the desperate situation in Iraq, since:

• There are still too many banned items in the new proposal. The current version of the Smart Sanctions proposal has a 23-page list of banned items, which highly restricts Iraq’s access to new technology and spare parts badly needed for the reconstruction of the ruined economy.
• The "Smart Sanctions" proposal would allow more commodities into Iraq, but would not address the fundamental problem of the low purchasing power of the vast majority of Iraqis. Presently, and also under the "new" sanctions, Iraqi people who are employed are paid low wages, with a greatly devalued currency. The present "oil for food" program results in annual revenues of less than $120 per person.
• Smart sanctions do not lift the almost complete ban on foreign investment, necessary because Iraq’s infrastructural and reconstruction needs are so severe: "The deterioration in Iraq's civilian infrastructure is so far reaching that it can only be reversed with extensive investment and development efforts." (Human Rights Watch, and others, August 2000).
• The "Smart Sanctions" proposal would increase the amount of money taken for the UN compensation commission. Currently, 25% of the proceeds from Iraq’s oil sales are diverted to the UN Compensation Commission, which processes claims for damages by victims of Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The new British proposal would restore the UNCC’s cut to 30%. This would be taking away revenue desperately needed by Iraq for reconstruction and basic needs.
• And finally, "Smart Sanctions" a total closure of the Iraqi border. If this happens, the Iraqi government will not have the supplement income it now derives from commerce with neighboring countries and uses to pay civil servants such as teachers and doctors.

• Attacking Iraq will result in more civilian deaths and casualties in a population who have already suffered a lot as the result of an 8 years of bloody war with Iran (in which about half a million Iraqis died), the 1990 Gulf war (with over 100.000 casualties) and 11 years of economic sanctions (that has so far left near one million civilian deaths).
• A military operation to topple the Iraqi regime will surely plunge Iraq into a civil war. In the absence of any meaningful political alternative for Saddam Hussein (as well as the lack of any powerful or popular opposition group), the most likely scenario will be an endless cycle of violence and bloodshed among different religious and ethnic groups (Shiites in the South, Sunnis in the middle and Kurds in the northern part of the country).
• The war against Iraq will have an immediately destructive impact on the whole region and can potentially lead to a military standoff between Iraq’s neighbors. While the fundamentalist Iran will do anything to bring the Iraqi Shiites into power, the nightmare of having another Islamic Republic in the region will cause Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan to counter Tehran’s attempt. Also Turkey might want to take advantage of the vacuum of power and annex the oil-rich Iraqi Kurdistan, a move which will put the NATO member at verge of war with neighboring Iran (which has a sizable Kurdish population) as well as Arab countries (who can not tolerate the partition of an Arab nation).
• Targeting another Muslim country will portray the US as an interventionist and expansionist country and cause a new wave of anti-American and anti-Western sentiments among Arabs and Muslims. This will in turn help the Muslim extremists receive more sympathy and support from the average person in the Middle East and eventually make future attacks against United States interests and its regional allies quite likely.
• US intervention in Iraq will even jeopardize the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. Such a unilateral military move can alienate moderate Arab governments in the region (who are already critical of unconditional US support for Israel) and make them more skeptical of US policies in the Middle East. The resultant mistrust will not only undermine the US credibility as a peace-broker, but also will put the existing global coalition against terrorism at risk and significantly reduce the likelihood of further cooperation between Arab countries and US to combat terrorism.

espite growing opposition, both at home and abroad, the Bush Administration appears to have begun its concerted final push to convince Congress, the American people and the world of the need to invade Iraq. Such an invasion would constitute an important precedent, being the first test of the new doctrine articulated by President Bush of "pre-emption," which declares that the United States has the right to invade sovereign countries and overthrow their governments if they are seen as hostile to American interests. At stake is not just the prospect of a devastating war but the very legitimacy of an international system built over the past century that--despite its failings--has created at least some semblance of global order and stability.

It is therefore critical to examine and rebut the Administration's arguments, because if as fundamental a policy decision as whether to go to war cannot be influenced by the active input of an informed citizenry, what also may be at stake is nothing less than American democracy, at least in any meaningful sense of the word.

Below are the eight principal arguments put forward by proponents of a US invasion of Iraq, each followed by a rebuttal.

