THE COUNTER DOSSIER

"the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt … that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons"
The Prime Minister's foreword to the dossier on Iraq, 24 September 2002

After over three months of inspections, the UN weapons inspectors reported on 6 March that "No proscribed activities, or the result of such activities from the period of 1998-2002 have, so far, been detected through inspections." If Britain had any intelligence to indicate that Iraq had continued to produce prohibited weapons, where was it when it could have been checked out by inspectors?
"the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt .. that he [Saddam Hussein] continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons"
The Prime Minister's foreword to the dossier on Iraq, 24 September 2002

IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei told the Security Council on 7 March 2003 that "After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq."
"We know that this man has got weapons of mass destruction. That sounds like a slightly abstract phrase, but what we are talking about is chemical weapons, biological weapons, viruses, bacilli and anthrax—10,000 litres of anthrax—that he has. We know that he has it, Dr. Blix points that out and he has failed to account for that."
Jack Straw to the House of Commons, 17 March 2003

The UN has never claimed that Iraq "has" these weapons, but that Iraq had certain amounts of weapons before 1991 or materials to build these weapons, and it hasn't adequately explained what happened to them. As Hans Blix said in September 2002, "this is not the same as saying there are weapons of mass destruction. If I had solid evidence that Iraq retained weapons of mass destruction or were constructing such weapons I would take it to the Security Council."
"There is no doubt about the chemical programme, the biological programme, indeed the nuclear weapons programme. All that is well documented by the United Nations."
Tony Blair, 30 May 2003

The UN has not found any evidence of any on-going programmes since the mid-1990s. Dr Blix said on 23 May that "I am obviously very interested in the question of whether or not there were weapons of mass destruction and I am beginning to suspect there possibly were not."
"Iraq has chemical and biological agents and weapons available [..] from pre-Gulf War stocks".
Prime Minister's dossier on Iraq, 24 September 2002

The claim that Iraq has managed to retain extensive stockpiles of these weapons for 12 years is not plausible. All chemical and biological agents that Iraq produced before 1991 - with the one exception of the chemical agent of mustard gas - would have degenerated by now.
"plants formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme have been rebuilt. These include the chlorine and phenol plant at Fallujah 2 near Habbaniyah."
Prime Minister's dossier on Iraq, 24 September 2002

All eight of the sites mentioned in the Prime Minister's dossier were visited by inspectors, who found no evidence of prohibited activities at any of them. At Fallujah II, the inspectors reported that: "The chlorine plant is currently inoperative".
"According to intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 Al Hussein missiles … They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650km, are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel."
Prime Minister's dossier on Iraq, 24 September 2002

There has been no sign of these missiles, and the government has downplayed the risk of there being any such weapons in Iraq since the invasion began. Chemical protection equipment was removed from British bases in Cyprus soon after September, indicating that the government did not take its own claims seriously.
"there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa".
Prime Minister's dossier on Iraq, 24 September 2002

Mr Blair asserts that this claim is still true, but even the US administration accepts that there is no reliable evidence for it. The IAEA, to whom the government has a responsibility to give any credible information about nuclear-related sales, has not received any information other than the infamous forged Niger documents.
Saddam Hussein's "military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them."
The Prime Minister's foreword to the dossier on Iraq, 24 September 2002

Mr Blair himself contradicted this claim when he said on 28 April that Iraq had begun to conceal its weapons in May 2002, and that had meant that they could not have been used. The supposed source for this claim is one individual who was in Iraq's military: he or she has not been produced to provide evidence for this claim.
"Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons."
President Bush, 7 October 2002

This claim was repeatedly rubbished by the International Atomic Energy Agency, who observed that the tubes were being used for artillery rockets, but the US administration kept making it. The head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, told the Security Council in January that the tubes were not even suitable for centrifuges.
"The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin -- enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure."
President Bush, 28 January 2003

The UN in fact drew the opposite conclusion. In March, UN inspectors reported: "it seems unlikely that significant undeclared quantities of botulinum toxin could have been produced, based on the quantity of media unaccounted for."
"By 1998, UN experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological weapons programs."
US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN Security Council, 5 February 2003

Drying technology is important because only dried biological agents can be stored for years. The UN has never claimed that Iraq had perfected these techniques. In fact, in March they recorded that it "has no evidence that drying of anthrax or any other agent in bulk was conducted."
"Saddam Hussein...has the wherewithal to develop smallpox"
US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN Security Council, 5 February 2003

The UN recorded in March 2003 that "there is no evidence that Iraq had possessed seed stocks for smallpox or had been actively engaged in smallpox research".
"When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp, and this camp is located in northeastern Iraq. You see a picture of this camp."
US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN Security Council, 5 February 2003
This camp was found to contain no suspicious materials. A journalist from ABC who entered the camp with US forces reported, "A specialized biochemical team scoured the rubble for samples. They wore protective masks as they entered a building they suspected was a weapons lab, but found nothing."
"Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."
President George W. Bush, address to the nation, 18 March 2003

The "most lethal weapons" are nuclear weapons. Unlike the US, Iraq has never possessed nuclear weapons.
"The evidence in respect of Iraq was so strong that the Security Council on the 8th of November said unanimously that Iraq's proliferation and possession of the weapons of mass destruction and unlawful missile systems, as well as its defiance of the United Nations, pose – and I quote – 'a threat to international peace and security'."
Foreign secretary Jack Straw, interview of 14 May 2003

There have been repeated attempts by the government to claim that the unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 1441 demonstrated that everyone accepted that Iraq possessed prohibited weapons. This is untrue: it claims that Iraq was not complying with inspectors, but nowhere asserts that Iraq possessed these weapons. Jack Straw here is wilfully misinterpreting one clause of the resolution, which stated in the abstract that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was a threat to international peace: it did not accuse Iraq of doing this, because most countries on the Security Council did not believe that Iraq was engaged in proliferation.

Inspections and Iraq's concealment of weapons
"We issued further intelligence over the weekend about the infrastructure of concealment. It is obviously difficult when we publish intelligence reports"
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 3 February 2003
Most of this "intelligence report" turned out to be cribbed from three on-line articles which were jumbled together sometimes in an incoherent manner.
"Escorts are trained, for example, to start long arguments with other Iraqi officials 'on behalf of UNMOVIC' while any incriminating evidence is hastily being hidden behind the scenes."
The dossier of February 2003

This claim was contradicted by the weapons inspectors. Chief UN inspector of Hans Blix told the Security Council on 14 February 2003 that "Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and access was almost always provided promptly ... we note that access to sites has so far been without problems".
"Journeys are monitored by security officers stationed on the route if they have prior intelligence. Any changes of destination are notified ahead by telephone or radio so that arrival is anticipated. The welcoming party is a give away."
The dossier of February 2003

Hans Blix told the Security Council on 14 February that "In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming."
"Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide a comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass destruction programs."
US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN Security Council, 5 February 2003

Hans Blix had suggested in December that Iraq should give sets of names in stages: "Iraq may proceed in pyramid fashion, starting from the leadership in programmes, going down to management, scientists, engineers and technicians but excluding the basic layer of workers". This seems to be what Iraq did: it provided lists of 117 persons for the chemical sector, 120 for the biological sector and 156 persons for the missile sector by the end of December 2002. On the UN's request, Iraq added more names.
"the reason why the inspectors couldn't do their job in the end was that Saddam wouldn't co-operate."
Tony Blair, interview on 4 April 2003
Hans Blix told the Security Council on 7 March 2003 that "the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as 'active', or even 'proactive'".

Past weapons inspections
"the UN has tried unsuccessfully for 12 years to get Saddam to disarm peacefully."
Tony Blair, interview in the Independent on Sunday, 2 March 2003

In 1999, the Security Council set up a panel to assess the UN's achievements in the peaceful disarmament of Iraq. It concluded that: "Although important elements still have to be resolved, the bulk of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated."
"The UN inspectors found no trace at all of Saddam's offensive biological weapons programme – which he claimed didn't exist – until his lies were revealed by his son-in-law."
Tony Blair, interview in the Independent on Sunday, 2 March 2003

This is pure fabrication, used to make the claim that weapons inspectors are ineffective. The UN had already determined that Iraq had had a biological weapons programme months before Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, defected. In the face of the evidence that the UN put to them, the Iraqi regime admitted that they had an offensive biological weapons programme on 1 July 1995. Saddam Hussein's son-in-law defected on 7 August 1995.
"Only then [after Hussein Kamel's defection] did the inspectors find over 8,000 litres of concentrated anthrax and other biological weapons, and a factory to make more."
Tony Blair, interview in the Independent on Sunday, 2 March 2003

UN inspectors have never found anthrax in Iraq. Iraq claimed that it had destroyed all its stocks of anthrax in 1991, and the dispute over anthrax since then has concerned the UN's attempts to verify these claims. The factory at which Iraq had made anthrax, al-Hakam, had been under inspection since 1991, contrary to the Prime Minister's claim.

Finding weapons
"I have got absolutely no doubt that those weapons are there. … once we have the cooperation of the scientists and the experts, I have got no doubt that we will find them."
Tony Blair, interview on 4 April 2003
Almost all the scientists have been captured, but there has still been no sign of the weapons.
"On weapons of mass destruction, we know that the regime has them, we know that as the regime collapses we will be led to them."
Tony Blair, press conference with George W. Bush, 8 April 2003

The regime collapsed over three months ago; still no weapons of mass destruction found.
"we know where they [the weapons] are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat."
US Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld, interview on 30 March 2003

If Mr Rumsfeld knew where the weapons were, why haven't they been found?
"We have already found two trailers, both of which we believe were used for the production of biological weapons"
Tony Blair, press conference in Poland on 30 May 2003

In fact, government experts believe that the trailers were used for the production of hydrogen for artillery guidance balloons, a system sold by the UK to Iraq in the 1980s.

Iraq and terrorism
"there is some intelligence evidence about linkages between members of al-Qaeda and people in Iraq."
Tony Blair to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, 21 January 2003

In early February, a classified British intelligence report, written by defence intelligence staff, was passed to the BBC. Far from substantiating the charge that there were "linkages" between al-Qaeda and Iraq, the report states that there were no current links between the two, and claims that Bin Laden's "aims are in ideological conflict with present day Iraq". The report was written in mid-January, and had been presented to Tony Blair just prior to his 21 January presentation at the Liaison Committee.
"We believe that there have been, and still are, some al-Qaeda operatives in parts of Iraq controlled by Baghdad. It is hard to imagine that they are there without the knowledge and acquiescence of the Iraqi Government."
Foreign Office spokesperson, 29 January 2003

No evidence has been presented of al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq: if such persons were in Iraq, why haven't they been found?

The decision to go to war
"As the Foreign Secretary has pointed out, resolution 1441 gives the legal basis for this [war]"
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 12 March 2003

Resolution 1441 was secured on the British commitment that it did not authorise military action, even if the UK or US believed it was being violated by Iraq. Britain's UN ambassador Jeremy Greenstock told the Security Council on 8 November 2002 that "There is no 'automaticity' in this Resolution. If there is a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion".
"Resolution 678 which says that the international community should take all necessary means to uphold security and peace. In other words, that Saddam Hussein should disarm".
Gordon Brown, interview on 16 March 2003

Resolution 678 was about using force to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It was not about the disarmament of Iraq, a topic that was only discussed at the Security Council for the first time some four months after Resolution 678 was passed.
"on Monday night, France said it would veto a second Resolution whatever the circumstances."
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 18 March 2003

Mr Blair claimed that diplomatic solutions were impossible because of French obstructionism at the Security Council. In fact, President Chirac said that France would vote against any resolution that authorised force whilst inspections were still working. Chirac said that he "considers this evening that there are no grounds for waging war in order to ... disarm Iraq", a position borne out by UN reports on the progress of inspections.

Post-war Iraq
"the oil revenues, which people falsely claim that we want to seize, should be put in a trust fund for the Iraqi people administered through the UN."
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 18 March 2003

Britain co-sponsored a resolution to the Security Council, which was passed in May as Resolution 1483, that gave the US and UK control over Iraq's oil revenues. There is no UN-administered trust fund.
"The United Kingdom should seek a new Security Council Resolution that would affirm ... the use of all oil revenues for the benefit of the Iraqi people."
Motion to the House of Commons for war with Iraq, moved by Tony Blair, 18 March 2003
Far from "all oil revenues" being used for the Iraqi people, the British co-sponsored Resolution 1483 continued to make deductions from Iraq's oil earnings to pay in compensation for the invasion of Kuwait.
"our aim has not been regime change, our aim has been the elimination of weapons of mass destruction"
Tony Blair, press conference, 25 March 2003
This claim is looking increasingly implausible. Weapons inspectors were reporting Iraq's "proactive" cooperation, and were projecting that Iraq could be declared as fully disarmed within three months if that cooperation continued. If Mr Blair was the elimination of prohibited weapons, why terminate the inspection process just when it was most effective?

Review of ElBaradei's speech in the Security Council (07/03/2003): False documents used by UK/US governments

Perhaps the most striking claim in today's proceedings at the Security Council was that made by IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei that the documents provided by the US and UK to substantiate their case that Iraq has tried to import uranium "are in fact not authentic."

He came to this conclusion after reviewing the evidence extensively - including "correspondence coming from various bodies of the Government of Niger" - and "compar[ing] the form, format, contents and signatures of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation".

One can only conclude then that these documents are deliberate forgeries.

To go over the background, the Blair govt in its 24 Sept 02 said - I think for the first time - that "there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

This was clarified by the US State Dept on 19 Dec 02 as "efforts to procure uranium from Niger".

Now ElBaradei reports today as follows:

"The IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation was centred on documents provided by a number of States that pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001.

"The IAEA has discussed these reports with the Governments of Iraq and Niger, both of which have denied that any such activity took place. For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of its relations with Niger, and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of African countries, including Niger, in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports. The IAEA was also able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the Government of Niger, and to compare the form, format, contents and signatures of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation.

"Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents - which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger - are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded."

ElBaradei concluded: "There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990."

This should be a major scandal: who (specifically) provided the false documents to the IAEA? Who produced them? And what indication should the US and UK have that the documents were false?

URLs below:

UK dossier - the claim is at p.25:
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page271.asp

State Department, 19 December:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118pf.htm

ElBaradei statement of 7 March 2003:
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml

In addition to the claims above, ElBaradei's arguments today were stronger than ever:

"After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq."

"There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites."

"There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes in question."

Glen Rangwala.

Review of the evidence presented by Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) and Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA) to the Security Council on 14 February 2003, and contrasts it to the claims of Colin Powell to the Security Council on 5 February and Tony Blair in a dossier of 2 February.
Links to the original documents are at the end of this page.

1. GENERAL

CLAIM

Powell: "The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose to the world."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "So far, UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared and destroyed."

2. COMPLIANCE with INSPECTIONS

a) CLAIM

Blair dossier, p.3: "Journeys are monitored by security officers stationed on the route if they have prior intelligence. Any changes of destination are notified ahead by telephone or radio so that arrival is anticipated. The welcoming party is a give away."

Powell: "This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that Iraq had been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji"

EVIDENCE

Blix: "Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming."

b) CLAIM

Blair dossier, p.3: "Escorts are trained, for example, to start long arguments with other Iraqi officials ‘on behalf of UNMOVIC’ while any incriminating evidence is hastily being hidden behind the scenes."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "we note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including those that had never been declared or inspected, as well as to Presidential sites and private residences."

3. 'COMPLIANCE on SUBSTANCE'

a) CLAIM

Powell: "We believe Saddam Hussein knows what he did with [chemical weapons] and he has not come clean with the international community. We have evidence these weapons existed. What we don't have is evidence from Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "a letter of 12 February from Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate may be of relevance. It presents a list of 83 names of participants 'in the unilateral destruction in the chemical field, which took place in the summer of 1991'. As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains an important reason why quantities of chemicals have been deemed 'unaccounted for', the presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed about the actions appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance."

b) CLAIM

Blair dossier, p.2: "The Regime has intensified efforts to hide documents in places where they are unlikely to be found, such as private homes of low-level officials and universities."