1. Iraq is providing support for Al Qaeda and is a center for anti-American terrorism.

The Bush Administration has failed to produce credible evidence that the Iraqi regime has any links whatsoever with Al Qaeda. None of the September 11 hijackers were Iraqi, no major figure in Al Qaeda is Iraqi, nor has any part of Al Qaeda's money trail been traced to Iraq. Investigations by the FBI, the CIA and Czech intelligence have found no substance to rumors of a meeting in spring 2001 between one of the September 11 hijackers and an Iraqi intelligence operative in Prague. It is highly unlikely that the decidedly secular Baathist regime--which has savagely suppressed Islamists within Iraq--would be able to maintain close links with Osama bin Laden and his followers. Saudi Prince Turki bin Faisal, his country's former intelligence chief, has noted that bin Laden views Saddam Hussein "as an apostate, an infidel, or someone who is not worthy of being a fellow Muslim." In fact, bin Laden offered in 1990 to raise an army of thousands of mujahedeen fighters to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

There have been credible reports of extremist Islamist groups operating in northern Iraq, but these are exclusively within Kurdish areas, which have been outside Baghdad's control since the end of the Gulf War. Iraq's past terrorist links are limited to such secular groups as the one led by Abu Nidal, a now largely defunct Palestinian faction opposed to Yasir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization. Ironically, at the height of Iraq's support of Abu Nidal in the early 1980s, Washington dropped Iraq from its list of terrorism-sponsoring countries so the United States could bolster Iraq's war effort against Iran. Baghdad was reinstated to the list only after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, even though US officials were unable to cite increased Iraqi ties to terrorism.

The State Department's own annual study, Patterns of Global Terrorism, could not list any serious act of international terrorism connected to the government of Iraq. A recent CIA report indicates that the Iraqis have been consciously avoiding any actions against the United States or its facilities abroad, presumably to deny Washington any excuse to engage in further military strikes against their country. The last clear example that American officials can cite of Iraqi-backed terrorism was an alleged plot by Iraqi agents to assassinate former President George Bush when he visited Kuwait in 1993. (In response, President Bill Clinton ordered the bombing of Baghdad, hitting an Iraqi intelligence headquarters as well as a nearby civilian neighborhood.)

An American invasion of Iraq would not only distract from the more immediate threat posed by Al Qaeda but would likely result in an anti-American backlash that would substantially reduce the level of cooperation from Islamic countries in tracking down and neutralizing the remaining Al Qaeda cells. Indeed, the struggle against terrorism is too important to be sabotaged by ideologues obsessed with settling old scores.

2. Containment has failed.

While some countries, in part due to humanitarian concerns, are circumventing economic sanctions against Iraq, the military embargo appears to be holding solid. It was only as a result of the import of technology and raw materials from Russia, Germany, France, Britain and the United States that Iraq was able to develop its biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programs in the 1980s.

Iraq's armed forces are barely one-third their pre-Gulf War strength. Even though Iraq has not been required to reduce its conventional forces, the destruction of its weapons and the country's economic collapse have led to a substantial reduction in men under arms. Iraq's navy is now virtually nonexistent, and its air force is just a fraction of what it was before the war. Military spending by Iraq has been estimated at barely one-tenth of what it was in the 1980s. The Bush Administration has been unable to explain why today, when Saddam has only a tiny percentage of his once-formidable military capability, Iraq is now considered such a threat that it is necessary to invade the country and replace its leader--the same leader Washington quietly supported during the peak of Iraq's military capability.

The International Atomic Energy Agency declared in 1998 that Iraq's nuclear program had been completely dismantled. The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) estimated then that at least 95 percent of Iraq's chemical weapons program had been similarly accounted for and destroyed. Iraq's potential to develop biological weapons is a much bigger question mark, since such a program is much easier to hide. However, UNSCOM noted in 1998 that virtually all of Iraq's offensive missiles and other delivery systems had been accounted for and rendered inoperable. Rebuilding an offensive military capability utilizing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) virtually from scratch would be extraordinarily difficult under the current international embargo.

3. Deterrence will not work against a Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction.

Saddam Hussein has demonstrated repeatedly that he cares first and foremost about his own survival. He presumably recognizes that any attempt to use WMDs against the United States or any of its allies would inevitably lead to his own destruction. This is why he did not use them during the Gulf War, even when attacked by the largest coalition of international forces against a single nation ever assembled and subjected to the heaviest bombing in world history. By contrast, prior to the Gulf War, Saddam was quite willing to utilize his arsenal of chemical weapons against Iranian forces because he knew the revolutionary Islamist regime was isolated internationally, and he was similarly willing to use them against Kurdish civilians because he knew they could not fight back. In the event of a US invasion, however, seeing his overthrow as imminent and with nothing to lose, this logic of self-preservation would no longer be operative. Instead, a US invasion--rather than eliminate the prospect of Iraq using its WMDs--would in fact dramatically increase the likelihood of his utilizing weapons of mass destruction should he actually have any at his disposal.

Saddam Hussein's leadership style has always been that of direct control; his distrust of subordinates (bordering on paranoia) is one of the ways he has been able to hold on to power. It is extremely unlikely that he would go to the risk and expense of developing weapons of mass destruction only to pass them on to some group of terrorists, particularly radical Islamists who could easily turn on him. If he does have such weapons at his disposal, they would be for use at his discretion alone. By contrast, in the chaos of a US invasion and its aftermath, the chances of such weapons being smuggled out of the country into the hands of terrorists would greatly increase. Currently, any Iraqi WMDs that may exist are under the control of a highly centralized regime more interested in deterring a US attack than provoking one.

4. International inspectors cannot insure that Iraq will not obtain weapons of mass destruction.

As a result of the inspections regime imposed by the United Nations at the end of the Gulf War, virtually all of Iraq's stockpile of WMDs, delivery systems and capability of producing such weapons were destroyed. During nearly eight years of operation, UNSCOM oversaw the destruction of 38,000 chemical weapons, 480,000 liters of live chemical-weapons agents, forty-eight missiles, six missile launchers, thirty missile warheads modified to carry chemical or biological agents, and hundreds of pieces of related equipment with the capability to produce chemical weapons.

In late 1997 UNSCOM director Richard Butler reported that UNSCOM had made "significant progress" in tracking Iraq's chemical weapons program and that 817 of the 819 Soviet-supplied long-range missiles had been accounted for. A couple of dozen Iraqi-made ballistic missiles remained unaccounted for, but these were of questionable caliber. In its last three years of operation, UNSCOM was unable to detect any evidence that Iraq had been concealing prohibited weapons.

The periodic interference and harassment of UNSCOM inspectors by the Iraqis was largely limited to sensitive sites too small for advanced nuclear or chemical weapons development or deployment. A major reason for this lack of cooperation was Iraqi concern--later proven valid--that the United States was abusing the inspections for espionage purposes, such as monitoring coded radio communications by Iraq's security forces, using equipment secretly installed by American inspectors. The United States, eager to launch military strikes against Iraq, instructed Butler in 1998 to provoke Iraq into breaking its agreement to fully cooperate with UNSCOM. Without consulting the UN Security Council as required, Butler announced to the Iraqis that he was nullifying agreements dealing with sensitive sites and chose the Baath Party headquarters in Baghdad--a very unlikely place to store weapons of mass destruction--as the site at which to demand unfettered access. The Iraqis refused. Clinton then asked Butler to withdraw UNSCOM forces, and the United States launched a four-day bombing campaign, which gave the Iraqis an excuse to block UNSCOM inspectors from returning. With no international inspectors in Iraq since then, there is no definitive answer as to whether Iraq is actually developing weapons of mass destruction. And as long as the United States continues to openly espouse "regime change" through assassination or invasion, it is very unlikely that Iraq will agree to a resumption of inspections.

5. The United States has the legal right to impose a regime change through military force.

According to Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, no member state has the right to enforce any resolution militarily unless the Security Council determines that there has been a material breach of its resolution, decides that all nonmilitary means of enforcement have been exhausted and specifically authorizes the use of military force. This is what the Security Council did in November 1990 with Resolution 678 in response to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, which violated a series of resolutions demanding their withdrawal that passed that August. When Iraq finally complied in its forced withdrawal from Kuwait in March 1991, this resolution became moot.

Legally, the conflict regarding access for UN inspectors and possible Iraqi procurement of WMDs has always been between the Iraqi government and the UN, not between Iraq and the United States. Although UN Security Council Resolution 687, which demands Iraqi disarmament, was the most detailed in the world body's history, no military enforcement mechanisms were specified. Nor has the Security Council specified any military enforcement mechanisms in subsequent resolutions. As is normally the case when it is determined that governments are violating all or part of UN resolutions, any decision about enforcement is a matter for the Security Council as a whole--not for any one member of the Council.

If the United States can unilaterally claim the right to invade Iraq because of that country's violation of Security Council resolutions, other Council members could logically also claim the right to invade states that are similarly in violation; for example, Russia could claim the right to invade Israel, France could claim the right to invade Turkey and Britain could claim the right to invade Morocco. The US insistence on the right to attack unilaterally could seriously undermine the principle of collective security and the authority of the UN and, in doing so, would open the door to international anarchy.

International law is quite clear about when military force is allowed. In addition to the aforementioned case of UN Security Council authorization, the only other time that a member state is allowed to use armed force is described in Article 51, which states that it is permissible for "individual or collective self-defense" against "armed attack...until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." If Iraq's neighbors were attacked, any of these countries could call on the United States to help, pending a Security Council decision authorizing the use of force.

Based on evidence that the Bush Administration has made public, there doesn't appear to be anything close to sufficient legal grounds for the United States to convince the Security Council to approve the use of military force against Iraq in US self-defense.