Powell: "Thanks to intelligence they were provided, the inspectors recently found dramatic confirmation of these reports. When they searched the homes of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000 pages of documents. You see them here being brought out of the home and placed in UN hands. Some of the material is classified and related to Iraq's nuclear program."

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "The IAEA has completed a more detailed review of the 2000 pages of documents found on 16 January at the private residence of an Iraqi scientist. The documents relate predominantly to lasers, including the use of laser technology to enrich uranium. [...] While the documents have provided some additional details about Iraq's laser enrichment development efforts, they refer to activities or sites already known to the IAEA and appear to be the personal files of the scientist in whose home they were found. Nothing contained in the documents alters the conclusions previously drawn by the IAEA concerning the extent of Iraq's laser enrichment programme."

c) CLAIM

Powell: " Iraq has a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to monitor Iraq's disarmament -- not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had been appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads, had had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed items. This was welcomed. A second commission, we learnt, has now been appointed with the task of searching all over Iraq for more documents relevant to the elimination of proscribed items and programmes. It is headed by the former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and is to have very extensive powers of search in industry, administration and even private houses."

4. CONCEALMENT?

a) CLAIM

Powell: " you will see the type of concealment activity Iraq has undertaken in response to the resumption of inspections. [...] We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move equipment of this nature before inspections if they were anxious to demonstrate what they had or did not have?"

EVIDENCE

Blix: "intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items were found. Even in such cases, however, inspection of these sites were useful in proving the absence of such items and in some cases the presence of other items – conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass destruction."

b) CLAIM

Powell: "This one is about a weapons munition facility, a facility that holds ammunition at a place called Taji. This is one of about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed chemical munitions. [...] Here you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red outlines. The four that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers. [...] Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking at two of those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, the tents are gone. It's been cleaned up. And it was done on the 22nd of December as the UN inspection team is arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the right. The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They found nothing."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "The presentation of intelligence information by the US Secretary of State suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and removing evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would like to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection."

5. The EFFECTIVENESS of INSPECTIONS

a) CLAIM

Powell: "The pattern is not just one of reluctant cooperation, nor is it merely a lack of cooperation. What we see is a deliberate campaign to prevent any meaningful inspection work."

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "The Government of Iraq reiterated last week its commitment to comply with its Security Council obligations and to provide full and active co-operation with the inspecting organizations. Subject to Iraq making good on this commitment, the above measures will contribute to the effectiveness of the inspection process."

b) CLAIM

Powell: "Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day. It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was making biological agents. How long do you think it will take the inspectors to find even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming forward as they are supposed to with the information about these kinds of capabilities."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "It is our intention to examine the possibilities for surveying ground movements, notably by trucks. In the face of persistent intelligence reports for instance about mobile biological weapons production units, such measures could well increase the effectiveness of inspections."

6. INTERVIEWS

a) CLAIM

Powell: "The regime only allows interviews with inspectors in the presence of an Iraqi official, a minder."

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: " The IAEA has continued to interview key Iraqi personnel. We have recently been able to conduct four interviews in private - that is, without the presence of an Iraqi observer."

b) CLAIM

Powell: "Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide a comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass destruction programs."

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "In response to a request by the IAEA, Iraq has expanded the list of relevant Iraqi personnel to over 300, along with their current work locations. The list includes the higher-level key scientists known to the IAEA in the nuclear and nuclear related areas."

7. WEAPONS and FACILITIES

a) CLAIM

Powell: "These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for. [...] Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were "unaccounted for". One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."

b) CLAIM

Powell: "As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence, Iraq has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever had. Notice the dramatic difference in size between the test stand on the left, the old one, and the new one on the right. Note the large exhaust vent. This is where the flame from the engine comes out. The exhaust vent on the right test stand is five times longer than the one on the left. The one of the left is used for short-range missiles. The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers. This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then, the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder for satellites to see what's going on underneath the test stand."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that is nearing completion [...]. So far, the test stand has not been associated with a proscribed activity."

c) CLAIM

Powell: "it strikes me as quite odd that these [aluminium] tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don't think so.

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "Iraq has been asked to explain the reasons for the tight tolerance specifications that it had requested from various suppliers. Iraq has provided documentation related to the project for reverse engineering and has committed itself to providing samples of tubes received from prospective suppliers."

d) CLAIM

Powell: "Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. [...] there is no doubt in my mind. These illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program".

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "IAEA inspectors found a number of documents relevant to transactions aimed at the procurement of carbon fibre, a dual-use material used by Iraq in its past clandestine uranium enrichment programme for the manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors. Our review of these documents suggests that the carbon fibre sought by Iraq was not intended for enrichment purposes, as the specifications of the material appear not to be consistent with those needed for manufacturing rotor tubes. In addition, we have carried out follow-up inspections, during which we have been able to observe the use of such carbon fibre in non-nuclear-related applications and to take samples."

References:

Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, "Briefing to the Security Council" (14 February 2003), at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/blix14Febasdel.htm

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, "The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq" (14 February 2003), at:

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml

Tony Blair, "Iraq - its infrastructure of concealment, deception and intimidation" (2 February 2003), via:

http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7111.asp

Secretary of State Colin Powell, "Remarks to The United Nations Security Council" (5 February 2003), at:

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm

For more detailed analysis of the evidence for the claims by the US and UK governments, see "Claims and evaluations of Iraq's proscribed weapons", at:

http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweapons.html

a) comments on Secretary of State Powell to Security Council (5 February 2003)

Glen Rangwala
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Free School Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RQ, UK

The main points I'd make about the Powell presentation are:

(a) He makes strong claims about Iraq's retention and development of non-conventional weapons, but the claims that he provides substantive evidence for are either tangential or the evidence is ambiguous.

An example would be how Powell claimed: "We know that Saddam's son, Qusay, ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes ... We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities." If Powell had been able to show any evidence for either of these claims, that would have constituted much more plausible proof of the US claims.

However, instead of providing proof of any of those claims, Powell instead produced photos of al-Taji ammunition storage facility that shows a small shed and a truck adjacent to the bunker. Powell claimed that these are "a signature item" for chemical bunkers. This seems on the face of it to be a wholly implausible claim: a picture of a truck and a shed by themselves reveal nothing about the contents of the adjacent bunker.

In summary, Powell didn't provide evidence for the stronger claims that he made, instead displaying a satellite photo that reveals very little. This would indicate that the evidence for the stronger claims is either non-existent or contentious.

(b) The recordings only seem to show is that Iraq didn't want its 7 December declaration to be found to be inadequate, not that it was trying to conceal weapons. The two are very different sorts of activities.

According to SCR 687 / 1441, the unilateral destruction of prohibited weapons and their remnants is prohibited. However, if the concern is more with Iraq's retention of weapons than formal observance of the terms of SC resolutions, then Iraq's attempts to dispose of any remaining parts of chemical rockets should not be interpreted as equivalent in security terms to it retaining stocks of weapons.

(c) Powell claimed the US had evidence of prohibited weapons at certain sites, but that Iraq moved them whilst inspectors were in the country to conceal them. Powell took this as evidence of Iraqi violation of SCR 1441.

For example, Powell claimed that the material at al-Taji store was moved on 22 December 2002. The question then becomes why didn't the US then provide this information to the inspectors as soon as they entered Iraq (27 November), who could have verified those claims, before the material was allegedly moved? Why did the US not allow an independent inspectorate to check its allegations about the contents of al-Taji, if they were genuine in their beliefs?

(d) There is a very strong reliance upon Iraqi defectors. This is a notoriously unreliable source, and many of the claims of the same defectors that Powell implictly refers to have since been shown to be inaccurate.

An example would be the claims of Adnan Saeed al-Haideri, who Powell refers to without naming him (as an "Iraqi civil engineer"). Haideri did not make any claims about mobile production facilities in his first press conferences in December 2001. It was only after debriefing by the US and a three-week "debriefing" by Nabil Musawi, spokesman for the opposition Iraqi National Congress, in Bangkok, that Haideri started talking about mobile facilities, in mid-2002.

In general, Powell makes some plausible claims that Iraq has not stood by the letter of the law in all respects. However, he does not show that Iraq has developed weapons on any scale, or that it has the potential to threaten Iraq's own people or its neighbours, much less the US. Nor does he show that Iraq may be able to develop its non-conventional capacity if weapons inspectors continue their work in Iraq.

------------

The claims by Powell in order:

1. A recording of a conversation of 26/11/02 between two senior officers in which al-Kindi company was said to have been "evacuated".

The sound quality of this recording is very poor, and I'm unable to hear the word used, that Powell translates as "evacuated".

2. A recording of a conversation of 20/1/03 in which two officers are discussing "forbidden ammo": there are orders to "clean out all the areas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas".

This seems more to be about making sure that the weapons inspectors don't find any material that is undeclared in the 7 December 2002 statement. The officers talk about "the possibility there is, by chance, forbidden ammo": in other words, like Unmovic found rockets on 16 January (4 days prior to

the conversation). The officers seem to be stating that they need to make sure that they have disposed of any such material, not the transfer of known stores away from Unmovic's reach.

3. al-Taji munitions facility. Powell's photos of this facility show a small shed and a truck adjacent to the bunker. Powell claimed that these are "a signature item" for chemical bunkers.

This seems on the face of it to be a wholly implausible claim: a picture of a truck and a shed by themselves reveal nothing about the contents of the adjacent bunker.

al-Taji was evacuated, according to Powell, on 22 December 2002. The question then becomes why didn't the US then provide this information to the inspectors as soon as they entered Iraq (27 November), who could have verified those claims, before the material was allegedly moved? Why did the US not allow an independent inspectorate to check its allegations about the contents of al-Taji, if they were genuine in their beliefs?

4. Powell claimed an unnamed ballistic missiles site was evacuated in November 2002, using large cargo trucks.

5. Iraq has prevented U-2 aerial reconnaissance flights.

6. Iraq has prevented interviews with its personnel.

Here, the US again is relying on allegations that it has not demonstrated. Powell claimed that the Iraq government insists on a minder being present; has threatened scientists with death if they revealed sensitive information; indicated that anyone who left Iraq to be interviewed would be treated as a spy; created false death certificates; and placed scientists under house arrest. None of these claims have been backed up with any substantive evidence at all by the US.

7. Iraq has not provided an adequate list of its scientists.

Iraq provided lists of 117 persons for the chemical sector, 120 for the biological sector and 156 persons for the missile sector by the end of December 2002. Powell contrasted Iraq's position with the list that UNSCOM compiled of 3500 names.

However, Hans Blix had himself suggested that Iraq should give sets of names in stages: "Iraq may proceed in pyramid fashion, starting from the leadership in programmes, going down to management, scientists, engineers and technicians but excluding the basic layer of workers." (statement to the Security Council, 19 December 2002). If Powell has a problem with Blix's way of working, he should raise those issues for the Council to discuss with Blix.

8. Iraq's alleged biological weapons stockpile.

Powell made the claim: "Less than a teaspoon of dry anthrax, a little bit -- about this amount. This is just about the amount of a teaspoon. Less than a teaspoon full of dry anthrax in an envelope shut down the United States Senate in the fall of 2001 [..] And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoonful of this deadly material."

The problem for Powell is that there is no evidence that Iraq did, or could, produce dried anthrax. It is known to have produced only wet anthrax agents. There have been allegations that Iraq was researching drying technologies for anthrax. In particular, Bacillus thuringiensis spores – a close relation to anthrax spores - were tested on a spray dryer in December 1989, according to UNSCOM. However, there has been no evidence that anthrax spores were themselves ever dried by Iraq, and it is unclear if Iraq ever obtained suitable drying equipment for itself.

A full review of the evidence about Iraq's anthrax is at:

http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweapons.html#bexista

9. Mobile biological production facilities. Powell discussed the claims of 4 defectors.

This is a notoriously unreliable source, and many of the claims of the same defectors that Powell implictly refers to have since been shown to be inaccurate.

Furthermore, many of the stationary sites Saeed claimed were engaged in the production of biological weapons have since been inspected by Unmovic. A review in brief is at:

http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweapons.html#bprodstat

10. Iraq's biological research developments. Powell attributes various claims to sources that do not, it seems, make these claims.

"By 1998, UN experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological weapons programs. ... We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully weaponized not only anthrax, but also other biological agents including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin.

Saddam Hussein has [..] the wherewithal to develop smallpox."

Firstly, the UN never concluded that Iraq had perfected drying techniques, merely that there was experimentation with Bacillus thuringiensis spores in 1989. Secondly, Iraq did not admit to having successfully weaponised ricin: it only admits to attempting field trials using 155mm artillery shells in November 1990. Finally, the claim about smallpox seems inapposite: unless Iraq had been able to preserve live smallpox virus from the early 1970s, it must have imported it: the only known stocks are in Russia and the US, and there is no indication these stocks have been compromised.

11. Iraq's biological weapons sprayers.

12. Chemical weapons stockpile. Powell referred to

(a) 550 artillery shells with mustard.

Iraq declared that it filled approximately 13,000 artillery shells with mustard prior to 1991. UNSCOM accounted for 12,792 of these shells, and destroyed them in the period of 1992-94. However, Iraq also declared that 550 mustard-filled artillery shells had been lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The extent to which these - if they still existed – could constitute an ongoing danger should be assessed in light of the need to deploy large amounts of mustard for effective use.

Mustard has a low volume-to-effectiveness ratio. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies record in the strategic dossier of September 2002, at p.43:

"large amounts of mustard are necessary for effective military operations.

Roughly, one tonne of agent is needed to effectively contaminate 2.6 square kilometres of territory, if properly disseminated."

(b) enough precursors to increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents.

UNSCOM did recognise that it was unable to account for the balance between the precursor chemicals that Iraq is known to have had in 1991, and those that were verifiably destroyed. The total declared by Iraq – either produced by Iraq or imported - amounted to some 20,150 tonnes. Of these, 14,500 tonnes were used for the production of chemical weapons or for producing other precursors (leaving a balance of 5,650 tonnes unused for this purpose). Iraq further declared that it had in january 1991 a total of 3,915 tonnes of precursors left from the original 20,150 tonnes, with the

discrepancy of 1,735 tonnes lost as a result of unsuitable storage, leaks, spillages etc.

Out of the 3,915 tonnes that Iraq claimed it still had in January 1991, UNSCOM accounted for 2,850 tonnes. The remainder was declared by Iraq either as having been destroyed unilaterally (242 tonnes) or having been destroyed during the Gulf War (823 tonnes). Iraq includes in the first of those categories - unilateral destruction in mid-1991 - all precursor chemicals for VX.

UNSCOM's assessment for each relevant precursor chemical that Iraq held in January 1991 is in Appendix II, para.22 of its January 1999 report. For some precursor chemicals, UNSCOM was able to account for the entire quantity held by Iraq; but with a number of other chemicals (such as dimethylaminohydrochloride, for the production of tabun; thionylchloride, for the production of G-agents mustard and VX; MPF and Cyclohexanol for G-agents; P2S5, diisopropyl amine, chloroethanol and choline for VX), UNSCOM was able to verify that destruction of these chemicals had taken

place, but was unable to verify the amount. To take the example of dimethylaminohydrochloride, Iraq claimed that it had 295 tonnes in January 1991; but that approximately 30 tonnes were destroyed in the Gulf War.

UNSCOM noted that "Evidence of destruction was seen by UNSCOM", but that "Accounting was not possible due to the state of destruction". Separately, 272 tonnes were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.

Given UNSCOM's inability to discern the quantities of materials destroyed in 1991, it is difficult to see how Iraq could ever verify that this material no longer exists, particularly the material destroyed when the buildings they were in were bombed. It is also difficult to see how the US has arrived at a figure of 500 tonnes of potential production from retained precursors, as this figure is not mentioned in any UNSCOM or UNMOVIC reports.

13. VX. As Powell recorded, Iraq admitted to producing nearly 4 tonnes of VX. It's believed that 1.5 tonnes of these remained in 1991.

In 1998, UNSCOM found VX degradation products on missile warheads, indicating that Iraq had stabilised VX sufficiently and had managed to weaponise it (in contrast to the Government of Iraq's own claims). Two factors would indicate that the 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent no longer exist in operational form:

Firstly, Iraq claimed that this quantity of VX was discarded unilaterally by dumping it on the ground. VX degrades rapidly if placed onto concrete (see this report of 15 November 2002). In accordance with Iraq's claim, UNSCOM tested the site at which the VX was reportedly dumped. UNSCOM's January 1999 report states in Appendix II, paragraph 16:

"Traces of one VX-degradation product and a chemical known as a VX-stabilizer were found in the samples taken from the VX dump sites."