6. The benefits of regime change outweigh the costs.

While the United States would likely be the eventual victor in a war against Iraq, it would come at an enormous cost. It would be a mistake, for example, to think that defeating Iraq would result in as few American casualties as occurred in driving the Taliban militia from Kabul last autumn. Though Iraq's offensive capabilities have been severely weakened by the bombings, sanctions and UNSCOM-sponsored decommissioning, its defensive military capabilities are still strong.

Nor would a military victory today be as easy as during the Gulf War. Prior to the launching of Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi government decided not to put up a fight for Kuwait and relied mostly on young conscripts from minority communities. Only two of the eight divisions of the elite Republican Guard were ever in Kuwait, and they pulled back before the war began. The vast majority of Iraq's strongest forces were withdrawn to areas around Baghdad to fight for the survival of the regime itself, and they remain there to this day. In the event of war, defections from these units are not likely.

Close to 1 million members of the Iraqi elite have a vested interest in the regime's survival. These include the Baath Party leadership and its supporters, security and intelligence personnel, and core elements of the armed forces and their extended families. Furthermore, Iraq--a largely urban society--has a far more sophisticated infrastructure than does the largely rural and tribal Afghanistan, and it could be mobilized in the event of a foreign invasion.

Nor is there an equivalent to Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, which did the bulk of the ground fighting against the Taliban. Iraqi Kurds, having been abandoned twice in recent history by the United States, are unlikely to fight beyond securing autonomy for Kurdish areas. The armed Shiite opposition has largely been eliminated, and it too would be unlikely to fight beyond liberating the majority Shiite sections of southern Iraq. The United States would be reluctant to support either, given that their successes could potentially fragment the country and would encourage both rebellious Kurds in southeastern Turkey and restive Shiites in northeastern Saudi Arabia. US forces would have to march on Baghdad, a city of more than 5 million people, virtually alone.

Unlike in the Gulf War, which involved conventional and open combat in flat desert areas where US and allied forces could take full advantage of their superior firepower and technology, US soldiers would have to fight their way through heavily populated agricultural and urban lands. Invading forces would likely be faced with bitter, house-to-house fighting in a country larger than South Vietnam. Iraqis, who may have had little stomach to fight to maintain their country's conquest of Kuwait, would be far more willing to sacrifice themselves to resist a foreign, Western invader. To minimize American casualties in the face of such stiff resistance, the United States would likely engage in heavy bombing of Iraqi residential neighborhoods, resulting in high civilian casualties.

The lack of support from regional allies could result in the absence of a land base from which to launch US air attacks, initially requiring the United States to rely on Navy jets launched from aircraft carriers. Without permission to launch aerial refueling craft, even long-range bombers from US air bases might not be deployable. It is hard to imagine being able to provide the necessary reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft under such circumstances, and the deployment of tens of thousands of troops from distant staging areas could be problematic. American forces could conceivably capture an air base inside Iraq in the course of the fighting, but without the pre-positioning of supplies, its usefulness as a major center of operations would be marginal.

Such a major military operation would be costly in economic terms as well, as the struggling and debt-ridden US economy would be burdened by the most elaborate and expensive deployment of American forces since World War II, totaling more than $100 billion in the first six months. Unlike in the Gulf War, the Saudis--who strenuously oppose such an invasion--would be unwilling to foot the bill. An invasion of Iraq would also be costly to a struggling world economy; higher oil prices could be devastating to some countries, causing even more social and political unrest.

7. Regime change will be popular in Iraq and will find support among US allies in the region.

While there is little question that most of Iraq's neighbors and most Iraqis themselves would be pleased to see Iraq under new leadership, regime change imposed by invading US military forces would not be welcome. Most US allies in the region supported the Gulf War, since it was widely viewed as an act of collective security in response to aggression by Iraq against its small neighbor. This would not be the case, however, in the event of a new war against Iraq. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah has warned that the Bush Administration "should not strike Iraq, because such an attack would only raise animosity in the region against the United States." At the Beirut summit of the Arab League at the end of March, the Arab nations unanimously endorsed a strongly worded resolution opposing an attack against Iraq. Even Kuwait has reconciled with Iraq since Baghdad formally recognized Kuwait's sovereignty and international borders. Twenty Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo in early September unanimously expressed their "total rejection of the threat of aggression on Arab nations, in particular Iraq."

American officials claim that, public statements to the contrary, there may be some regional allies willing to support a US war effort. Given President Bush's ultimatum that "either you are with us or you are with the terrorists," it's quite possible that some governments will be successfully pressured to go along. However, almost any Middle Eastern regime willing to provide such support and cooperation would be doing so over the opposition of the vast majority of its citizens. Given the real political risks for any ruler supporting the US war effort, such acquiescence would take place only reluctantly, as a result of US pressure or inducements, not from a sincere belief in the validity of the military operation.

8. "Regime change" will enhance regional stability and enhance the prospects for democracy in the region.

As is apparent in Afghanistan, throwing a government out is easier than putting a new one together. Although most Iraqis would presumably be relieved in the event of Saddam Hussein's ouster, this does not mean that a regime installed by a Western army would be welcomed. For example, some of the leading candidates that US officials are apparently considering installing to govern Iraq following a successful US invasion are former Iraqi military officers who took part in offensives that involved war crimes.

In addition to possible ongoing guerrilla action by Saddam Hussein's supporters, American occupation forces would likely be faced with competing armed factions among the Sunni Arab population, not to mention Kurdish and Shiite rebel groups seeking greater autonomy. This could lead the United States into a bloody counterinsurgency war. Without the support of other countries or the UN, a US invasion could leave American forces effectively alone attempting to enforce a peace amid the chaos of a post-Saddam Iraq.

A US invasion of Iraq would likely lead to an outbreak of widespread anti-American protests throughout the Middle East, perhaps even attacks against American interests. Some pro-Western regimes could become vulnerable to internal radical forces. Passions are particularly high in light of strong US support for the policies of Israel's rightist government and its ongoing occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The anger over US double standards regarding Israeli and Iraqi violations of UN Security Council resolutions and possession of weapons of mass destruction could reach a boiling point. Recognizing that the United States cannot be defeated on the battlefield, more and more Arabs and Muslims resentful of American hegemony in their heartland may be prone to attack by unconventional means, as was so tragically demonstrated last September 11. The Arab foreign ministers, aware of such possibilities, warned at their meeting in Cairo that a US invasion of Iraq would "open the gates of hell."

Ten reasons to oppose Bush's war of terror
The Socialist Alliance was appalled by and condemned the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington (see a full statement here). But the Socialist Alliance is also totally opposed to the war of retaliation against Afghanistan by the US government and its allies-including the Howard government and its ALP "opposition" Here are 10 good reasons why:

1 Because the war will bring even more pain and suffering to millions of innocent people
AFGHANISTAN IS ONE OF THE POOREST countries in the world. Before the bombing began the World Food Program (WFP) estimated that famine meant six million in the country needed food aid: now that figure has risen to 7.5 million, with millions facing death from starvation unless aid is increased massively and food convoys can resume.
The war will annihilate a country that is already largely destroyed. Because US weapons cannot be targeted to "take out" the guilty and miss the innocent; because the land war will shed the blood of numberless Afghan men, women and children; because George W. Bush, has told the US public that "we will use every necessary weapon of war"; and most of all because the war against terrorism "will likely be sustained for a period of years, not weeks or months" (US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld).
The conflict and suffering will not stop with Afghanistan. The US reservs the right to attack any country it regards as harbouring terrorists, like Iraq. In an October 7 letter to the Security Council US ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, wrote: "Our inquiry is in its early stages. We may find that our self-defense requires further actions with respect to other organisations and other states." Former CIA chief James Woolsey is even talking about a two- or three-decade war.
The 1550 Australian troops being sent to this unjust war will repeat the fate of those sent to Vietnam-as deputy-sheriff to the US military machine. They will be bit-players in a vicious conflict; they will inflict suffering on a people who have never brought Australia any harm; and they themselves will be the next generation to suffer from all the terrible after-effects of combat-all to help a cynical Liberal politician win his "khaki election".

2 Because it will spread, not reduce, terrorism
TERRORISTS ARE NOT BORN, BUT MADE. Made firstly by the appalling poverty and oppression that prevails in countries like Palestine, Pakistan, Iraq and many more. That's what creates a social base for terrorism., which is not an act of individual "evil" or "madness" but a political method.
Secondly, because socially progressive forces to lead the fight for social and national justice have been destroyed, are weak or simply don't exist the terrorist response seems the only weapon of resistance left. As a result many, especially young people with no future, feel that terror is the only weapon they have.
Even if the Western powers "get" Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, do they seriously think that will have "whipped" terrorism? Until the appalling inequalities and injustices of life in most of the Third World are seriously addressed terrorism will continue to spring up and Bush's war will only spur more to adopt the terror tactic That's why an ex-MI5 agent told a recent London rally against the war: "No-one in the intelligence community believes war is the answer to terrorism."
For one thing terrorism is cheap. The airliner attacks of September 11 are estimated to have cost no more than $200,000 and involved a score or so people. Similar attacks can readily be repeated and the US$30 billion a year the US spends on its intelligence budget is no guarantee Washington will have any more success in stopping them than they did on September 11.
Secondly, Islamic fundamentalism has a strong social and political presence across the whole of the Middle East. Even if-especially if-bin Laden and the Taliban are defeated in Afghanistan, fundamentalism will attract more support. UK Guardian commentator Tariq Ali foresees a "Talibanisation" of the Middle East:
"A major concern for the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis is that the Taliban, cornered and defeated in their own country, will turn on Pakistan and wreak havoc on its cities and social fabric…The consequences of the Anglo-American war in Afghanistan are likely to be incendiary."