However, from this information alone, UNSCOM was not able to make "a quantified assessment"; that is, they were not able to verify that all 1.5 tonnes of the agent had been so destroyed.

Secondly, VX, even if stabilised, degrades. The IISS strategic dossier of September 2002 records the status of VX produced before the Gulf War: "Any VX produced by Iraq before 1991 is likely to have decomposed over the past decade [...]. Any G-agent or V-agent stocks that Iraq concealed from UNSCOM inspections are likely to have deteriorated by now." (pp. 52 and 53).

14. Chemical production facilities. Powell refers specifically to one site, Tariq State Establishment.

It's noticeable that he doesn't refer to any of the sites that the US administration has been referencing since 2001 (Fallujah II, Ibn Sina at Tarmiyya, al-Qa'qa'), given that these have all been inspected by Unmovic, who have found nothing suspicious at any of them.

15. Musayyib transshipment point. Powell claims that chemical weapons were transported to this site, and the topsoil then removed, so as to remove any trace of the weapons.

If Powell really had suspected that chemical weapons were transported through that point, he would have provided that information to Unmovic, who could have conducted tests at that site for chemical residues and vapours.

His presentation of the information to the public, prior to possible testing, would indicate that the claims were not being taken seriously.

16. Recording of a discussion of a nerve agent cover-up. This recording features what we are told is a commander saying "remove - the expression - nerve agents" very slowly.

Powell did not reveal when the recording was made ("just a few weeks ago"), nor what the purpose of the conversation was - something that he should have been able to tell from the context of the recording. There is a less threatening interpretation of the discussion: the individuals were drawing

up a report, and were discussing the terminology to use. The individuals are explicitly referring to "the expression", not to the items themselves as Powell suggests in his interpretation.

17. Nuclear scientists. Powell claimed that "over the last 18 months Saddam Hussein has paid increasing personal attention to Iraqis' top nuclear scientists".

This seems to conflict directly with the evidence presented by Mohamed ElBaradei in his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003, paras.22-23:

"In its CAFCD [Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration, 7 December 2002], Iraq declared that the current and former IAEC sites, as well as the locations to which former IAEC personnel were transferred, are now devoted to the conduct of non-nuclear commercial activities. [...] From the IAEA's assessment to date of the Iraqi declaration, the following conclusions have been drawn: [...] The part of the CAFCD which covers Iraq's programme between 1991 and 1998 is consistent with the conclusions drawn by the IAEA on the basis of its verification activities conducted throughout that period and regularly reported to the Security Council."

18. Aluminium tubes. Powell returns to this one, claiming that the tubes are higher quality than necessary for rockets, and that "they can be adapted for centrifuge use".

Again, ElBaradei's conclusions point in the opposite direction, in his briefing to the Security Council on 9 January 2003 (paras.9-10):

"the IAEA has conducted a series of inspections at sites involved in the production and storage of reverse engineered rockets, held discussions with and interviewed Iraqi personnel, taken samples of aluminium tubes, and begun a review of the documentation provided by Iraq relating to contracts

with the traders. While the matter is still under investigation, and further verification is foreseen, the IAEA's analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the aluminium tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets. While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it."

19. Magnet production plant. Powell said: "In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That's the same weight as the magnets used

in Iraq's gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War. This incident, linked with the tubes, is another indicator of Iraq's attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program."

ElBaradei in his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003, said at paras.58-59:

"Iraq presented detailed information on a project to construct a facility to produce magnets for the Iraqi missile programme, as well as for industrial applications, and that Iraq had prepared a solicitation of

offers, but that the project had been delayed due to 'financial credit arrangements'. Preliminary investigations indicate that the specifications contained in the offer solicitation are consistent with those required for the declared intended uses. However, the IAEA will continue to investigate

the matter [...]"

20. Retention of SCUDs. Powell claimed that Iraq retains "a few dozen Scud variant ballistic missiles".

This is unlikely. According to Unscom, by 1997, 817 out of Iraq's known 819 ballistic missiles had been certifiably destroyed. On the worst-case assumption that Iraq has salvaged some of the parts for these missiles and has reconstructed them since 1998, even Charles Duelfer - former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, deputy head of Unscom and strong proponent of an invasion of Iraq - has provided an estimate of only 12 to 14 missiles held by Iraq.

21. Existing missile programmes, missile imports.

Iraqi weapons programme personnel extended the al-Samoud missile range and imported missile engines and raw material to produce solid missile fuel. The Iraqi government acknowledged these transgressions in its December 7 declaration, and since this date has agreed to halt these programs.

22. Production of missiles with a range of greater than 1000km.

Powell's claim rests on a view of developments on al-Rafah / Shahiyat liquid propellant engine static test stand. However, these sites have been repeatedly visited by UNMOVIC since the very first day of inspections, 27 November 2002. The relevant excerpt of the UNMOVIC / IAEA report of 21

January 2003 read:

"Another missile team traveled to the Shahiyat Test Facility, about 100 km north of Baghdad, to verify that this site was still abandoned."

23. Terrorism - Palestinian groups.

24. Terrorism - Zarqawi and al-Qa'ida.

Many of the claims are about how an operative of Ansar al-Islam was in Baghdad. Powell need not stop there. The head of Ansar al-Islam, Mullah Krekar (Najm al-Din Faraj) is currently living freely in Norway.

http://newsobserver.com/24hour/world/story/716951p-5262639c.html

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2713749.stm

http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqiopposition.html#ansar

The US has not requested his arrest. If Iraq is guilty of occasional meetings with second-level al-Qa'ida operatives, then what is the Norwegian government guilty of?

25. Human rights abuses.

Indeed.

----

A few further comments:

Powell: "I asked for this session today for two purposes: First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. [...] And as Dr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7, 'did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998.'"

Powell misses out the next part of ElBaradei's quote, where he explains what the "certain questions" are: "Iraq's progress prior to 1991 related to weapons design and centrifuge development". ElBaradei summarises: "While these questions do not constitute unresolved disarmament issues, they

nevertheless need further clarification."

ElBaradei's core assessment was that "we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s. However, our work is steadily progressing and should be allowed to run its natural course. With our verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme. These few months would be a valuable investment in peace

because they could help us avoid a war. We trust that we will continue to have your support as we make every effort to verify Iraq's nuclear disarmament through peaceful means, and to demonstrate that the inspection process can and does work, as a central feature of the international nuclear arms control regime." (his concluding words). Mr Powell shows no sign of supporting that core assessment.

---

Powell: "Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page declaration rich in volume but poor in information and practically devoid of new evidence."

Blix made this statement to the Security Council on 9 January 2003. He seemed to revise, and in some ways reverse, this judgement in his statement to the Security Council on 27 January 2003:

"In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and information covering the period from 1998 and onward. This is welcome."

b) Intelligence? the British dossier on Iraq's security infrastructure Glen Rangwala 05/02/2003

In preparation for Powell's presentation at 15:30 GMT today, I had a look at the third British government's "dossier" released last Thursday, "Iraq - Its Infrastructure Of Concealment, Deception And Intimidation" (30 January 2003). The document is at:
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7111.asp
(references below to page numbers relate to the downloadable Word version).
The document claims to draw "upon a number of sources, including intelligence material" (p.1, first sentence).
Now this is a bit misleading.
More precisely, the bulk of the 19-page document (pp.6-16) is directly copied without acknowledgement from an article in last September's Middle East Review of International Affairs entitled "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis".
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/jv6n3a1.html
The author of the piece is Ibrahim al-Marashi, a postgraduate student at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He has confirmed to me that his permission was not sought; in fact, he didn't even know about the British document until I mentioned it to him.

It's quite striking that even Marashi's typographical errors and anomalous uses of grammar are incorporated into the Downing Street document. For example, on p.13, the British dossier incorporates a misplaced comma:
"Saddam appointed, Sabir 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri as head"..
Likewise, Marashi's piece also states:
"Saddam appointed, Sabir 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri as head"..
The other sources that are extensively plagiarised in the document are two authors from Jane's Intelligence Review:
Ken Gause (an international security analyst from Alexandria, Virginia), "Can the Iraqi Security Apparatus save Saddam" (November 2002), pp.8-13.
Sean Boyne, "Inside Iraq?s Security Network", in 2 parts during 1997.
None of the sources are acknowledged, leading the reader to believe that the information is a result of direct investigative work, rather than simply copied from pre-existing internet sources.
The fact that the texts of these three authors are copied directly results in a proliferation of different transliterations (eg different spellings of Ba'th, depending on which author is being copied).
There are two types of changes incorporated into the British document. Firstly, numbers are increased or are rounded up. So, for example, the section on "Fedayeen Saddam" (pp.15-16) is directly copied from Boyne, almost word for word. The only substantive difference is that Boyne estimates the personnel of the organisation to be 18,000-40,000 (Gause similarly estimates 10-40,000). The British dossier instead writes "30,000 to 40,000". A similar bumping up of figures occurs with the description of the Directorate of Military Intelligence.

The second type of change in the British dossier is that it replaces particular words to make the claim sound stronger. So, for example, most of p.9 on the functions of the Mukhabarat is copied directly from Marashi's article, except that when Marashi writes of its role in:
"monitoring foreign embassies in Iraq"
this becomes in the British dossier:
"spying on foreign embassies in Iraq".
Similarly, on that same page, whilst Marashi writes of the Mukhabarat:
"aiding opposition groups in hostile regimes"
- the British dossier renders this as:
"supporting terrorist organisations in hostile regimes".
Furher examples from the section on "Fedayeen Saddam" include how a reference to how, in Boyne's original text, its personnel are "recruited from regions loyal to Saddam", referring to their original grouping as "some 10,000-15,000 'bullies and country bumpkins.'"

becomes in the British government's text a reference to how its personnel are:
"press ganged from regions known to be loyal to Saddam" ... "some 10,000-15,000 bullies."
Clearly, a reference to the "country bumpkins" would not have the rhetorical effect that the British government was aiming for.
Finally, there is one serious substantive mistake in the British text, in that it muddles up Boyne's description of General Security (al-Amn al-Amm), and places it in its section on p.14 of Military Security (al-Amn al-Askari). The result is complete confusion: it starts on p.14 by relating how Military Security was created in 1992 (in a piece copied from Marashi), then goes onto talk about the movement of its headquarters - in 1990 (in a piece copied from Boyne on the activities of General Security). The result is that it gets the description of the Military Security Service wholly wrong, claiming that its head is Taha al-Ahbabi (whilst really he was head of General Security in 1997; Military Security was headed by Thabet Khalil).

Apart from the obvious criticism that the British government has plagiarised texts without acknowledgement, passing them off as the work of its intelligence services, there are two further serious problems. Firstly, it indicates that the UK at least really does not have any independent sources of information on Iraq's internal politics - they just draw upon publicly available data. Thus any further claims to information based on "intelligence data" must be treated with even more scepticism.
Secondly, the information presented as being an accurate statement of the current state of Iraq's security organisations may not be anything of the sort. Marashi - the real and unwitting author of much of the document – has as his primary source the documents captured in 1991 for the Iraq Research and Documentation Project. His own focus is the activities of Iraq's ntelligence agencies in Kuwait, Aug90-Jan91 - this is the subject of his hesis. As a result, the information presented as relevant to how Iraqi agencies are currently engaged with Unmovic is 12 years old.

For reference, here are a few other summary comments on the British document.

Official authors are (in Word > Properties) P. Hamill, J. Pratt, A. Blackshaw, and M. Khan.

p.1 is the summary.

pp.2-5 are a repetition of Blix's comments to the Security Council on the difficulties they were encountering, with further claims about the activities of al-Mukhabarat. These are not backed up, eg the claim that car crashes are organised to prevent the speedy arrival of inspectors.

p.6 is a simplified version of Marashi's diagram at: http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/pdfs/iraqint.pdf
p.7 is copied (top) from Gause (on the Presidential Secretariat), and (middle and bottom) from Boyne (on the National Security Council).
p.8 is entirely copied from Boyne (on the National Security Council).
p.9 is copied from Marashi (on al-Mukhabarat), except for the final section, which is insubstantial.
p.10 is entirely copied from Marashi (on General Security), except for the final section, which is insubstantial.
p.11 is entirely copied from Marashi (on Special Security), except for the top section (on General Security), which is insubstantial.
p.12 is entirely copied from Marashi (on Special Security).
p.13 is copied from Gause (on Special Protection) and Marashi (Military Intelligence).
p.14 is wrongly copied from Boyne (on Military Security) and from Marashi (on the Special Republican Guard).
p.15 is copied from Gause and Boyne (on al-Hadi project / project 858).
pp.15-16 is copied from Boyne (on Fedayeen Saddam).
A final section, on the Tribal Chiefs' Bureau, seems to be copied from a different piece by Cordesman.

c) THE COUNTER DOSSIER on Bush & Blair's reports (27/9/2002)

There is no case for a war on Iraq. It has not threatened to attack the US or Europe. It is not connected to al-Qa'ida. There is no evidence that it has new weapons of mass destruction, or that it possesses the means of delivering them.

This pamphlet separates the evidence for what we know about Iraq from the wild suppositions used as the pretext for a war.

1. THREAT

For there to be a threat to the wider world from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, there need to be two distinct components: the capability (the presence of weapons of mass destruction or their precursor elements, together with a delivery system) and the intention to use weapons of mass destruction.

Most of the discussion on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction from British and American governmental sources has focused on Iraq's capabilities. However, a more fundamental question is why the Iraqi regime would ever use weapons of mass destruction. There are three aspects to this:

a. External military use.

The US administration has repeatedly stated that Iraq is a "clear and present danger" to the safety and security of ordinary Americans. Yet the Iraqi leadership have never used weapons of mass destruction against the US or Europe, nor threatened to. Plans or proposals for the use of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq against these countries have never been discovered, and in their absence can only be presumed to be non-existent.

Iraq would face with massive reprisals if its leadership ever ordered the use of weapons of mass destruction on the US or Europe. It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which the Iraqi regime would use these weapons directly against any western country. The only conceivable exception would be if the Iraqi leaders felt they had nothing left to lose: that is, if they were convinced of their own imminent demise as a result of an invasion. Weapons of mass destruction were not used by Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, despite having both a much more developed capacity than it holds at present (see below) and the routing of its army. The best way to avoid prompting Iraqi leaders to use any non-conventional capacity would be to refrain from invading Iraq or attempting to assassinate or depose its rulers.

The only occasion on which the Iraqi government used weapons of mass destruction against another country was against Iran from 1981/82 to 1988. The use of mustard agents had a devastating impact on Iranian troops in the first years of the war, and the civilian death toll from the use of sarin and tabun numbers in the thousands. However, it should be noted that the use of chemical weapons was undertaken with the compliance of the rest of the world. The US Secretary of State acknowledged that he was aware of reports of Iraqi use of chemical weapons from 1983, and a United Nations team confirmed Iraqi use in a report of 16 March 1984. Nevertheless, the US administration provided "crop-spraying" helicopters to Iraq (subsequently used in chemical attacks on the Kurds in 1988), gave Iraq access to intelligence information that allowed Iraq to "calibrate" its mustard attacks on Iranian troops (1984), seconded its air force officers to work with their Iraqi counterparts (from 1986), approved technological exports to Iraq's missile procurement agency to extend the missiles' range (1988), and blocked bills condemning Iraq in the House of Representatives (1985) and Senate (1988).

Most crucially, the US and UK blocked condemnation of Iraq's known chemical weapons attacks at the UN Security Council. No resolution was passed during the war that specifically criticised Iraq's use of chemical weapons, despite the wishes of the majority to condemn this use. The only criticism of Iraq from the Security Council came in the form of non-binding Presidential statements (over which no country has a veto). The 21 March 1986 statement recognised that "chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces"; this statement was opposed by the United States, the sole country to vote against it in the Security Council (the UK abstained).

In summary, Iraq has never used chemical weapons against an external enemy without the acquiescence of the most powerful states. It has done so only in the knowledge that it would be protected from condemnation and countermeasures by a superpower. There is no reason to suspect that the Iraqi leadership now places any military gains it might achieve through the use of chemical weapons above its desire to form international alliances with major powers.

Further reading: "U.S. Diplomatic and Commercial Relationships with Iraq, 1980 - 2 August 1990", www.casi.org.uk/info/usdocs/usiraq80s90s.html

(b) Arming terrorists

One prospect raised by President Bush in his State of the Union address of 29 January was that hostile countries such as Iraq could supply non-state organisations with weapons of mass destruction, to use against the US:

"By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States."

The State Department's annual report on terrorism, released on 30 April 2001, stated that the Iraqi regime "has not attempted an anti-Western terrorist attack" since 1993. The small paramilitary groups that Iraq supports, such as the Arab Liberation Front (in Palestine) and the Mujahidin e-Khalq (for Iran), have no access to Iraq's more advanced weaponry, let along weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, these groups have never carried out attacks on the US or Europe, and have little if any supporting infrastructure in those countries. The Iraqi regime has no credible links to al-Qa'ida, either in the perpetration of the 11 September attack, or in the presence in eastern Iraqi Kurdistan (controlled by the US-backed Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, not the Iraqi government, since 1991) of Ansar al-Islam. This group is an off-shoot of the US-backed Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan which has taken funds and arms from Iran and (reportedly) from al-Qa'ida.

The Iraqi regime has not been shown to have any intention of attacking the Western world, and it knows that it would be subject to massive reprisals if it did so. In summary, Iraq has shown no indication that it would be willing to use terrorists to threaten the outside world with weapons of mass destruction.

Further reading: "Did Mohamed Atta Meet an Iraqi Spy in Prague?", at slate.msn.com/?id=2070410

(c) Internal repression by the Iraqi military

As part of the Anfal campaign against the Kurds (February to September 1988), the Iraqi regime used chemical weapons extensively against its own civilian population. Between 50,000 and 186,000 Kurds were killed in these attacks, over 1,200 Kurdish villages were destroyed, and 300,000 Kurds were displaced. The most infamous chemical assault was on the town of Halabja in March 1988, which killed 5,000 people. Human Rights Watch regards the Anfal campaign as an act of genocide.

The Anfal campaign was carried out with the acquiescence of the West.

Rather than condemn the massacres of Kurds, the US escalated its support for Iraq. It joined in Iraq's attacks on Iranian facilities, blowing up two Iranian oil rigs and destroying an Iranian frigate a month after the Halabja attack. Within two months, senior US officials were encouraging corporate coordination through an Iraqi state-sponsored forum. The US administration opposed, and eventually blocked, a US Senate bill that cut off loans to Iraq. The US approved exports to Iraq of items with dual civilian and military use at double the rate in the aftermath of Halabja as it did before 1988. Iraqi written guarantees about civilian use were accepted by the US commerce department, which did not request licenses and reviews (as it did for many other countries). The Bush Administration approved $695,000 worth of advanced data transmission devices the day before Iraq invaded Kuwait.

As for the UK, ten days after the Foreign Office verbally condemned the Halabja massacre, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry rewarded Iraq by extending £400 million worth of credits to trade with Iraq.

The Iraqi regime has never used chemical weapons in the face of formal international opposition. The most effective way of preventing any future use against Iraqi civilians is to put this at the top of the human rights agenda between Iraq and the UN. The Iraqi regime's intentions to use chemical weapons against the Kurds will not be terminated by provoking a further conflict between the Iraqi state and its Kurdish population in which the Kurds are recruited as proxy forces. The original repression of the Kurds escalated into genocide in response to Iran's procurement of the support of the two main Kurdish parties for its military efforts from 1986. This is essentially the same role that the US sees for the Kurds in its current war preparations.

Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction are a false focus if the concern is with regional security. Chemical weapons were not used for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. A peaceful Gulf region can be achieved only through building political links between Iraq and its neighbours. This is why the Arab states of the Middle East have started to reintegrate Iraq into regional networks and purposeful dialogue. Their interests are ill-served by attempts to turn the countries of the Gulf against each other once again.

Further reading: Dilip Hiro, "When US turned a blind eye to poison gas", at: www.observer.co.uk/focus/story/0,6903,784125,00.html

2. NUCLEAR

In 1998, when the US ordered UN weapons inspectors to leave Iraq, it was widely accepted the Iraq's nuclear capacity had been wholly dismantled. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), charged with monitoring Iraq's nuclear facilities after the Gulf War, reported to the Security Council from 8 October 1997 that Iraq had compiled a "full, final and complete" account of its previous nuclear projects, and there was no indication of any prohibited activity. The IAEA's fact sheet from 25 April 2002, entitled "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Programme", recorded that "There were no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance."

In recent months, however, the UK government has put primary emphasis on Iraq's alleged nuclear programme. UK ministers have made three major claims:

a. That Iraq was within three years of developing a nuclear bomb in 1991.

This could be true. Uranium was imported from Portugal, France, Italy and other countries; uranium enrichment facilities operated at Tuwaitha, Tarmiya, and Rashidiya, and centrifuge enrichment facilities were being built at al-Furat, largely with German assistance. Theoretical studies were underway into the design of reactors to produce plutonium, and laboratory trials were carried out at Tuwaitha. The main centre for the development of nuclear weapons was al-Atheer, where experiments with high explosives were carried out. However, IAEA experts maintain that Iraq has never had the capacity to enrich uranium sufficiently for a bomb and was extremely dependent on imports to create centrifuge facilities (report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 June 2002). If this is so, Iraq may have only been close to developing a bomb if US and European assistance had continued to the same extent as before.

In the Gulf War, all Iraq's facilities capable of producing material for a nuclear programme and for enriching uranium were destroyed. The IAEA inspected and completed the destruction of these facilities, with the compliance of the Iraqi government. From 1991, the IAEA removed all known weapon usable materials from Iraq, including 22.4kg of highly enriched uranium. The IAEA left 1.8 tonnes of low-grade uranium in heavyweight sealed barrels at the Tuwaitha facilities. This uranium has remained untouched by the Iraqis, and is inspected annually by experts from the IAEA, who have confirmed that the seals had never been tampered with. The remaining facilities at Tuwaitha and buildings at al-Atheer were destroyed by the IAEA by 1992.

b. That Iraq could make a nuclear device "within three years" without foreign assistance.

This claim, repeated by a UK Foreign Office minister, derives from a statement from the head of Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in February 2001 that Iraq could enrich its own uranium and construct its own nuclear device in three to six years. This claim was backed up by a statement from the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control that Iraq's only uranium extraction facility at al-Qaim has been rebuilt (it had been destroyed in 1991). If Iraq was again extracting uranium, then it could reasonably be presumed that it was intending to enrich and weaponise it. The allegation about Iraq's extraction of uranium, however, seems to be wrong.

Since the emergence of these claims, a number of journalists have visited al-Qaim and have found it in a state of disrepair. Paul McGeough, the much-respected Middle East correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald, wrote on 4 September 2002 that the site appeared to be a "near-vacant lot ... as the result of a clean-up supervised by the [IAEA]". Reuters reporters have confirmed the same impression. If Iraq was hiding its nuclear extraction facilities every time a journalist visits, this would beg the question of when any extraction could actually take place.

If Iraq has no operating facilities to extract uranium, and if it continues to refrain from accessing the low-grade uranium sealed at Tuwaitha, then there is no way it could produce a nuclear device without foreign assistance.

Furthermore, enriching uranium requires substantial infrastructure and a power supply that could be easily spotted by US satellites. No such information has been provided. Over the past year, US and UK sources have made much of the fact that Iraq has attempted to import specialized steel and aluminium tubes that could be used in gas centrifuges that enrich uranium. According to the Washington Post (10 September 2002), such tubes are also used in making conventional artillery rockets, which Iraq is not prohibited from developing or possessing under UN resolutions. As David Albright, former IAEA inspector in Iraq and director of the Institute for Science and International Security, told the Washington Post, "This is actually a weak indicator for suggesting centrifuges -- it just doesn't build a case. I don't yet see evidence that says Iraq is close."

c. That Iraq could have a nuclear bomb "within months" if fissile material is acquired from abroad. Even the US Department of Defense recognises that claims about Iraq's imminent production of a nuclear bomb are not credible: "Iraq would need five or more years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon" (January 2001 intelligence estimate). However, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) managed to hit the headlines in September 2002 by claiming that Iraq "could assemble nuclear weapons within months if fissile material from foreign sources were obtained." This claim is no more than a tautology.

If Iraq could import the core material for a bomb, then it would have a bomb. Obtaining the fissile material is the most difficult part of constructing any nuclear device, and there are no signs that Iraq has attempted to obtain any such material from abroad. According to the Nuclear Control Institute (nci.org/heu.htm), "With bomb-grade, high-enriched uranium (HEU), a student could make a bomb powerful enough to destroy a city". Unless we are to stop any students of physics from entering Iraq, the best control on the circulation of fissile material would be to invest resources into safeguarding Russia's nuclear material. We would then need to complete a fissile-material cut-off treaty as agreed by the UN General Assembly in 1993.

On 7 September 2002, Tony Blair and George Bush proclaimed that commercial satellite photographs showing new buildings near a facility that had been part of Iraq's nuclear programme before 1991 were "proof" of Iraqi intentions. By contrast, a spokesperson from the IAEA - which had provided the pictures months earlier - said: "We have no idea whether it means anything. Construction of a building is one thing. Restarting a nuclear program is another."

1. The threat of Iraq's weapons.

I. Stockpile

This Prime Minister's dossier claims that information already in the public domain "points clearly to Iraq's continued possession, after 1991, of chemical and biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf War." (Executive Summary, para.2). There are also references to surviving stocks of weapons in Chapter 2, para.13 and Chapter 3, paras.3 and 5-7 of the dossier.

If Iraq had a stockpile of chemical and biological weapons in 1998, it must consist of items produced prior to 1991. Not even the British government claims that Iraq was engaged in the active production of chemical or biological weapons in the period of weapons inspections (1991 to 1998); the ongoing monitoring and verification undertaken by UNSCOM would have detected any such attempts.

The Iraqi government never provided UNSCOM with information assessed to be sufficiently complete to verify that Iraq had destroyed all the chemical and biological agents it had produced prior to 1991. These are items that are considered as "unaccounted for". It may also be the case that Iraq had in fact produced more of these agents than they had declared to UNSCOM or that UNSCOM itself had uncovered.

Whilst it would undoubtedly be useful to have a clear understanding of what happened to all of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons material that it had produced, a more pressing question here is whether any chemical or biological agents produced by Iraq prior to 1991 would have remained useable after at least 11 years. As the analysis below attempts to demonstrate, the overwhelming majority of the chemical and biological warfare agents produced by Iraq prior to 1991 would be expected to have deteriorated to the point where they are no longer lethal.

If the Prime Minister's past allegations that Iraq possessed a stockpile of illicit weapons were to be true, then the dossier would need to present credible evidence that Iraq had managed to stabilise its chemical and biological agents to a greater extent than it is previously thought to have done. The dossier does not make this claim: it only makes an unsubstantiated assertion (in Chapter 3, para.6) that Iraq had "the knowledge and capability to add stabiliser to nerve agent and other chemical warfare agents which would prevent such decomposition." The fact that this assertion falls short of the claim that Iraq actually achieved the stabilisation of its chemical agents can be taken as an acknowledgement that no evidence has been discovered - after over 7 years of intrusive inspections and 11 years of intelligence gathering - to demonstrate Iraq's retention of stabilised chemical or biological agents.

(a) Biological warfare agents.

Before 1990, Iraq manufactured four major biological agents.

(i) Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxin). According to the "strategic dossier" of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) of 9 September 2002:
"Any botulinum toxin produced in 1989-90 would no longer be useful" (p.40).

According to a CIA briefing of 1990 on the threat from Iraq's biological weapons facilities:
"Botulinum toxin is nonpersistent, degrading rapidly in the environment. .. [It is] fairly stable for a year when stored at temperatures below 27c."
("Iraq's Biological Warfare Program: Saddam's Ace In The Hole", August[?] 1990, at: http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/960702/73924_01.htm)

(ii) Anthrax. Much of the discussion of the threat of Iraq's biological weapons has focused on Iraq's past development of anthrax. By contrast, a report from 1998 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) seems to discount the possibility that the anthrax produced in bulk prior to 1991 can still be effectively weaponised:

"Anthrax spores are extremely hardy and can achieve 65% to 80% lethality against untreated patients for years. Fortunately, Iraq does not seem to have produced dry, storable agents and only seems to have deployed wet Anthrax agents, which have a relatively limited life."
(Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Past and Future Biological Weapons Capabilities", CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, February 1998; at: http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/iraq_bios.pdf)

It should be noted that this assessment of the degradability of wet anthrax is not accepted by the entire expert community. The IISS report of 9 September 2002 states that "wet anthrax from [the 1989-90 period - if stored properly - would still be infectious." (p.40).

(iii) Aflatoxin. The Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons on 24 September 2002 that Aflatoxin is a lethal agent. It is not. Prolonged exposure may be carcinogenic, but as a weapon its relevant characteristic is in inducing headaches, vomiting and liver disease.
Source: CSIS paper of February 1998, as above; p.13.

(iv) Clostridium Perfringens (causing gas gangrene). Persistence unknown. However, as an anaerobic bacillus, it has the same causes for a short-shelf life as other anaerobic bacteria such as clostridium botulinum.

(b) Chemical warfare agents.

Before 1990, Iraq had produced and weaponised four lethal chemical agents:

(i) and (ii) Sarin and cyclosarin. These "G-series" nerve agents, used in the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war, deteriorate rapidly, especially if impurities are present in their manufacture. This seems to have been the case with Iraq's nerve agents. The Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force of the US Department of Defense gave the following assessment in March 2001:

"Impure or improperly stored sarin is unstable and degrades over time. US experts consider chemical warfare agents less than 50 percent pure to be militarily ineffective.Western sources estimate the sarin Iraq produced never exceeded 60 percent purity, and Iraq reported that poor operating practices at Al Muthanna limited the purity of sarin to between 20 and 50 percent. Since it contained at least 40 percent impurities when manufactured, sarin produced at Al Muthanna had a short shelf life.The CIA estimates the chemical warfare agent in the rockets stored at Al Muthanna had deteriorated to approximately 18 percent purity by the time that Bunker 2 was destroyed, leaving about 1600 kilograms (1.6 metric tons) of viable sarin."
("The Gulf War Air Campaign - Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release at Al Muthanna, February 8, 1991", 19 March 2001; at: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/al_muth/al_muth_s02.htm)

The taskforce of the Department of Defense attributed the high level of Iraqi cooperation in revealing the scale of its earlier chemical programme to the fact that the Iraqi government realised that the nerve agents it had produced were no longer viable:

"We believe Iraq was largely cooperative on its latest declarations because many of its residual munitions were of little use - other than bolstering the credibility of Iraq’s declaration - because of chemical agent degradation and leakage problems."
("Chemical Warfare Agent Issues During the Persian Gulf War", Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, April 2002; at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/cwagents/cwpaper1.htm)

A similar assessment was made by the CIA in a memorandum from January 1991:

"Iraq is not able to make good-quality chemical agents. Technical failures have reduced their purity and caused problems in storage and handling. This is a particular problem for the sarin- type nerve agents (GB and GF). These both contain hydrofluoricacid (HF), an impurity that attacks metal surfaces and catalyzes nerve agent decomposition. This leads to metal failure and leaks in the ammunition, increasing handling hazards. ... Lower purity significantly limits shelf life and reduces toxic effects when the munition is employed. ... The nerve agent should have already begun to deteriorate, and decomposition should make most of the nerve agent weapons unserviceable by the end of March 1991."
("Iraq: Potential for Chemical Weapon Use", 25 January 1991; at: http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/970825/970613_dim37_91d_txt_0001.html)

This assessment is repeated in the IISS strategic dossier of 9 September 2002:

"As a practical matter, any nerve agent from this period [pre-1991] would have deteriorated by now.." (p.51)

(iii) Mustard. A "blister agent", mustard has a longer shelf-life than G-series nerve agents. As the final assessment report from UNSCOM recorded:

"a dozen mustard-filled shells were recovered at a former CW storage facility in the period 1997 - 1998 .. After seven years, the purity of mustard ranged between 94 and 97%."
(Enclosure 1 to the Annex of the Letter to the President of the Security Council, 29 January 1999, S/1999/94, para.33; at: http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s99-94.htm)

However, mustard has a low volume-to-effectiveness ratio. As the IISS record in the strategic dossier:

"large amounts of mustard are necessary for effective military operations. Roughly, one tonne of agent is needed to effectively contaminate 2.6 square kilometres of territory, if properly disseminated."