3 Because it is illegal in international law
TO JUSTIFY ITS BOMBING OF AFGHANISTAN the US has invoked Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This gives a state the right to repel an attack until the UN Security Council can take steps to ensure international peace and security. But it does not allow unilateral retaliation once an attack has stopped.
As a result the atrocity of their war on the Afghan people puts Bush, Britain's Blair and Howard on the same moral level as the organisers of the atrocity of September 11. And even as it answers one crime with another. the US has declared itself prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner.
There were always alternatives to war. For example, the US rulers didn't think for a minute to submit the evidence of Osama bin Laden's guilt to the US judiciary, seek a warrant for his extradition and prepare to bring him to trial.
Of course, it never entered their head to submit evidence against bin Laden to a representative international tribunal, like the General Assembly of the United Nations or the proposed International Criminal Court-no international institutions are going to tell Uncle Sam how to fight terrorism.
That's why the US Congress has refused to ratify the 12 UN covenants dealing with terrorism, which would give these agreements the force of law within the US. It's also why the US continues to reject plans for a United Nations special conference on terrorism.
None of this is surprising in a government that was itself found guilty by the World Court of acts of state terrorism against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in the 1980s and ordered to pay compensation. Washington immediately refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the court.
It's worth noting that the one international expression of support the US did seek for its "war on terrorism"- the resolution on September 11 attack by the UN Security Council-didn't actually give the US the explicit right to bomb Afghanistan.
However, even if it had the bombing of the richest country in the world by the poorest remains a crime against humanity.

4 Because the US rulers are the last people to determine who is and isn't a terrorist
THE US ADMINISTRATION'S IDEA of who is a terrorist is broad and narrow at the same time. Broad as far as its opponents are concerned. In a May 10 "statement for the record" to various US Senate committees FBI director Louis J. Freeh roped into his definition a "category of domestic terrorists, left-wing groups, [who] generally profess a revolutionary socialist doctrine and view themselves as protectors of the people against the 'dehumanising effects' of capitalism and imperialism."
In the wake of September 11 US State Department spokeperson Richard Boucher said of the chances of a Sandinista victory in the coming Nicaraguan presidential elections: "We have serious concerns about the Sandinistas' history of confiscating properties without compensation, destroying the economy and maintaining links with those who support terrorism."
Yet as far as convicted terrorists at the other end of the political spectrum go, various US administrations have been very reluctant to use the "t" word and rather compassionate in their practical dealings with them.
Take, for example, Cuban exiles Luis Posada Carriles. and Orlando Bosch, guilty of the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner in which 73 died. After escaping from a Venezuelan jail while awaiting trial Posada Carriles immediately got a job in the White House with Colonel Oliver North, helping organise the contra terror in Nicaragua and the Salvadoran military's death squads. He later moved on to bombing Cuban tourist resorts and is presently being held in Panama for an attempted assassination attempt against Fidel Castro. Under intense US pressure, Panama is refusing to extradite him to Cuba.
Orlando Bosch has lived in the United States for ten years, after being released from a US prison in 1990 and pardoned in 1992. The New York Times described that last decision as "squandering American credibility on issues of terrorism".
Not surprisingly, the terrorist work of Bosch and Posada Carriles was funded by the ultra-right Cuban American National Foundation, a staunch supporter of the Republican Party in general and the Bush clan in particular. US ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, shares a similar background: he helped organise the Salvadoran generals in their slaughter of tens of thousands in the early 1990s.
Another problem with letting the US decide who is a terrorist is that for Washington today's "terrorists" were in many cases their "freedom fighters" of yesteryear. Saddam Hussein himself took part in a 1963 CIA-backed Baath party coup against the then president of Iraq, Abdul-Karim Kassem, guilty in Washington's eyes of being soft on "communism".
The Taliban are the most blatant example of this sort of flip-flop. These "freedom fighters" against the Soviet Union were funded to the tune of $US6 billion between 1978 and 1992, and by 1987 they were receiving 65,000 tons of weaponry a year from the US alone. While their brutally reactionary fundamentalism was turned against the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan government they were "patriots" in the eyes of former US secretary of state Zbigniew Brzezinski . It was only when their anti-communist Frankenstein turned against its US makers that the Taliban became "terrorist".