Iraq declared that it filled approximately 13,000 artillery shells with mustard prior to 1991. UNSCOM accounted for 12,792 of these shells, and destroyed them in the period of 1992-94. However, Iraq also declared that 550 mustard-filled artillery shells had been lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The extent to which these - if they still existed - could constitute an ongoing danger should be assessed in light of the need to deploy large amounts of mustard for effective use.

(iv) VX. In 1998, UNSCOM found VX degradation products on missile warheads, indicating that Iraq had stabilised VX sufficiently and had managed to weaponise it (in contrast to the Government of Iraq's own claims). The IISS strategic dossier records the status of VX produced before the Gulf War:

"Any VX produced by Iraq before 1991 is likely to have decomposed over the past decade ... Any G-agent or V-agent stocks that Iraq concealed from UNSCOM inspections are likely to have deteriorated by now." (pp. 52 and 53).

In summary, the overwhelming majority of the chemical and biological weapons agents that Iraq has retained from prior to 1991 would no longer be useable in the present day - if the assessments presented above are correct. The major exception is mustard. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Iraq has retained sufficient stocks of mustard to deploy in a militarily effective way.

II. Ongoing development

The majority of the claims in the Prime Minister's dossier, from pp.17-32, relate not to the retention of prior stocks - the focus of UNSCOM's work - but to the development of new nuclear, chemical and biological facilities. Any new facilities could either manufacture new weaponisable material, or - more simply - they could constitute chemical agents out of precursor stocks that were undeclared by Iraq to UNSCOM and would not have deteriorated as the agents themselves would have done. For example, if stable precursors for VX, sarin or cyclosarin were retained by Iraq after 1991, they could be used to produce fresh supplies of these agents.

However, the Prime Minister's dossier - like the strategic dossier of the IISS - provides no evidence that this is actually taking place. The assertions that facilities are being reconstituted or built is phrased in noticeably ambiguous language: this indicates that there is considerable uncertainty within the UK intelligence institutions about whether Iraq is actually engaged in the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

(a) Nuclear development

The main evidence presented in the dossier for the continuation of Iraq's nuclear programme is that Iraq has been "making concerted covert efforts to acquire dual-use technology and materials with nuclear applications" since 1998. However, it should be noted that the claim in the dossier is not that the materials that Iraq has sought to import can only be used as part of a nuclear weapons programme, but that these materials could be used in such a programme. Conversely, it is quite conceivable that these materials are not being used in a nuclear programme at all.

For example, the dossier notes that Iraq has attempted to purchase Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF) since 1998, and that AHF could be used in gas centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium (Chapter 3, para.21). However, AHF is also used as an alkylating agent in the petrochemical industry. For a country that has been made solely dependent upon its petrochemical exports for its foreign exchange, the import of AHF can hardly be a surprise or a cause for suspicion.

More significantly, the attempts by Iraq to import aluminium tubes has been highlighted both in President George W. Bush's paper "A Decade of Deception and Defiance" (12 September 2002), p.9, and in the Prime Minister's dossier on p.26, para.22, and presented as evidence that Iraq was seeking to construct gas centrifuges. David Albright, former IAEA inspector and director of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), has argued that the aluminium tubes are more likely to be used in the making of conventional artillery rockets. Although this was mentioned in the original counter-dossier, an ISIS paper has subsequently made the following clarifications:

Iraq has imported the same form of aluminium tubes from the 1980s onwards, for non-nuclear purposes.
That steel or carbon fibre tubes would have been more suitable if Iraq had been planning to use them in the construction of gas centrifuges. Iraq had previously invested in developing steel and carbon fibre parts for its nuclear programme before 1990.
These tubes are not critical centrifuge components; the most advanced components (rotors, end caps, bearings) would still need to be imported if Iraq was intent on building gas centrifuges.
(ISIS report, "Aluminum Tubing..", 23 September 2002, updated on 27 September; at: www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/aluminumtubes.html).

It is noteworthy that none of the imports listed in the Prime Minister's dossier are identified as being for the exclusive purpose of nuclear development, and it is not claimed that these items are in fact being put to use in a nuclear programme.

The sole claim that could indicate an active nuclear programme is one of the most ambiguous in the entire dossier: it is claimed that "Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa" (Chapter 3, para.20). The absence of any detail - such as the year (or even the decade) in which this purported attempt to obtain uranium; the country in which Iraq's alleged activities are thought to have taken place; and the quality of the uranium sought - coupled with the lack of emphasis given to this claim in the dossier may indicate that a serious risk is not attributed to this possibility. Iraq has indeed sought to import significant quantities of uranium (yellowcake) from Niger; this was in 1981-82. Could it be this episode to which the dossier refers, and the reason why the claim is left in such an ambiguous form?

(b) Chemical and biological weapons development

One of the most detailed set of claims in the Prime Minister's dossier concerns the rebuilding of facilities that were formerly associated with chemical and biological weapons. It is noticeable that the dossier does not claim that any specific facility is currently being used for the production of chemical or biological warfare agents. Instead, the facilities are identified as being capable of producing such agents as well as civilian products, or that the material that is being produced could be used in the development of illicit weapons.

Unless there is a reliable assessment that the production undertaken at these facilities is part of a chemical and biological warfare programme, the information presented in Chapter 3, paras.8-13, cannot be taken as indicating that Iraq has recently produced illicit chemical and biological agents. This is an overview of the sites mentioned in the Prime Minister's dossier.

Fallujah 2, near Habbaniyah: this site, which used to produce chemical weapons precursors, was bombed in the Gulf War, and its remaining stocks were removed and destroyed by UNSCOM. It was inactive in 1998. The Prime Minister's dossier claims that it now produces chlorine and phenol (ie carbolic acid), which could serve as precursor chemicals. They could also be used as disinfectants. There are no assertions in the dossier that they are currently being used otherwise.
Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah: the dossier identifies this as a chemical research centre (and provides a satellite photograph). The Research Centre for Industrial Chemistry which was established in March 1992. According to IAEA reports from 1993 and 1994, the Centre was engaged in small scale chemical recovery work, such as the purification of phosphoric acid and the recovery of vanadium from coal ash.
al-Qa'qa' chemical complex: according to the dossier, this plant produces phosgene. Iraqi officials claimed to journalists visiting the site after the release of the dossier that phosgene is produced as a by-product of the manufacture of gun-powder.
al-Sharqat: this facility is identified in the dossier as producing nitric acid. Indeed, according to the IAEA report of January 1994, it is the principle supplier of sulphuric and nitric acid to Iraqi industries. The dossier does not claim that the nitric acid produced at al-Sharqat is used in the production of illicit weapons, merely that nitric acid "can be used" in missile fuel and in purifying uranium.
Fallujah: this is identified in the dossier as producing castor oil. The official purpose of the production of castor oil is for brake fluids.
al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute (also known as al-Manal). Prior to 1991, it was engaged in research on viral warfare agents. In March 2001, the Government of Iraq wrote to the UN Secretary-General to notify him of the reactivation of this facility for the production of foot and mouth vaccine. A number of journalists have visited al-Dawrah since then. On 12 August 2002, a reporter from Russian news agency RIA-Novosti recounted that: "Journalists were shown empty shops at the plant, and dark, dusty premises with no light. Electric cables and various pipes along the walls had been cut through. Remnants of structures and equipment were piled on the floor."
Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghraib: according to the dossier, this site has expanded storage capacity. Journalists were allowed into the new buildings at this plant within two hours of the dossier's release, and reported that they found only empty fridges.

III. Delivery means

Unless the chemical and biological agents could be delivered by Iraqi forces, they cannot be considered to be a danger. Four possibilities are mentioned in the Prime Minister's dossier (Chapter 3, para.14): free-fall bombs, artillery shells and rockets, helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers (such as the L-29), and ballistic missile.

With regard to Iraq's biological weapons, the IISS strategic dossier claims:

"On balance, Iraq's ability to deliver BW efficiently with conventional munitions (missiles, planes, rockets, etc.) against opposing forces on the battlefield or against civilian targets beyond Iraq's borders appears to be limited, unless Iraq has made substantial advances in delivery technology." (p.29)

There are no claims in the Prime Minister's dossier about such substantial advances. Out of the four delivery means listed above, helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers have been discussed in the counter-dossier, and shown not to be a viable delivery means beyond Iraq's borders. Artillery shells and Iraq's rockets have a very limited range, and could only be considered a threat to Iraq's own citizenry and those within a few kilometres of Iraq's borders.

Ballistic missiles are also not a credible delivery means. The IISS strategic dossier reviews the evidence on the design of Iraq's missile warhead for al-Hussein missile:

"dissemination would be extremely inefficient if Iraq has not advanced beyond its 1990-era design. Most agent would be destroyed on impact, and the immediate area of dispersal would be fairly small (a few hundred metres in diameter)." (p.40; for biological agents).

"Unless Iraq has advanced beyond the impact fusing and warhead design of its 1990-era special warheads, however, its ability to effectively disseminate CW agent with such missile warheads is questionable. Most of the CW agent is likely to be destroyed on impact, and the remainder would be dispersed over a limited area." (pp.53-54).

Delivery of free-fall bombs would require strong air force capabilities. According to the IISS, however, these are "very weak ... Poor maintenance, lack of spare parts, and low flight training time has likely degraded operational performance." (p.54)

IV. Threat

There is no presentation in the Prime Minister's dossier of Iraq having a strategic doctrine - or even a military plan - to use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in an offensive capacity. There is no indication of why Iraqi leaders would have an intention to use such weapons, other than to deter current US attempts to unseat the current regime by force.

2. The need for ongoing inspections in Iraq

One of the most problematic parts of the Prime Minister's dossier is the discussion of the "Presidential sites" (Part 2, para.5). The dossier states that inspectors were "barred" from these sites in December 1997, and by virtue of omission implies that these sites remained unaccessed by inspectors.

Instead, an agreement was reached in February 1998 between the UN Secretary-General and the Government of Iraq (the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998) which allowed weapons inspectors access to all sites in Iraq, as long as they were accompanied by senior diplomats appointed by the UN Secretary-General at eight listed Presidential sites (the procedure for inspections is here). The Memorandum of Understanding was endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1154 (2 March 1998); it was agreed to by the British government of the time, also headed by Prime Minister Blair. The Iraqi government fulfilled the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding, and no further delays and obstacles were reported by weapons inspectors over these sites in the remaining period of inspections. Satisfactory compliance from the Government of Iraq with regard to Presidential sites was noted in the reports to the Security Council of 15 April 1998 (S/1998/326) and 6 May 1998 (S/1998/377), and was welcomed in a statement of the President of the Security Council of 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/11).

In the dossier and in the Prime Minister's accompanying speech to the House of Commons, repeated reference was made to the large area of the Presidential sites. The UN technical mission to Iraq that surveyed these sites issued a report on 20 February, prior to the conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding. The total area of the eight Presidential sites amounts to 31.5 square kilometres, of which approximately 10.2 square kilometres is made up of lakes. One site, the Radwaniyah in Baghdad, totalled around 17.8 square kilometres, and is by far the largest (para.14). The mission conducted detailed surveys of each site, and found no military installations (other than sentry towers, guard rooms, and - in one case - headquarters for the Presidential Battalion) on any of them (para.12).

The draft resolution placed by the US before the Security Council on 28 September seeks to do away with this category of Presidential sites, and thus nullify the Memorandum of Understanding that the US and UK had previously agreed to. As expected, the Government of Iraq has rejected this new provision. It is likely that if the resolution is passed, Iraq will not permit inspectors into Presidential sites without the diplomatic accompaniment agreed in 1998; it is possible that the whole inspections regime will be blocked by the US if there is no agreement on this issue. Alternatively, a confrontation will be provoked in which the Government of Iraq withdraws its offer to allow unrestricted access to weapons inspectors. The US will thus have succeeded in preventing the resumption of inspections, and in preserving the pretext for war that the Iraqi offer threatened to discredit.

GLEN RANGWALA, 27 September 2002.
Contact details on Index page.

Ten Reasons Why We Shouldn't Launch Another War Against Iraq

(Verso, 2002/ARROW Publications 2002)

THE ALLEGATION THAT IRAQ IS PUTTING NEW CONDITIONS ON INSPECTORS

This is rubbish. There are long-standing agreements (made in 1996, 1997 and 1998) which allow inspections of 'sensitive sites', including Presidential palaces, subject to certain conditions (limiting numbers of inspectors or requiring accompaniment by foreign diplomats). It is the US, not Iraq, which is putting new conditions on the inspections (Colin Powell has admitted this) in order to cook up such an objectionable resolution that Iraq will withdraw its offer to allow in inspectors, and so open the way for war. (References for these statements at the end of this email.)

ADDITIONALLY

This whole issue was shamefully misrepresented by the British Government in the recent dossier on Iraq's weapons:

'In December 1997, Richard Butler reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq had created a new category of sites, 'presidential'
and 'sovereign', from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors would henceforth be barred. The terms of the ceasefire in 1991
foresaw no such limitation. However, Iraq consistently refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential
sites.' (Dossier, p. 34)

DISTORTION 1: THE MISSING AGREEMENTS

It is true that Iraq resisted inspection of 'sensitive sites'. But, in fact, there was a series of agreements between UNSCOM and Baghdad between 1996 and 1998, which enabled UN weapons inspectors to visit these disputed sites.

1) In June 1996, Rolf Ekeus, then head of UNSCOM, agreed with the Iraqis that only FOUR weapons inspectors would enter designated 'sensitive sites'.

2) In Dec. 1997, Richard Butler, the new head of UNSCOM, negotiated a new agreement, whereby at larger 'sensitive sites' such as
the sprawling presidential palaces, more inspectors could enter 'if the size of the site warranted it, as decided on a case by case basis'.

3) In Feb. 1998, Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, agreed new procedures for inspecting eight identified presidential palaces.
Inspectors would be accompanied by foreign diplomats to safeguard Iraq's 'sovereignty'.

(Reference for all three agreements: Richard Butler, Saddam Defiant: The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Crisis of Global Security, London; Ekeus: p. 96; Butler: p. 125; Annan: p. 155)

So, in Dec. 1997, the month that the Government says that Richard Butler concluded Iraq was embarking on total noncooperation over the inspection of 'sensitive sites', the UNSCOM chief actually concluded an agreement with Iraq that allowed MORE weapons
inspectors into these 'sensitive sites' than had previously been permitted by Baghdad.

DISTORTION 2: THE INSPECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL PALACES

The Government says that 'Iraq consistently refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential sites.'

This is also the reverse of the truth. The 'sensitive sites' inspection process developed by Ekeus, Butler and Annan enabled UNSCOM to inspect the presidential palaces after the Feb. 1998 Memorandum of Understanding:

'Our inspections of the Presidential sites were eventually conducted over a period of ten days, and on April 15 [1998], a report on these "entries" (in the UN vernacular) was presented to the Security Council.' (Reference: Richard Butler, Saddam Defiant, p. 164)

On the validity of the Iraqi position that the 1996/1997/1998 agreements are still in force: 'We understand the MOU
[memorandum of understanding] to still be valid', said UNMOVIC spokesperson Ewen Buchanan. (FT, 19 Sept.)

Colin Powell told a Congressional committee, 'There is standing authority for the inspection team but there are weaknesses in that
authority which make the current regime unacceptable. And we need a new resolution to clean that up and put NEW CONDITIONS on
the Iraqis so that there is no wriggling out . . . if somebody tried to move the [inspectors'] team in right now, we would find ways to
thwart that.' (Telegraph, 21 Sept., p. 20, emphasis added)
______________________________________________________________________________________________

Iraq's Reply On Blair's Report

Iraqi News Agency, INA Baghdad, Oct.2

UK prime minister Mr. Tony Blair on 24 Sept. 2002 released a report on the so-called acquisition by Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological).

The report was disputed by many governments as well as British sources for being a list of unsubstantiated assumptions and allegations or merely a propaganda sheet.

Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs present this report to clarify the points misleadingly addressed in Mr. Blair's report.

Blair's Report, long a waited by the world opinion, contains not so much but a series of lies and empty propaganda which are totally inconsistent with the facts and reports made by the Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) teams.

What asserts Blair's lies and fabrications is the fact that he has lost sight of Iraq's cooperation with these two international institutions (UNSCOM & IAEA). Indeed he failed to consider the events and activities which confirmed Iraq's full cooperation in the implementation of paragraphs (8,9,10,11,12 and 13) of SCR 687.

Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM & IAEA from 1991 to 1998 Following is a statement of the intensive effort made by Iraq in the fulfillment of its obligation as defined by SCR 687

Nuclear Activity :

What Iraq has achieved in this field, in application of SCR 687, is the product of the on-site operations which continued until an earlier time of the current year, through the annual periodic inspection carried out by the IAEA under the safeguards system (NPT), Document (QE / 002/009) dated 15 March 2002 .

According to the well known facts, Iraq submitted all technical and scientific details about the sites involved the previous program together with the quantities and types of Nuclear materials, equipment and devices which were involved in the previous Nuclear Activity with full and precise details.

The nuclear file was officially closed by the IAEA in July 1995 and then reopened in Aug. 1995. In Oct. 1997, the Agency submitted its semi-annual report in which it indicated Iraq's implementation of its obligations as regards section (C) of SCR 687 of the nuclear file. The Agency empowered the Security Council to take a resolution
to move to the on going monitoring of nuclear program, Document (S/ 1997 / 779).

In April 1998, IAEA submitted another report in which it confirmed once again Iraq's commitments to this file, Document (S/1998/312). According to the realities and facts contained in the agency's reports, Iraq undertook to destroy all the buildings and laboratories at Al-Atheer, Al-Tarmiya, Al-Shirqat and Al-Tuwatha sites. Iraq also
destroyed all machines and equipment involved in the previous nuclear program including the dual use equipment. In addition other buildings and laboratories with areas of 270,000 square meters were destroyed.

Between 1993 and 1994, Iraq handed over to IAEA 127 kgs of enriched uranium used as nuclear fuel for the peaceful research reactor. The Agency transported this quantity outside Iraq. As for the remaining nuclear materials they are at present in the possession of IAEA.

According to IAEA reports, Iraq's declarations about its nuclear activity are correct, precise and credible. Iraq also submitted its Full, Final and Comprehensive Disclosure (FFCD), supported by documents.

Chemical Activity:

As regards the question of chemical weapons, Iraq, after the adoption of resolution SCR 687, made declarations about the quantities, types and the geographical sites of the filled and empty ammunitions, the produced chemical agents, the raw materials, the production facilities and the supporting facilities.

In September 1991, the UNSCOM supervised the destruction of all empty chemical ammunitions at Al-Muthana Establishment which included 12,500 pieces of artillery ammunitions and aerial bombs. In February 1992, the UNSCOM destroyed the chemical ammunitions at Al-Khamissiya area which included 400 (122mm) rockets filled with Sarin. From June 1992 to June 1994, the UNSCOM destroyed the empty and filled ammunitions, the production equipment, production sites, stores, liquid and solid materials at Al-Muthana Establishment which
included 690 tons of the produced final agents and 38500 ammunition pieces, filled and empty, liquid amounted to 1,800 000 liters, solid intermediate materials, amounted to 1000 tons as well as 150 production equipment and four production sites and stores.

Iraq was cooperative in this matter. It provided all assistance for the destruction work at the shortest possible time and under the UNSCOM supervision which appreciated Iraq's cooperation. Iraq also submitted its FFCD in line with the forms prepared by the UNSCOM itself which contained full details of the chemical weapons program.

Biological Activity:

Iraq in June 1991, ratified the Biological weapons Ban Treaty and asserted its commitments under Geneva protocol of 1925 under para 7, section (C) of SCR 687.

In 1995, Iraq submitted to UNSCOM the draft FFCD of the biological program in the hope of submitting the final version in June 1996 which contained full information about the program in all its details (date of program, sites involved in the program, research & development, production, weaponization, destruction damaging, material balance, procurements).

In this context Iraq fully cooperated with the UNSCOM in its work for the verification and destroying biological weapons, all remaining biological agents stock piles, equipment, devices, materials and culture media which were used in the process of research, development, production and storage, together with the destruction of equipment
and material used for pure civilian purpose. The destruction also included the furniture, desks, cooling systems, refrigerators, science book and journals under the UNSCOM supervision.

The UNSCOM teams which undertook to follow up the biological file have used highly advanced scientific methods for the detection of any trace of a previous or present biological activity. Moreover, the active and strict monitoring system covered a very wide network of sites and through the surprise and daily inspections the UNSCOM did not find anything that ran contrary to SCRs 687 and 715. While Iraq reiterates this information in response to Blair's lies and fabrications, it asserts such information on the strength of the inspectors reports and the briefings presented to the Security Council as well as on the facts which have become well known to the international public opinion.

Ballistic Missiles:

Iraq had submitted all detailed information about the sites, quantities and types of missiles, launchers, key parts, missiles supporting devices, production and repair sites to UNSCOM. In the light of this information UNSCOM undertook to verify the destruction of missiles and launchers which were in possession of Iraq after 1991. It included 133 missiles and 14 combat launchers. The UNSCOM also verified their full destruction and the full accounting of the material balance through the documentary and material proofs. The UNSCOM admitted this fact in its report
to the Security Council, Document (S/1997/774). In addition, 75 warheads of the missiles were destroyed, 30 of which were destroyed under the UNSCOM supervision and 45 were destroyed unilaterally by Iraq. The UNSCOM was able to verify their destruction and admitted that in its report to the Security Council, Document(S/1998/920).
The missile file was officially closed by UNSCOM in June 1995 (UNSCOM report to Security Council S/1995/para. 30) and was reopened in Aug. 1995 when Iraq submitted its FFCD in accordance with the forms
prepared by the UNSCOM in June 1996. It took three years for the UNSCOM to carry out its additional verification which eventually proved that Iraq's previous declarations were true, accurate and credible (UNSCOM report to Security Council S/1997/774).

A legal and objective reading of the procedures undertook by Iraq in its cooperation with the UNSCOM in implementing its obligations under SCR 687 relating to the question of disarmament in the missile field proves undoubtedly that Iraq has fall of its commitments under para. 8, 9 and 10 of SCR 687.

Iraq's Imports:

The claim that Iraq has imported some materials proscribed by the Security Council Resolutions and the allegation that Iraq has developed its program of proscribed weapons through smuggling with foreign countries and companies, is a claim not supported by any fact. The truth of the matter is that Iraq, when it agreed to SCR 715, it started the application of a mechanism within the context of the resolution which put the country's imports and exports of dual use materials as defined by the Security Council to the monitoring mechanism by the IAEA and UNSCOM .

Both of them were assigned to specify materials covered by this mechanism.

In Feb. 1995 Iraq received the draft of import - export monitoring mechanism plan and implemented it despite remarks made by Iraq about them. Iraq's imports were subject to the UNSCOM monitoring system through checking Iraqi customs measures, visits to all entry points to the country (land, air and sea), as well as checking all documents and correspondence relating to this. The inspection teams made visits by helicopters and vehicles which covered Iraq from the north to the south and from the east to the west. On its part, Iraq gave every possible assistance in the performance of the tasks of those teams and in answering the questions relating to the commercial mechanism. The task of those teams was to collect information about the import to oversee Iraq's implementation of relative Security Council Resolution and no violation was recorded against Iraq in this context whether from IAEA or UNSCOM. So, from where about dose Blair' get such deceiving information which says that Iraq has imported some prohibited materials? How did he included countries in this file when he knows, that Iraq has not imported any material prohibited by the Security Council Resolution.

The UNSCOM, from 1991 until its withdrawal on 15 Dec. 1998 has sent dozens of teams but they were not able to observe a violation in this regard. Similarly, the import monitoring mechanism, which is in operation since June 1996 under SCR 1051 up to its halting on 15 Dec. 1998 did not indicate any single violation of the resolution.

Facts about Iraq's Cooperation

The essential question which must be asked is that why have the work of UNSCOM and IAEA is ignored what Iraq has so far achieved? Iraq, since 1994, and as Rolf Ekeus admitted, has implemented 95% of its due obligations under the proscribed weapons file. Another question that has to be posed is that what the inspection teams had done from 1991 up to 15 Dec. 1998? The total number of the inspection teams was 276 distributed according to the following table:

* 83 Missile inspection teams.
* 62 Chemical inspection teams.
* 74 Biological inspection teams.
* 40 Nuclear inspection teams.
* 5 Import / Export inspection teams.

As for the special missions, 12 teams were assigned to them. The number of inspectors was 3845 and the number of inspections carried out by those teams for the sites, covered and uncovered by the monitoring system, was 3392. Iraq extended full cooperation to the discussion and verification teams whose number amounted to 94 out of the total number of the inspection teams. They interviewed 1378 persons. In addition, Iraq worked and cooperated with the monitoring groups whose number was 192 and whose inspectors were 1232. They carried out 10256 inspection. As regards the aerial reconnaissance, transportation and logistic affairs, 1306 sites, covered and uncovered by the monitoring system, were surveyed while the number of sorties was 908. In addition, US spy planes (U-2) carried out 434 sorties with a total flying hours amounted to 1800 hours.

The above-mentioned facts can never be called in question. They are solid facts contained in the UNSCOM and IAEA reports.

The number of the reports written by the UNSCOM from 1991 to 1998 was 24 and the number of the reports made by IAEA from 1991 to 1995 was eight. After 1995 and up to 1998, the IAEA reports were incorporated with the UNSCOM reports within the framework of the unified semi-annual reports issued by the UNSCOM.

It is important that we refer here to the information contained in a number of the documents of the UNSCOM and of its reports to the Security Council Document (S/1993/26910) issued on December 1993 states:

"The Iraqi Authorities were keen to ensure that the inspection proceeded without incident: Iraq provided all the support requested by the inspection teams, access to all sites and areas to be inspected was guaranteed; no problems were encountered by the team in execution of its operational plan"

Document S/1994/490 issued by the IAEA states:

"A marked improvement has occurred in the working relationship with the Iraqi side. An evident effort is now deployed by the Iraqi authorities to provide promptly the information needed to fulfill the requirements of the different resolutions to remove remaining gabs or uncertainties ".

(Document S/1994/1138) states

"The Commission has received considerable assistance and support from Iraq in its efforts to install sensor and tags."

(Document S/1994/1151 issued by the IAEA states!

"The Iraqi attitude has enabled the inspector's work to be conducted effectively and has contributed significantly to expediting the process of establishing ongoing monitoring and verification, as called for in the Security Council Resolutions."

(Document S/1995/494) the UNSCOM Executive Chairman says:

"Much had been achieved in the implementation of paragraphs 8 - 10 of Security Council Resolution 687(1991) -indeed, the bulk of what was required."

The same document also says that "Iraq at the commission's request, has provided accurate information about the VX project and has fulfilled its promise as required by the commission."

The Document also says:

"The commission is satisfied that Iraqi's cooperation in carrying out the monitoring plan has been of a degree that satisfies the provisions of paragraph 5 of Scrutiny Council Resolution 715."

(Document S/1995/844) of IAEA says:

"The level of practical cooperation by Iraqi counterparts in facilitating and expediting IAEA field work continues to be high."

(Document S/1995/864) states that:

"Iraq has continued to provide the support requested by the Commission in the conduct of inspection and verification."

The Commission Chairman welcomes this approach by Iraq and of providing the necessary documents.

(Document S/1995/1038) says:

"The Iraqi side accepted all the comments and recommendations made by the commission experts concerning the additional information to be included in the final version of the Full, Final and Complete Disclosures."

Claims about alleged activities after 1998

Proceeding from above and in order to put before the British and world public opinion all the facts that refute the file of lies contained in Blair's report, we shall tackle this in detail through our reply supported by facts.

Nuclear Activity

Blair, in paragraph 19 and 21 of his report claimed that Iraq tries to acquire a local capability for uranium enrichment by centrifuge. In fact the centrifuge constituents consist of dozens of parts including pumps, rotaries and maraging steel but they exclude Aluminum.

Blair in his file attempted to misrepresent this paragraph by saying that there is information which indicates that the purpose of this Aluminum is for a nuclear program. The Aluminum pipes exist in Iraq and the IAEA and UNSCOM check them and they are subject to the monitoring under SCR 715.

As for Blair's allegation that Iraq tried to acquire quantities of uranium from South Africa, this is basically a bogus lie... what indicates this is that he attributed it to an intelligence information without even giving a proof that supports his claim. If we add to this South Africa's denial of Blair's claims in this regard, Iraq's credibility has thus been asserted. IAEA stated that all nuclear materials in South Africa are subject to its safeguards and inventory system and it has never found any shortage in their number. In the same way, nuclear materiin Iraq are also subject to the same safeguards conditions and are checked every year and this could invalidate Blair's claim. IAEA's Document (QE/002/009) of 15 Feb. 2002 substantiates our argument.

Blair concluded, according to his own assumptions, that Iraq needs (5) years to produce a nuclear weapon if sanctions remained imposed on it. As a consequence Blair went on his fabricated assumption, stating that if Iraq manages to acquire fissile material and other necessary materials from foreign sources, it can produce a nuclear weapon in a course of one or two years.

Blair assumptions are groundless due to the monitoring imposed on importations according to Security Council Resolution (1051) and the strict monitoring on importations implemented through the MOU, and due to periodical inspection implemented by IAEA annually under the safeguards system.

Chemical Activity

Blair has repeated flimsy and deceptive claims in this area, and for the sake of truth we state the following:

1 - There are no toxic chemical agents, precursors or chemical weapons. All that stated by Blair were destroyed by the Iraqi side under the supervision of the Special Commission. In addition, there is a protocol singed by both parties in this concern (protocol of handing over Al-Muthana site to the Iraqi side in June 1994) and as stated in the Special Commission semi annual report. The seventh report of the Special Commission executive chairman in June 1994 "Doc S/1994/750".

Since 1991, the Special Commissions recovered all that related to the past chemical program. The Special Commission inspection team (UNSCOM-17) had made a full inventory at the toxic chemical agents, precursors, chemical, raw materials, filled and empty munition.

All the above mentioned items and all materials related to chemical weapons were destroyed during the period 1991 - 1994.

2 - There are no capabilities to produce chemical or biological agents since the specialized equipment required for the production of chemical and biological agents are not available. Iraq's capabilities to produce biological & chemical agents were destroyed during the aggression of 1991.

The destruction were extended by the Special Commission inspection teams, to cover all Iraq's stock of toxic agents, filled & empty munition, precursors and production equipment. The Iraqi declarations concerning dual use materials, equipment and various chemical sites, in addition to the activities of the monitoring teams which operated since 1994 till the end of 1998, prove that there are no any prohibited items at these site, which is a certain evidence that there are no capabilities to produce these materials whatsoever.

VX agent production require an advanced technology which is not available in Iraq. All the production equipment possessed by Iraq to develop the VX agent were tested by the Special Commission before destruction in 1997 and it found that those equipment were never used., This confirms that Iraq was not able to use them, and subsequently it did not obtain any large scale or significant production of VX agent.

3 - The Special Commission is fully aware that the chemical agents production was in crude form and there was no chemical agent produced by distillation and purity more than 90%.

This aspect was clarified in chemical weapons "Full and Final and Comprehensive Declaration" submitted to the Special Commission in June 1996. That means these agent will be expired and disposed of after a short course of time.

4 - Al-Muthana establishment was destroyed totally during the thirty state aggression in 1991, then the Special Commission completed this destruction.

The site is now abandoned, and the commission is fully aware of that.

The chlorine and Phenol plant at Falluja /2 site was reconstructed after the aggression to produce the Chlorine which is used for civil purposes (water treatment).