5 Because it will undermine our democratic rights and civil liberties
THE HORRORS OF SEPTEMBER 11 were a godsend to all those who want to tighten state and police controls. Legislation already passed by the US Senate will allow police and secret service agencies increased surveillance and interrogation powers. These include the power to hold foreigners suspected of being terrorists for up to seven days without charge, the right to impose "roving wiretaps" instead of taps on specific phone numbers, and the power to subpoena internet providers to provide email transmission records of suspected terrorists.
Even senators who voted for this bill expect that it will face constitutional challenge in the courts.
Here in Australia the Coalition, with the backing of the ALP, has announced substantial new powers for ASIO and is proposing anti-terrorism laws, which could violate basic rights and freedoms. The proposed changes being canvassed include the right to arrest and detention for up to 48 hours, the removal of the right to silence when under questioning, the creation of "terrorist offences" and related legislation violating the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association.
According to Damien Lawson of Melbourne's Western Suburbs Legal Service "the definition of terrorism is so broad that many community organisations involved in organising public protest or dissent could be included".
More broadly, the lynch mob mood being created by Bush ("You are either with us or against us") is making even the most timid expressions of dissent suspect. Being "soft on terrorism" is becoming a sin as mortal as being "soft on communism" during the Cold War. So hysterical is the atmosphere that anti-globalisation activists have been scared into calling off demonstrations and US officials like Colin Powell and national security adviser Condoleeza Rice have pressured US and Arabic-language TV networks not to give coverage to bin Laden.
In the words of New York Times commentator Frank Rich: "America's New War, as CNN has branded it, is already whipping up one of the Cold War's most self-destructive maladies-a will to stifle dissent." (See a Socialist Alliance statement on Howard's terror laws here.)

6 Because it will deepen racism and xenophobia
ACROSS THE WESTERN WORLD burning down mosques and assaults on people of Middle Eastern appearance have exploded since the September 11 attacks. In Sydney the Australian Arabic Communities Council has documented over 70 instances of attacks and abuse. In the US all immigrants have come under suspicion, with September 11 bringing an end, for example, to all talk of an amnesty for the millions of undocumented Mexican immigrants.
While Western leaders have condemned these attacks, the "war on terrorism" and all the talk in the popular press about "Osama bin Laden cells" and "terrorist infiltrators among asylum seekers" can only heighten fear and hatred of Muslim and Arab peoples. It deliberately puts pressure on these communities to behave as super-patriots to place themselves above suspicion.
Much more eloquent than the crocodile tears of Bush and Blair is the actual policy of exclusion, discrimination and repression against asylum-seekers and refugees practised by Western governments. Its constant message is that "we"-the mainly white, law-abiding citizens of the West-are under threat from "illegals" and "ethnic mafias" when the truth is that the vast majority of asylum-seekers are victims of Western policy such as support for Israel's war on the Palestinians and the criminal blockade of Iraq.
At a supposedly more "intellectual" level the September 11 attacks are being interpreted by some as an opening shot in a new "clash of civilisations" or as evidence of "Islamic methods of warfare" against which the "democratic" West must do everything to defend itself.
This is the language of the medieval Crusades dressed up for the 21st century, and is the mirror image of the language of jihad (holy war). Bush's self-righteous fundamentalism of "God Bless America" and "standing tall against the evil-doers" must deepen the appeal in the Arabic-speaking and Middle Eastern world of the bin Laden fundamentalist version of Islam.

7 Because it rests on an alliance which includes some of the worst state terrorists
BUSH'S WAR IS BUILT ON AN ALLIANCE with some of the nastiest people on the planet. They include:
· Pakistani dictator General Pervai Musharraf, who overthrew an elected government, was even rapped on the knuckles by Bill Clinton for human rights abuses, but has been transformed overnight from coup-leader into "president";
· Islam Karimov, the boss of Uzbekistan, who keeps 7000 political prisoners in jail and wants to solve his bankrupt country's economic crisis by laying an oil pipeline across Afghanistan to a Pakistan port;
· Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose troops reduced the rebel ex-Soviet republic of Chechnya to a wasteland and whose secret service is strongly suspected of bombing Moscow apartment blocks in order to scapegoat "Chechen terrorists" before the last Russian presidential elections;
· The butcher generals of Turkey, who in their campaign against the Kurdish people have banned the speaking of the Kurdish language and killed 30,000 over the last decade;
· The hyper-rich Saudi ruling family, whose religious police taught the Taliban all they know about the total degradation of women, public executions and hand-choppings and how to run a totally rigged judicial system;
· The present Israeli government of Ariel Sharon, who helped mastermind the slaughter of 1700 Palestinians in the camps of Sabra and Shatila during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in the early 1980s, and;
· The "Northern Alliance", which Human Rights Watch has found guilty of "indiscriminate aerial bombardment and shelling, direct attacks on civilians, summary executions, rape, persecution on the basis of religion or ethnicity, the recruitment and use of children as soldiers, and the use of antipersonnel landmines". According to the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan the very thought of a return to power by the Northern Alliance has "plunged our people into a horrific concern and anxiety in fear of re-experiencing the dreadful happenings" of their last rule over southern parts of the country.