This site was covered by monitoring since 1994. After UNSCOM departure in December 1998 the site was raided and destroyed. The aerial bombing had also destroyed the monitoring system's cameras and sensors. It is worth mentioning that the Phenol is not a dual use material and was not stated in the second annex which is covered by the chemical monitoring plan.

On the other hand, Iraq had included Chlorine in its semi-annual declarations, but lately the Special Commission omitted the Chlorine from the dual use materials in June 2001, (Doc S/2001/860) enabling Iraq of using Chlorine without being subject to export - import monitoring.

5 - Ibn Sina company has no relation whatsoever to the past chemical program and its absolutely not specialized in producing any chemical agent. The reconstruction of Ibn-Sina company was carried out according to the IAEA's approval as an industrial site for the production of researches of primary chemical materials which enter in civilian industries, and there are no sites constructed with forgone assistance.

Ibn-Sina site is well know for IAEA and UNSCOM. It was subject to the on going monitoring since 1994. The site was periodically visited by monitoring groups to be acquainted with its activities since it contains equipment tagged by UNSCOM. The site, also presenting semi-annual declarations according to the monitoring
system.

Blair's claim on this site is nothing but exaggeration and distortion of world community opinion against Iraq.

6 - Al-Qaqa state company was reconstructed after the destruction caused by the 1991 aggression. This company is specialized in the production of chemical materials and conventional explosives unrelated to the chemical program, and it has no plant to produce Phosgene.

The Special Commission had investigated this issue and monitoring groups were inspecting this company on systematic basis.

Moreover, Al-Qaqa company has tagged equipment and submitting semi-annual declarations.

Hence, Blair's claim that this company was dismantled by UNSCOM is only a false claim because it was under monitoring and had never been dismantled.

Blair has referred to the experts and staff working in the chemical industries claiming that Iraq can re-collect them to restore the chemical program. Actually those Iraqis are working in civilian industries - and if we put in consideration that Iraq has no raw material or sites specialized in chemical weapons production, how
it could then be possible for Iraq to utilize the expertise of those people in such field.

Biological Activity

With reference to what Blair has stated concerning the biological area, Iraq is completely clear of all biological weapons and agents since 1991. Iraq do not keep any quantity of those agents. Furthermore, all the biological experts are sure of the fact that the biological agents, being of a limited shelf life, could not be effective or of high toxicity or effect after such a long period. For instance the Botulinum protein converted to non toxic substance after three years
even if it stored in ideal storing conditions.

The anthrax spores converted within two years to ineffective vegetative cells also even if it stored under ideal storing conditions, particularly the biological agents produced by Iraq were in slurry state and Iraqi production method made the final product containing a lot of impurities and of a short shelf life. This fact is clearly know by UNSCOM and its experts.

The Special Commission, in addition, had severely investigated the issue of biological agents and weapons destruction and disposal by taking samples and swaps and through the supporting documents presented by the Iraqi side.

The Special Commission had also destroyed the remaining quantities of culture media imported for the past program purposes, that the destroyed quantities were totaled to (30 Tons). The claim contained in Blair's report that UNSCOM had destroyed only the equipment which directly connected to the biological agents production is untrue, because UNSCOM destroyed in addition to the production equipment, others which were not directly related to the past program that the
destroyed equipment were totaled to 926.

The produced quantities which Blair claims that they are more than what Iraqi side had declared by 2times, because he constructed his account on the Special Commission's assumptions that there are undeclared importations of culture media without having any evidence of practical proof. For example, the yeast extract which UNSCOM claimed that there are some undeclared importations of this material, but, factually that quantity was imported for the drugs production
plant, later on UNSCOM acknowledged that the other quantity was not imported for the past biological program after verifying the issue with full cooperation from the Iraqi side.

The Iraqi side had illustrated the full material balance for the culture media including the imported quantities, and that which were obtained locally and the consumed quantity in addition to the remaining media destroyed by UNSCOM in 1996.

The allegation stated in the report which indicated according to intelligence information, that Iraq has started producing biological agents using mobile production sites is much to any body astonishment. It seems that those who prepare Blair's report seek to mislead the world community opinion, simply because the production process requirement and complicated services are not available.

Claiming that planning for a project for a mobile biological production site started in 1995 (During the presence of the Special Commission).

If it is so, then the Special Commission should have raised this issue at that time and not Blair in 2002.

The allegations that Iraq has reconstructed and renewed the sites which were previously used in producing biological agents is a groundless and false claim. Because the Special Commission supervised in 1996 on the destruction at Al-Hakam site totally and turned it to a desolate land.

The site is currently abandoned as it is, and there is no construction took place in it whatsoever.

The FMD site is also abandoned since 1996, when UNSCOM destroyed some of its equipment and the ventilation system. The site was visited many
times by Arab and Foreign press delegations who witnessed that the site is not renewed or rehabilitated or annexed by any new building.

Al-Falluja site (Break fluid production plant) is designated to produce break fluid and definitely not Raisin as the report claims. Vaccine and sera institute which Blair's reports referred as a store for biological agents and its storing capacity had been increased. This statement is also a lie because the vaccine and sera institute
never used for storing biological agents and it's a site for the production of human vaccines in addition to be a storing site for imported human vaccine through MEMO. The site was visited by press media delegations and saw the vaccine stores, noting that the site is regularly visited by UN representatives to check the vaccines. The site also visited by UNICEF and WHO organizations representatives.

Missile Activity

The missile area is what Blair has beaten the drum for it. Actually Iraq does not possess any missile with a range more than 150 Km, since summer 1991. Because all remaining missiles were destroyed either by UNSCOM or unilaterally by Iraq according to SCR 687 requirements.

The Special Commission itself reached this fact through verifying the total quantity of missile imported from former USSR and those which consumed during the Iraq - Iran war, the aggression of 1991, and R & D activity and tests. Accordingly, UNSCOM reached what so- called material balance of missiles, depending on a long strict and concentrated investigation. Finally UNSCOM admitted to the Security Council in its report (S/1997/774) the fact which indicate that 817
of 819 missiles have been accounted for "The Commission is now in a position to be able to account for practically all, except two, imported combat missiles that were once the core of Iraq's proscribed missiles force". The Commission has also account for all declared operational missile launchers, both imported and indigenously produced."

Actually Iraq also had behaved in high transparency in dealing with the Special Commission concerning missiles permitted under the SCRs 687 & 715 and any claims which state that Iraq is exceeding the permitted limitation according to these resolutions are a misleading aim fallacies. Since the effective & efficient operation of monitoring system in 1994 UNSCOM inspection were verifying the missiles which were under research and development through inspection, the cameras installed at the key sites for 24 hr monitoring, the sites concerned with missile activity including key and supporting sites, monthly
status for the produced parts at those sites (parts of the produced missiles).

Moreover, UNSCOM inspectors were always present at the flight test and static tests for the missiles under development to make sure that none is exceeding the permitted range through recording the coordinates for the firing site and falling site, calculating the range accordingly.

The strict monitoring continued at increasing levels until 16 December 1998 when the UNSCOM left Iraq. The sites involved in missile activity were targeted, among other sites, during the aggression which took place on same day. As regards Blair's claim that Iraq has built a new test station for the development of missiles that could reach areas indicated by site (A), they are used for the purpose of Al Sumood missile within the range allowed by SCR 715 and which followed up by
the Special Commission to meet the requirements of engine static tests. The strong technical evidence that could not be called in question is that the station is not for the purposes of engines larger than Al Sumood engine. It is a station for horizontal testing, that is, it is so designed to embrace the horizontally tested engine. Experts who are well grounded in this field know that this kind of connection can not be used for engines larger than Al Sumood engine with its known size, and unlike the vertical test stations which can be used for the testing of missile engine of larger sizes. As regard the issue of the RPV (remotely piloted vehicle) project raised by Blair, it is clear that he does not depend on his intelligence but on information disclosed by Iraq with transparency to the Special Commission in the
fulfillment of the requirements of SCR 715 related to the ongoing monitoring.

The aim of this essential project is to maintain the scientific and research activity through the reliance on local capabilities for the purpose of aerial reconnaissance. The UNSCOM had carried out intensive and strict inspection for this project through a specialized inspection team. That process was accompanied by checking all document relating to that project_

The team concluded that the purpose of the project was an aerial reconnaissance and had nothing to do with the requirements of SCRs 687 and 715..

As for Al Mamoon plant, this plant, like other sites concerned with missile activities, was covered by the ongoing monitoring. Cameras were installed to transmit pictures for 24 hours for several workshops in plant. The (APC) project was declared to UNSCOM since its design stages and was followed up by the Commission in a strict manner up to its departure on 16 December 1998.

The item relative to the previous activity and which were not destroyed during the aerial bombardment of 1991 aggression were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision and were not dismantled as Blair claims. The sever damage done to the equipment has made it impossible for their reconstruction to carry out the manufacturing purposes for which they are made, specially that the solid missile fuel industry requires higher degrees of accuracy.

In addition, Iraq was keen to apply the so called import /export mechanism by providing the necessary notifications about the importation of dual use items that is those contained in the technical annexes of SCR 715 until the departure of UNSCOM on 16 Dec. 1998.

Now Tony Blair has released his report, which is full of lies, fabrications and fallacies, it has become quite clear why has the British Prime Minister turned down Iraq's invitation to send a delegation of British experts whose number, timing of entry into Iraq and the sites to be inspected, mibe chosen by him, so that the British media and other international opinion get acquainted themselves with the facts as they really are.

Should Blair had accepted Iraq's offer he could have entangled himself in a big political and procedural trap and then those who wrote the report for him could not promote those lies and fabrications. This also applies to the offer presented by Iraq's National Assembly to the US Congress and the US administration which may fall in it.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

IRAQ

Four Questions, Four Answers

By Hans C. von Sponeck

UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (1998-2000)

at the European Colloqium

Brussels, 25 September 2002

Question No.1: Is there an Imminence of Threat posed by Iraq?

The United States maintains that Iraq poses a threat to its security. This threat, it is argued, is so serious that a pre-emptive military strike is required to protect the US and the wider global community. The UK shares this perception.

The rest of the world, particularly Iraq's neighbours, do not agree with this assessment. In any case articles 39, 42 and 51 of the UN Charter are not applicable. None of the 'evidence' the US and the UK have produced is accepted by the international community as hard core and unquestionable evidence that Iraq is in possession of or trying to produce ABC weapons materials.

Attempts to link acts of terrorism involving the 1993 and 2001 WTC, the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-Es-salaam, the USS Cole in Aden, the anthrax cases in the US and collaboration with AL Qaeda to the Government of Iraq have failed.

A study by the UK International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), published on 9 September 2002 constitutes a good compendium of speculation concluding (see p.74) that Iraq "could probably assemble nuclear weapons", "probably resumed biological growth media", "probably retained chemical agents such as mustard gas and precurssors", "probably retained a small force of ballistic missiles with ranges up to 650 km, such as the al Hussein missiles.

In its introduction the IISS study re-assures that its purpose is to describe these (WMD) issues "accurately and fairly". Its conclusions (see p.73) unfortunately constitute a political statement which amounts to war-mongering. The document states inter alia: "A war, if it installs a new government in Baghdad willing to comply with Iraq's international commitments, would eliminate Iraq's WMD threat, but at the risk of limited CBW use (and civilian casualties) during the conflict to overthrow the present regime."

During a July 2002 visit to Iraq, the Government of Iraq gave me permission to visit two sites of my choice, Al Dora at the outskirts of Baghdad and Al Fallujah III which western intelligence agencies and main stream US and UK media had identified as sites for which evidence existed that they had been producing biological agents since the departure of UN arms inspectors in December 1998.

The IISS report points out that at Al Dora "work appears to have started. The facility has about 25% of its capacity" (see p.30). For Al Fallujah III it points out that the "plant for processing castor beans has been destroyed. Its current status is unknown" (see p. 30).

In a document entitled "A Decade of Deception and Defiance" handed out by the US Government on 12 September at the time when US President Bush was delivering his speech at the UN/GA, it is pointed out that Al Dora "has an extensive air handling and filtering system" (see p.8) and for Al Fallujah it states (see p.9) that " (the GOI) is making an effort to hide activities at (the) Fallujah plant."

The British Government released its long announced 'dossier' on 24 September 2002. More a review of past WMD programmes than an empirical analysis of the current situation in Iraq, the dossier is a document of allegations not of evidence of the seriousness of the current WMD reality in Iraq. For Al Fallujah, the dossier maintains that "the castor oil production facility has been rebuild." Al Dora is cited as a "facility of concern".

My visit to these two sites (accompanied by the ARD German/TV) showed conclusively that Al Dora and Al FallujahIII facilities had been destroyed ( it should be noted that the IISS report acknowledges this for Al FallujahIII). What is destroyed can not be a threat.

Conclusions: The evidence offered by the US and UK administrations as well as the IISS assessment of Iraq's WMD status does not support in any way the contention that an imminent threat emanates from Iraq justifying a military offensive. The US government promoted mass hysteria and the psycho war are internationally unacceptable. In the interest of preventing such a war, the Iraqi Foreign Minister's statement to the UN/GA that the country is free of WMD and the agreement by the Iraqi authorities to re-admit unconditionally UN arms inspectors at this stage should be taken at face value and UNMOVIC's installation in Baghdad be pursued without delay.

Question No.2: What explains the present US Government Iraq policy?

There is no simple explanation. The importance of Iraq's sources of energy, the composition of the Bush II administration and changes in the political landscape of the Middle East, however, are three major factors which are part of such an explanation:

· Iraq's sources of energy:

During the 31 July/1 August hearings on Iraq in the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the ranking representative of the Republican Party, Senator Richard Lugar (R-In) stated: "…we are going to run the oil business. We are going to run it well, we are going to make money; and it's going to help pay for the rehabilitation of Iraq because there is money there!"

· The Bush II administration:

Key policy makers in the administration of the present US Government had been involved in the Bush I 1991 Golf War. This may explain why the US Government is taking the Iraq Liberation Act of the US Congress of October 1998 much more literal than the Clinton administration did. The Act calls for 'regime change' in Iraq. The policy of 'containment within' under President Clinton has become a policy of 'occupation from outside' under President Bush.

This policy change combined with a missionary fanaticism to spread their version of 'democracy' and a fatal mix-up of the justified fight against terrorism and a regime change strategy for governments considered as too aggressively anti-American are the main ingredients of the US administration's approach on Iraq.

· The political landscape in the Middle East:

The severe deterioration of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the course of the past twelve months has intensified the cohesion among Arab governments. Testimony of significant policy changes within the Arab League became apparent in the final communiqué of the March 2002 Beirut Summit. It concluded with a rejection of a war against the 'brotherly country Iraq'. Since then all Arab governments including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have repeated their opposition to a military confrontation with Iraq. There is strong public resentment, particularly in Saudi Arabia, to what is perceived as double standards in dealing with the two major conflicts in the Middle East, the Palestinian issue and Iraq. It can also no longer be hidden that the US is on notice that agreements to their military presence in the Middle East are no longer to be taken for granted. This in turn has added an element of extreme urgency in introducing changes in the US Iraq policy.

Conclusions: The Iraq policy of the US administration has little to do with the return of UN arms inspectors or with a concern for the suffering of the Iraqi people. It has all to do with a US determination to introduce a regime change in Baghdad. With this objective, the US enjoys no international support. President Chirac confirmed this when he stated publicly: "It is not a question of Bush/Blair on one side and Chirac/Schroeder on the other side, it is Bush/Blair on one side and all the others on the other side."

Question No. 3: What are the implications for the Iraqi population?

First of all it must be pointed out that the suffering and the trauma resulting from the intensified confrontation between Iraq and the US/UK and the prospects of war have been sidelined by politicians and the media in Europe. The massive evidence of the toll these developments and twelve years of economic sanctions have taken among the Iraqi population is well documented by reputable IGOs and INGOs. The impact of this reality will be felt long after economic sanctions have been lifted and the Iraq conflict has ended.

The humanitarian exemption, the oil for food programme has at all times been underfunded, particularly in the initial three phases when the UN/SC had decided that the oil for export revenue could not exceed $2.6 billion per phase. Despite this small amount, the UN/SC insisted that the UNCC had to receive 30% of the oil revenue,funding which was desperately needed by an undernourished population deprived from even basic medicines to protect their health.

The total value of what has been received in Iraq between 16 December 1996, the beginning of the oil for food programme and 10 May 2002 amounts to $172 per person/year. One indicator of the state of impoverishment of the Iraqi population is that 55% of the population lives below the poverty line. Were the monthly food basket valued at $ 25 not given to the population free of charge under the oil for food programme, some 90% of the population would be forced to live under the poverty line.

Another dramatic indicator of the ill being of the population relates to child mortality. UNICEF in its annual State of the Children's report identifies Iraq as the country which showed an increase of 160% in the mortality rate of children under five for the period 1990 to 1999. This constitutes the highest recorded increase of all the 188 countries surveyed. According to the same organisation, female literacy had slipped to 45% in 1995 while in 1987 Iraq had received from UNESCO international recognition that it had achieved a literacy level of 80%. There are other alarming figures published by WHO showing that the number of youth with mental disorders has more than doubled between 1990 and 1998.

While the US Government accuses Iraq of having violated 16 UN resolutions, no mention is made that the main responsibility for the violation of just about all international treaties and conventions from the UN Charter to the International Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, the Geneva and Hague Conventions and the genocid convention points to the US and British governments ( see in this connection a document of UN/ECOSOC dated 21 June 2000 (GE.00-14092) in which Prof. Marc Bossuyt, presently judge in the Belgian Supreme Court and formerly chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission gives evidence to this effect; see also selected papers on "The Impact on International Law of a Decade of Measures Against Iraq" published by Oxford University Press in February 2002).

It must also be stated that the establishment of the two no-fly-zones is based on no UN mandate and constitutes a serious breach of international law and UN resolutions which make specific mention of Iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty. As the UN designated Official for Security of UN staff in Iraq, I introduced air strike reports which reflected collected and verified information on damage to life and property of civilians as a result of UK/US air incursions and attacks in Iraq. In 1999 my office in Baghdad recorded 132 air strikes with 144 civilian death and over 300 wounded and civilian property destroyed. These airstrike reports were, when possible, handed to US and UK officials in New York during various briefing visits. I was told by representatives of these two governments that I was violating my mandate in producing such documents and that in any case all I was doing was to put a UN stamp on Iraqi propaganda. It is a serious matter that the UN Security Council having a mandated oversight responsibilty has not been able to stop this serious violation, particularly since US and UK pilots have operated in Iraqi airspace after Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 under 'enlarged rules of engagement'. These allow them to use their firing power with fewer restrictions and consequently with more damage to civilian life and property.

Should a US war against Iraq take place, particularly the hightech war currently contemplated in Washington, there would be significant civilian casualties and destruction. To prevent this must be a major challenge for European democracies.

Conclusions: The political battle continues to be played on the backs of the Iraqi people. Objectionable treatment of people within Iraq can not provide the justification for a crippling punishment extended by the UN Security Council to the Iraqi people in the form of economic sanctions, blocking of humanitarian supplies, regular air attacks and, possibly military confrontation. Governments who are in possession of the many accounts from reputable international organisations on the state of the human condition can no longer remain silent regarding the fact that today the main perpetrators responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people are the governments of the US and the UK. This does not mean that one should negate the concern over the internal human rights situation. The UN Human Rights Rapporteur must be allowed to continue his dialogue with the Iraqi authorities in this respect.

Question No.4: What could be the demands of the international public conscience against a war on Iraq and for the lifting of economic sanctions?

· The European Colloqium (EC) should convey to the European Parliament (EP) that the February 2001 hearings on Iraq have failed to contribute to a credible EU Iraq policy. In the absence of an objective position on Iraq, the EU had been largely excluded as a contributor to the international Iraq debate. The EC should point out that this could be redressed.

· Neither the report of the UK International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) dated 9 September 2002 nor the the document handed out by the US Government dated 12 September provides any evidence whatsoever of the imminence of an international threat posed by the Iraqi Government that would justify evoking articles 39, 42 or 51 of the UN Charter.A unilateral military strike by the US against Iraq would in any case be a grave violation of international law. The EP should be reminded of this serious fact.

· The EC should advise the EP that in case of such a unilateral attack on Iraq by the US, permission by EU member countries for US forces to use airfields, harbours and other facilities might be consistent with NATO statutes but would constitute a breach of international law. The EP should be requested to convey this to member governments.

· · The Brussel's meeting of the EC should be concluded by expressing full support for the UN/Security Council-led arms inspection process. The EC should emphasize in this context that the Iraq Government should not be hindered in any way to demonstrate its preparedness to unconditionally cooperate with UNMOVIC. The EC should furthermore convey to the UN Secretary General that it considers the protection of the integrity of the team of UN inspectors as a paramount responsibility of the chairman of UNMOVIC. Misuse of UNMOVIC for intelligence operations, as had been the case with UNSCOM, harbours the grave danger of a confrontation between Iraq and the US. It would undoubtedly be used by US authorities as an immediate pretext to respond with a military attack. The EC should convey to the EP that it has a profound responsibility to pass on these concerns to member governments and to the UN.

· Comprehensive economic sanctions against the people of Iraq are entering their 13^th year. The human condition identified already in 1991 after the Gulf War as 'apocalyptic' have significantly worsened since then in both mental and physical terms. The amount of evidence collected by reputable international organisations about child mortality, malnutrition, re-emerging diseases, impoverishment, educational neglect and psychological disorders continues to accumulate ( please see in particular recent reports by UNICEF, CARITAS, Save the Children/UK).

What the international community has seen since May 2002 when UN/SC resolution 1409 introduced so-called 'smart sanctions' represents, as predicted by individual members of the current UN Security Council, anything but an improvement. In addition, over $5 billion worth of humanitarian supplies remain on hold - blocked by US/UK authorities. The oil pricing confrontation created by the US/UK governments to end the 'illegal' surcharge issue has resulted in a major shortfall of funding for the present phase XII of the oil for food programme and seriously endangers the already fragile humanitarian exemption programme.

The EC should make a strong case in its Brussels' communiqué for the lifting of economic sanctions once the UN arms inspectors programme is underway with the full cooperation of the Government of Iraq. The EC should request the EP to strongly support such an approach in the interest of ending the suffering of a people who have done nothing wrong.

· National anti-sanction groups in Europe and elsewhere are unrelenting in their efforts to bring about justice and conditions of human dignity for the Iraqi people. The public conscience is alert and at national levels has helped in shaping political decision making. In these critical days of international relations, efforts to make it possible that at times national initiatives can function in an integrated manner would seem of importance. The ideal would be to create a European response mechanism that can be used to periodically react to morally, ethically and legally unacceptable policies and positions on Iraq maintained by individual members of the United Nations. Such a mechanism would be particularly significant at this moment to protest against economic sanctions and to solicit support against a military attack on Iraq. Protesting would create awareness that such an attack would lead to another human catastrophe and endanger the international solidarity in the fight against terrorism. It would be of immense value in this respect if the EC could agree on an 'action alert focal point'. Such a focal point would function as a basis for the strategic issuance of joint statements and the preparation of integrated actions and lobby work.

· As a step in this direction, national associations, whether represented at the Brussels' meeting or not should be encouraged to forward the final communiqué and a copy of the open letter to the EP to all the respective foreign affairs committees of the national parliaments of the EU, national media and other influential bodies on the ground. The EC should foreward these two documents to the President of the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary General, the Secretary General of the Arab League, the Holy See and the International Court of Justice.

· An important first step towards improved cooperation among different national groups working towards the lifting of economic sanctions and averting an unjustified war against Iraq would be the preparation of a masterlist of cooperating entities and their coordinates.

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The Choice on Iraq:The UN's Disarmament Agenda or the US's Overthrow Agenda

Forthcoming in 'Eclipse: The Anti-War Review', published by the University of Sussex- www.eclipsereview.org- October 2002

Eric Herring

Dr. Eric Herring is Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Bristol. His research visit to Iraq in April 2002 with the International Peace Mission, on which this article draws, was funded by the Nuffield Foundation Grant Number SGS/00665/G.
Some of his other writings on Iraq and other subjects can be viewed at http://www.ericherring.com/

The current crisis is often represented as being caused by Iraq's refusal to comply with UN resolutions to give up its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes. Therefore, the argument goes, Iraq will only comply if major military threats are made, and anyway as Saddam Hussein has never complied so far, we have to be prepared to go to war to get rid of him. This crisis and indeed the failure to complete the disarmament of Iraq and thus bring about the lifting of the sanctions which have devastated
Iraqi society are actually a product of the US agenda of seeking the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Despite the assertions about Iraqi non-compliance, in December 1998 the UN weapons inspectors reported that
- Iraq's nuclear weapon programme had been eliminated 'efficiently and effectively'
- the elimination of Iraq's chemical weapon and missile capabilities was almost complete
- disarmament work remained in the biological weapon area
- Iraq had still to provide further information in all areas
- Iraq had agreed in principle to long-term monitoring but not to a specific system.

On the other elements of UN Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq has recognised Kuwait, has returned some but not all Kuwaiti property, has returned some but not all missing ersons, is paying compensation though it has denied liability in principle, has not sponsored international terrorism for 10 years according to the CIA but has denied ever sponsoring it and is not yet allowed to export oil for the purpose of servicing its external debt.

In other words, far from simply not complying, Iraq had complied with most of what had been asked of it (however grudgingly). It is a fantasy that, as is so often said, Iraq will never comply as long as Saddam is in charge.
Furthermore, the UN resolutions allow for partial relaxation of sanctions in reward for partial compliance but this was never offered.

It is a myth, frequently and conveniently repeated by those in favour of war, that Iraq 'expelled' or 'threw out' the weapons inspectors. Nor is it true that Iraqi non-cooperation forced the inspectors to leave. What happened was that just before the weapon inspectors were due to report very extensive if incomplete Iraqi compliance in 1998 (as indicated above), US President Bill Clinton,
lauded at the recent Labour Party conference for his great wisdom on Iraq decided to bomb Iraq with Blair's backing, and told the chief weapons inspector Richard Butler he should get the weapon inspectors out so as not to be present during the bombing. Butler made a personal decision not authorised by the Security Council to order them out. The US and Britain then launched their Operation Desert Fox bombing of Iraq without Security Council approval. Iraq refused from that point until September 2002 to allow inspectors related to resolution 687 back into the country.

If US policy really has been driven by a perceived need to disarm Iraq then it has been irrational. Its response to incomplete but extensive compliance has been to label it non-compliance, force the withdrawal of those doing the disarming, bomb Iraq and call for the overthrow of Iraq's leader. This hardly creates any incentive to comply any further. There has always been a significant thread of US and British opinion who have feared that Iraq will comply because sanctions might then be lifted.

Disarmament of Iraq has not been the top priority for the United States: instead, its priority, stated all along has been to keep the pressure on for as long as it takes to get rid of Saddam Hussein (as Mil Rai puts it, leadership change, not regime change, which they are actually very frightened of, as indicated by their response to the 1991 uprising: they want rid of him, not the brutal system that
runs Iraq). How serious the US has been about this objective has varied, but all along disarmament has been subordinated to the overthrow policy. If Iraq had complied fully despite the bombing, maybe the US would have been forced to accept the lifting of the sanctions. That is indeed my guess. But it is also possible that the US would have been able to ensure that Iraq was never declared to be fully in compliance. And it doesn't change the point that US policy makes no sense if it is meant to be aimed at prioritising getting rid of Iraq's prohibited weapon programmes. The official US policy objective of overthrowing Saddam represents non-compliance with the very UN resolutions with which Iraq is meant to comply. The leadership change agenda has fundamentally undermined the disarmament agenda.

Saddam Hussein is not crazy. He is rational, though he miscalculates. While certainty is impossible, his priorities and goals can be deduced from his actions. After he was forced out of Kuwait, his aim was to receive a clean bill of health from the UN weapons inspectors and get the sanctions lifted while still secretly maintaining most of his prohibited weapon programmes. Eventually it became clear that this was not going to work, and he accepted that he would have to give up all or virtually all of those
programmes in order to get the sanctions lifted. The UN and various governments sought to reassure him that the US would be forced to go along with the lifting of the sanctions. However, with the US using the weapons inspectors to spy on Iraq (another fact almost totally absent from current news coverage) and the US proclaiming that the sanctions would never be lifted until Saddam
Hussein was out of power, Iraqi incentives to disarm were being undermined. When the US forced the withdrawal of the inspectors and bombed Iraq, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of indefinite sanctions and a US policy officially committed to his overthrow. It is hardly surprising that he may have made efforts to revive prohibited weapons programmes.

Only nuclear weapons are really weapons of mass destruction (meaning only one of which is necessary for vast and rapid destruction). With 19 years up to 1991, $18,000 million, lots of international assistance and little monitoring, Iraq failed to build a nuclear weapon. With little time, money or assistance, and lots of people watching, it is utterly implausible that Iraq has managed to make much headway after restarting virtually from scratch since December 1998. Making biological and chemical weapon agents
is easy: turning those agents into a weapon is vastly more difficult. Finding a way of then delivering those weapons in a way which can inflict large numbers of casualties or doing so with any kind of reliability is very much harder still. Many such weapons have to be used in just the right conditions and require that no serious counter-measures betaken. Iraq lacks a capability to attack the US and
Britain directly with such weapons, and has at most a highly limited and unreliable capability to use them even against forces invading Iraq. Saddam Hussein knows that using such weapons would prompt such a massive US and British response that it would be suicidal and pointless in anything other than the last gasp of trying to avoid total defeat during an invasion. Iraq is now a shattered society
with a disintegrating infrastructure; a demoralised, impoverished population after the bombing (continuing on a weekly basis by US and British aircraft) and sanctions of the last 12 years. With a total debt of something in the region of $200 billion (including compensation awarded against it by the UN for the invasion of Kuwait), Iraq has a staggering debt to exports ratio that makes it the most indebted state in the world, alongside Rwanda and Sudan. To be piled on top of this is whatever portion is awarded of
the $217 billion of further compensation claims against Iraq. The threat from Iraq is not imminent or grave. And if, despite all this, you still think the threat from Iraq is imminent or grave, all the more reason not to undermine the UN disarmament agenda.

Maybe, just maybe, a war would result in a quick Iraqi military collapse, the advent of democratic government in Iraq, the lifting of the sanctions and an economic revival necessary for the relief of at least some of the extreme and crushing poverty in Iraq. But the recent US-led wars in both Afghanistan and Kosovo show that prosperity and freedom did not follow even with quick military victory,
and there is no reason to think that this case will be any different.

Whatever the outcome for ordinary Iraqis, the US wants its war, with rationales coming and going daily. The excuse that war would be necessary if Iraq did not readmit the weapons inspectors has now been dumped. The new excuse being worked on by the US is a new UN Security Council resolution designed to be impossible for Iraq to accept, including the stationing of US forces throughout Iraq in a replay of the US manoeuvre at Rambouillet designed to ensure that the US could bomb Yugoslavia.

The US can be stopped, mainly because the US elite and the Western elite more broadly is deeply divided by a war crisis brought about by the recent dominance of the Rumsfeld-Perle-Wolfowitz faction since the September 11 attacks on the United States. What is not helping is that the dominant and false framing in news coverage is that this is very much a crisis of Iraqi non-compliance with UN disarmament requirements. The reality is that the crisis is one of continuing US non-compliance gand unwillingness to respond to Iraqi compliance with most of what has been asked of it. To put it bluntly, we are heading for war on the basis of lies (some of the people making the argument for war now know what the truth is) and self-deception (some of them believe their own propaganda). What is needed are efforts to force the United States to drop its overthrow agenda and accept the UN disarmament agenda. In
addition, the elements of the UN sanctions which are causing a continuing humanitarian disaster in Iraq must on principle be lifted immediately. And for the longer term, three things are needed. First, the weapon programmes of Israel and others must be addressed as it is unrealistic to expect Iraq to accept them indefinitely without response. Second, Iraq's debt and compensation burdens must be reduced to take into account the share of the responsibility of Western and Arab governments and institutions for being willing to lend money to fund Saddam Hussein's crimes and follies. And third we must work to ensure that our own governments are no longer able to build up such dictators only to knock them down when they step out of line.
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Dr. Eric Herring
Department of Politics
University of Bristol
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