8 Because, at bottom, it's a war for global US interests
BUSH'S "WAR AGAINST TERRORISM" IS THE MOST open-ended war ever declared. So long as there is a group or nation in the world that the US calls "terrorist" or a state to accuse of harbouring terrorism, then Washington has a pretext for war. This makes the "war against terrorism" perfect cover for the US to use its military power to pursue its economic and political ends.
The US has been encountering stiff opposition to its global economic agenda-trade "liberalisation", defence of corporate patent "rights", ditching of social and environmental standards, along with the right to station the US military in every part of the world and build whatever weapons it pleases.
Now, exploiting the grief and anger of the American people, Washington has grabbed the terrorist attacks as a chance to turn the tables on its rivals and impose a new number one priority that favours US interests on world politics.
As a result what we now face is not a short war of retaliation against bin Laden and the Taliban but an ongoing campaign, one which aims to relaunch the neo-liberal offensive and reassert US dominance in all spheres.
Central to the US agenda is the expansion of its military power. Firstly, all the objections to Bush's National Missile Defense (NMD) program can now be swept aside-obviously a nation that is charged with defence of freedom against terrorism needs every weapon it can lay its hands on.
The coming boost in US military spending, which will include such items as a global bomber based on space-shuttle technology, will give the US first-strike nuclear capacity. It will be aimed not, of course, against Afghanistan, but against its actual and emerging economic rivals, in particular China, which will be drawn into an exhausting arms race. If the US succeeds in imposing the "war against terrorism" as the most important priority, it will:tighten its grip on the vast oil deposits of Central Asia and the Caucusus. It will also:
· Reduce the need to manufacture special excuses for intervening against popular struggles-pretexts like the "war on drugs", the flimsy rationale for Plan Colombia whose real aim is to crush the Colombian popular and guerrilla movements. In the future the job can largely be done by "revelations" of a "terrorist threat" and some sinister references to anthrax.
· Be useful in confronting the European Union in those areas where economic rivalry is intense-particularly in the Middle East and Arabic-speaking world (Europe has been strengthening economic links with countries like Libya and Iraq). Washington is moving to include some Middle Eastern states in its anti-terrorist alliance, while outlawing others and pressuring its European rivals to do likewise.
· Be turned against old enemies like Cuba and Vietnam, and any other Third World country resisting US plans for the planet. Already stories are appearing in the US media of Cuba's alleged capacity to wage biological warfare, as a result of its biotechnology research. The ultra-right Miami Cuban exile community is calling on its friend Bush to include Havana on the Pentagon's terrorist target list.
· Have a useful weapon against its newest enemy-the global anti-corporate movement. The global justice movement has been winning broad sympathy among working people and is causing increasing anxiety among the leaders of the major industrial powers. As the victim of a terrible terrorist attack Washington is now able to present its agenda for the world as a defence of human rights and democracy-it has acquired a new "Evil Empire" against which to lead the mission for freedom. The message is that the US must remain strong to defend us all against the terrorists, and that the global justice movement can only weaken the defence of the central pillar of Western civilisation.

9 Because the only way to eliminate terrorism is to strike at its roots
THE SOCIALIST ALLIANCE IS 100 PER CENT opposed to terrorism. We believe in and fight for the free, mass, democratic struggle of working and oppressed people in defence of their own interests.
For example, it's up to the Afghan people-and not the present imperialist unholy alliance-to free themselves of the Taliban, bin Laden and the Northern Alliance.
But we understand why young Palestinians feel so enraged and desperate that they are willing to destroy themselves and other innocent people in suicide bombings. We say that to eliminate terrorism we have to eliminate the conditions that drive people to terrorist acts. We have to fight for policies for global justice and equality like those in this ten-point plan:
1. Stop arming dictatorial regimes.
2. Stop training the troops of repressive regimes.
3. Stop fostering "friendly" terrorist groups.
4. Cancel the Third World debt.
5. End the WTO-IMF drive to enhance global corporate exploitation, which just sinks the Third World deeper in debt.
6. Increase untied humanitarian aid to the Third World.
7. End the war against refugees.
8. Demand that the US ratify UN conventions against terrorism and abide by international law.
9. Make the UN Security Council representative of and accountable to the UN General Assembly, and remove the veto power of the permanent members.
10. Lift the blockade of Iraq and support consistent implementation of UN resolutions, especially on Palestine.